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ABSTRACT
Risk is generally understood as a product of the likelihood and consequence of an event.
However, the way in which estimations of consequences are formed is unclear due to the
complexities of human perception. In particular, the influence of Affect, defined as positive
or negative qualities subjectively assigned to stimuli, may skew risk consequence
judgements. Thus a clearer understanding of the role of Affect in risk consequence
estimations has significant implications for risk management, risk communication and policy
formulation.

In the Psychometric tradition of risk perception, Affect has become almost synonymous with
the concept of Dread, despite Dread being measured in a way which excludes emotional
elements. One of the most consistent findings of the Psychometric Paradigm is that the level
of Dread associated with a hazard is the best predictor of perceived risk. However, there is
debate over whether Dread risk is associated with Affect, or whether the factor is dominated
by severe consequences. The purpose of this study was to ascertain the association of Affect
with Dread risk characteristics and risk consequence judgements. The study investigated
whether the predictive power of Dread should be attributed to negative Affect, or to cognitive
estimations of the magnitude and severity of consequences.

The study employed a three Phase between-subjects design, with respondents from 28
countries (N=1838) completing emotionally and neutrally worded research instruments based
on the Psychometric Dread risk model. Results were assessed via descriptive data analysis, ttests, Factor Analysis and Multidimensional Scaling. The study found that the association of
Affect on estimations of risk consequence was largely confined to the Dread risk
characteristics of personal control and voluntary choice. These were secondary to the much
larger influence of the consequence severity characteristics, estimations of which were
unmoved by negative Affect. The study concluded that the Dread risk factor is primarily an
unemotional measure of the severity of risk consequences, and the role of emotion in Dread
risk is a separate factor related to control and choice.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Psychometric risk research provides insights into the way in which risks are perceived,
which has implications for understanding risk behaviour in response to risk issues. The
Psychometric Dread risk factor is widely regarded as the most important factor to emerge
from the Psychometric Paradigm of risk perception (Taylor-Gooby & Zinn, 2006a);
however the broadening of the meaning of Affect to include the concept of Attitude has
resulted in the findings of Affect Heuristic research being linked to the Psychometric
concept of Dread risk (Sjöberg, 2006b). Thus the literature suggests that there may have
been some ―questionable assumptions and overly strong generalizations‖ (Sjöberg,
2003a, p. 109) made regarding the Dread risk factor. This study sought to clarify some of
these assumptions and generalisations by exploring the concept of Dread risk in terms of
Affect and risk consequence.

1.1 Background of the Study
This section highlights the major findings in the literature in relation to risk and the
Psychometric paradigm. The major themes are defined and the development of research
in the area is outlined. The context of this Thesis has its foundations in the concept of
risk. Risk may be defined as the effect of uncertainty on objectives (Standards Australia,
2009), and the way that risk is perceived and assessed is influenced by many factors:
however, perceptions do not always match reality. Conceptual meaning is dependent on
perceptual processes (Eysenck & Keane, 2005) and objective risk is necessarily
dependent on ―subjective and assumption-laden‖ (Slovic, 1999, p. 690) risk perceptions.

The development of research in the area has its foundations in early probability theory
(later developed into Decision Theory), which asserts that humans are rational optimisers,
making choices of the highest expected utility through estimations of value and
probability (Gardner, 2008). It was recognised however, that the view of humans as
rational optimisers could not account for many aspects of human behaviour. In 1957,
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Herbert Simon developed the theory of Bounded Rationality, which attempted to capture
the limitations of human cognitive capacity (Simon, 1956). Bounded Rationality Theory
posits that decision alternatives are sought until ―an alternative is found that reaches or
surpasses the aspiration levels on the goal variables‖ (Selten, 2002, p. 14).

In the 1970s, Kahneman and Tversky (1974) sought to define the boundaries theorised in
Bounded Rationality, finding that ―people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles
which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to
simpler judgmental operations‖ (p. 1124). Research suggests that judgemental operations
in relation to risk are formed by employing both Affective and cognitive information
processing, rather than by using either of these information processing models alone
(Booth-Butterfield, Cooke, Pearson, Lang, & et al., 1994). This view supports modern
cognitive psychological theories which, according to Slovic et al. (2011), show that the
―rational and the experiential systems operate in parallel and each seems to depend on the
other for guidance‖ (p. 1).

Given this theoretical setting, Psychometric risk research thus aimed to provide insights
into the role of the rational and experiential systems in the perception of risk. Researchers
of the Psychometric paradigm developed a methodology for producing ―quantitative
representations or cognitive maps of risk attitudes and perceptions‖ (Slovic, 1987). These
cognitive maps employ two factors, Dread and Knowledge, to form a spatial
representation of risk perceptions (Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1982) (figure 1.1).
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Figure 1.1.

The Psychometric factors of Knowledge and Dread (Slovic, 1987, p. 282).

According to Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor (2007), risk research was focused
for many years on cognitive processes, rather than Affective impacts on decision making.
One of the early proponents of the significance of the role of emotion in decision making
was Zajonc (1980), who asserted that ―affective judgments may be fairly independent of,
and precede in time, the sorts of perceptual and cognitive operations commonly assumed
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to be the basis of these affective judgments‖ (p. 151). Research into the pre-cognitive
impact of emotion on risk judgements resulted in the proposal of an Affect Heuristic
(Slovic et al., 2007). In this context, the term Affect refers to ―the specific quality of
‗goodness‘ or ‗badness‘ experienced as a feeling state (with or without consciousness)
and demarcating a positive or negative quality of a stimulus‖ (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, &
MacGregor, 2007, p. 2).
Emotional Affect is essentially a ―subjectively experienced feeling or emotion [together
with] the observable behaviour that represents it‖ (Fielder & Bless, 2001). In the early
1990s, risk researchers began to increasingly shift their focus away from cognitive
heuristics, and began to inquire after the heuristic basis of emotion. The view that
emerged from research into the Affect Heuristic was that ―emotional reactions to risky
situations often diverge from cognitive assessments of those risks. When such divergence
occurs, emotional reactions often drive behaviour‖ (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, &
Welch, 2001, p. 276). As a result, it is now widely conceived among risk researchers that
risk perception ―is mainly governed by emotional processes‖ (Sjöberg, 2006b, p. 101).

1.2 Statement of the Problem
The gap in the knowledge found in the body of literature is summarised by Sjöberg
(2006b), who states:
It can be concluded that the received message from 25 years of risk perception
research, viz. that emotional factors dominate the picture, is due to the
misleading name given to an assortment of very different items, only one of
which explicitly denotes emotional reactions. The importance of ‗Dread‘ is
due to the importance of severe consequences, which proves nothing about the
role of emotions. When tested empirically, emotions by themselves play a
minor role (p. 106).
Much of the success in the field of risk perception research may be attributed to the
Psychometric Paradigm, and to Dread risk in particular. Since its inception, research has
refined the concept of Dread risk to an emotional factor, principly in light of research
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stressing the importance of the Affect Heuristic to perceived risk (Finucane, Alhakami,
Slovic, & Johnson, 2000; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002; Slovic et al.,
2007; Slovic, Peters, Finucane, & MacGregor, 2005). This bridging of Dread and Affect
has led to the view that fear is the major determinant in risk judgments and that ―people
will make their [risk] decision based on the dread of a particular event, rather than based
on the actual harm that may be inflicted‖ (Smith & Brooks, 2013, p. 55). However, this
widely held view has been called into question.
Sjöberg (2006a) asserts that ―a close look at the definition of Dread shows that it is
measured wholly, or mostly, with non-emotional components which can be best
summarised as measuring the perceived severity of consequences‖ (p. 7). Such a view is
supported by Schusterschitz, Schütz, and Wiedemann (2010), who found that ―the
explanatory power of the Dread factor is strongly influenced by the Severity of
Consequences‖ (p. 394).

Sjöberg (2003) has previously highlighted the need for an investigation of the Affective
relationship to Dread risk items, stating that these ―dimensions may have a relationship to
emotional processes but they are not emotional per se and their emotional significance
remains to be documented‖ (p. 109). Thus the need for research to address this gap in the
knowledge was identified in order to assess whether the prevailing interpretation of
Dread risk as a measure of risk-as-feelings is a valid view, and to understand the
relationship between Dread risk and severe consequences. This was accomplished in the
study by exploring the concept of Dread risk in terms of Affect and risk consequence.

1.3 Significance of the Study
The general theoretical literature on risk and specifically in the context of Psychometric
risk perception leaves several vital questions relating to Dread risk and Affect
unanswered. The literature reveals that there is some debate over the nature of Dread risk
and its relationship to Affect. Determining how Affect is associated with Dread risk
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characteristics and whether the factor is dominated by severe consequences would
contribute to a more accurate conception of Dread. Addressing this research problem has
theoretical and policy implications for a range of risk governance areas.
One of these areas is risk management, as ―many aspects of risk management are highly
subjective and are greatly influenced by the perceptions of information providers,
analysts, and users of the products‖ (Standards Australia, 2006, p. 20). Despite evidence
for the need to include Psychometric dimensions in risk assessments, it is unclear how
these factors should be incorporated into ―decision frameworks‖ (Gregory &
Mendelsohn, 1993, p. 259; Merkhofer, 1987). The implications of addressing the Dread
risk issue directly impacts risk management by clarifying the association of Affect with
Dread risk characteristics, especially those related to risk consequence.

The study outcomes are also significant to risk communication, as it has long been
recognised that ―risk communication would benefit from a shift in attention from
message construction to audience analysis‖ (Marris, Langford, & O'Riordan, 1998, p.
646). The role of Affect is particularly significant to this domain, as Sjöberg (2007)
asserts that risk communication based on the ―notion of the primacy of a primitive initial
emotional reaction‖ (p. 223) will likely fail. Addressing this research problem also has
implications relevant to policy formulation, as an awareness of the impact of different
risk judgements is ―of intense practical significance‖ (Viscusi, 1997, p. 1658) to policy
development.

7

1.4 Research Questions
The study was set out to explore the concept of Dread risk in terms of Affect and risk
consequence. The study responded to two questions arising from the identified gap in the
general theoretical literature on risk Psychometric risk perception:
1. How is Affect associated with the Dread factor‟s risk characteristics?
The study sought to investigate whether perceptions of the Dread risk characteristics
would be significantly different if perceptions were influenced by Affect. It was reasoned
that if Dread risk characteristics were associated with Affect, it would support the view of
Dread risk as a measure of ―the level of fear… of an event occurring [which] elevates
perceptions of the risk beyond reasonable norms‖ (Standards Australia, 2006, p. 20). If
Affect were not found to be associated with Dread risk, the results would support the
view of Sjöberg (2006b), who asserts that the factor consists of items largely unrelated to
Affect.
2. How is Affect associated with risk consequence?
The study also sought to investigate whether Affect was associated with risk consequence
estimations and Dread risk characteristics related to risk consequence, and whether these
items were dominant in the factor. The findings would offer some insight into the nature
of the Dread risk factor and provide empirical evidence to either support or contest the
conception of Dread as Affect.
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1.5 Review of the Methodology
The focus of this Thesis was to understand the impact of Affect on Dread risk
characteristics, particularly perceptions of risk consequence characteristics. A
methodology was sought that could provide an avenue to make such an assessment. This
summary of the methodology contains a brief outline of the participants, the materials,
and the procedure. Participants were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk, an online
service which crowd-sources tasks that ―require human intelligence to complete‖
(Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010, p. 411). The study consisted of three Phases, the
first two of which employed a total sample size of N=200. The third study Phase
employed a total sample size of N=1638. The study attracted respondents from 28
countries and participants ranged in age from 18 to 71.

The materials used in the study included the Affective Norms for English Words list
(ANEW), produced by the University of Florida, which provides a ―set of normative
emotional ratings for a large number of words in the English language‖ (Bradley & Lang,
2010, p. 2). This list was used to determine specific wording for a Psychometric Dread
risk research instrument, resulting in two versions, one with words reflecting negative
Affect, and the other with emotionally neutral wording.

These Psychometric Dread risk surveys consisted of ten Dread risk factor items in the
context of six different hazards (Slovic, 1987). The Psychometric Knowledge factor was
outside the scope of this research, and was thus not assessed. The hazards chosen for the
study have been demonstrated in previous work to represent a spread of risk perceptions
from low to high Dread (Slovic, 1987). In addition to these instruments, a set of questions
relating to the risk consequences of the six hazards were devised and worded into
Affective and neutral versions. A seven point Likert scale was used to measure all
responses.
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The study applied a positivist research approach together with a quantitative
methodology. The research instruments for the three study Phases were developed into
online versions. The Amazon Mechanical Turk service (Amazon.com, 2014) was used to
recruit participants, who were then redirected to the online surveys. Phases One and Two
of the study were executed simultaneously, and involved two independent cohorts in a
between-subjects design.

The first cohort (n=100) completed the neutral Psychometric Dread risk survey and the
neutral Risk Consequence Task, while the second cohort (n=100) completed the affective
versions of the same research instruments. Phase Three of the study combined and
replicated the procedures of Phases One and Two. The data of the three Phases were
analysed via descriptive data analysis, Independent Samples t-tests, Multidimensional
Scaling analysis, Factor Analysis and Cronbach‘s Alpha. These statistical measures were
used to assess any significant differences or associations between neutral and Affective
perceptions of the six hazards in the context of risk consequence and the Dread risk factor
characteristics.

1.6 Thesis Proceedings
The Thesis is comprised of nine chapters inclusive of this introduction. The proceeding
chapters are summarised here:
Chapter 2: Literature Review
The intention of this chapter is to provide context in order to illustrate gaps in the current
understanding of Psychometric Risk. The review of the literature provides a contextual
foundation for the study and highlights the elements that were fundamental in the shaping
of the aim and objectives. It also offers a framework and justification for the Research
Questions and the development of the study methodology.
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Chapter 3: Theory Supporting the Study
This chapter highlights the significant findings in Psychometric risk perception research
as well as outlining the criticisms of the approach. The Theory Supporting the Study
chapter provides a deeper understanding of the Psychometric Paradigm and Dread risk
and the association with Affect.
Chapter 4: Methodology
The chapter details the methods and procedures used in the collection of data in the three
study Phases. The reasoning behind the study design is discussed, as is the theoretical
basis for the research instrument design. The procedure is detailed and the approaches to
data analysis, reliability and validity are outlined. The chapter concludes with a summary
of the methodological limitations.
Chapter 5: Phase One
This chapter details the implementation of the first study Phase, including the design,
procedure and data analysis. This Phase involved participants completing either a neutralworded or an Affective-worded Psychometric risk survey in a between-subjects design.
The analyses of data using various statistical measures are presented, together with a
summary of the results. The limitations identified in this initial Phase are also outlined,
together with improvements for the second and third Phases of the study.
Chapter 6: Phase Two
This chapter details the design, procedure and data analysis of Phase Two of the study.
This Phase involved participants‘ completing either a neutral-worded or an Affectiveworded Risk Consequence Task in a between-subjects design. A summary of the results
is presented and the chapter concludes with a review of the Phase Two design,
implementation, and outcomes.
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Chapter 7: Phase Three
This chapter reports the results of Phase Three of the Study. The third Phase combined
the first two study Phases, and replicated the procedures with some methodological
improvements. The Phase Three results are presented and the chapter concludes with a
summary of the Phase Three outcomes.
Chapter 8: Interpretations and Limitations
This chapter offers an interpretation of the results and a response to the Research
Questions. The interpretations of the study findings are discussed in conjunction with the
relevant literature, and exceptions and alternate explanations are outlined. An overview
of the implications and significance of the research outcomes is provided, and the
limitations of the study are detailed. The chapter concludes with a summary of the
interpretations and Responses to the Research Questions.
Chapter 9: Conclusions and Recommendations
This final chapter provides a synthesis of the empirical findings of the study and shows
how these converge in response to the Research Questions. The theoretical and policy
implications of the research outcomes are also discussed, demonstrating how the findings
of the study may influence further understanding and application of knowledge in the risk
domain. The chapter concludes with recommendations for future investigations and
closing remarks on the significance and contribution of the research.

1.7 Conclusion
This introductory chapter presented the background to the study, highlighting the major
findings in the literature in relation to risk and the Psychometric paradigm. The identified
gap in the knowledge framed the research problem, and the significance of addressing the
knowledge gap was outlined. The study‘s methodology was discussed and a summary of
the Thesis proceedings was presented. The following chapter offers a review of the
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relevant literature in order to provide a contextual foundation for the study, and to
highlight the theoretical elements that were fundamental in shaping the study objectives
and methodology.
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
2.1 Introduction
The previous chapter provided an overview of the gap in the literature leading to the
research problem, and framed the Research Questions that the study would address. The
intention of this chapter is to provide context to the identified gaps in the current
understanding of Psychometric Dread risk. The review of the literature provides a
contextual foundation for the study and highlights the elements that were fundamental in
shaping the approach taken. It also offers a framework and justification for the Research
Questions and development of the methodology of the study.

This review of the literature includes a discussion on the definition and nature of risk, and
the fundamental aspects of reality and subjectivity that underpin the concept. The various
perspectives of the major theories of risk perception are discussed, and the justifications
and criticisms of each are analysed. The review then examines the literature concerned
with the more fundamental aspects of perception, grounded in cognitive psychology and
follows these concepts through to the evolution of theories of decision making. Issues
relating to emotion and cognition are introduced, and the various heuristics and biases
that have been proposed to explain irrational behaviour are discussed.

The impact of emotion and framing effects on risk judgements are then examined, finally
leading the literature review to a discussion of the influence of each of the discussed
elements on perceived risk, assessments of probability and consequence. Throughout the
review of the literature, references are made to how each of the discussed concepts relates
to Psychometric Dread, leading to questions of the accuracy of its conception and
efficacy as a predictor of perceived risk.
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2.2 Objective and Subjective Risk
Risk is a concept that governs all aspects of human life. The review of the literature
reveals a search for rationality among misperceptions, and makes clear that much of what
was once thought of as rational decision processes may be relics of an earlier age in
human history. These evolutionary by-products in the form of hard-wired rules-of-thumb
often perform poorly in a modern context.

The literature review indicates that the distillation of risk to the fundamental concepts of
probability and consequence is flawed in the context of human decision making and
obscured by the complexities of human perception. In an effort to understand the
predictably irrational nature of human decision making, risk perception research has
shown that the controllability and manageability of future events are largely illusory. The
body of literature on perceived risk abounds with examples of fear and irrationality in an
increasingly unpredictable world, and the search for an understanding of subjective
human perception within the objective reality of risk.

Risk may be defined as the effect of uncertainty on objectives (Standards Australia,
2009), and the way that risk is perceived and assessed is influenced by many factors.
However, perceptions do not always match reality. Although perception may be defined
in direct terms as ―the acquisition and processing of sensory information‖ (Eysenck &
Keane, 2005, p. 31), some theories of cognitive psychology assert that perception is an
active process that involves the construction of categories that are influenced by culture,
values, beliefs, attitudes, expectations, knowledge, language, and education (Falikowski,
2002). This value-laden construction of categories results in different perceptions of risk
and highlights the subjectivity of risk perception, especially in regards to intuitive
interpretations of risk.
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The subjectivity of intuitive risk has led some to argue that risk assessment is more of an
art than a science (Broder, 2000, p. 1). If the perception of risk is fundamentally
subjective, then any attempt at critically assessing risk will be influenced by the value
laden assumptions and resulting intuitive reactions that the risk elicits. Ferrier and Haque
(2003) illustrate this point, stating that ―in some cases, human perception is greater than
objective reality... in other cases, the perceived experience of a hazard is lesser than the
reality‖ (p. 277). The difficulty in determining how the subjectivity of risk perception
influences the assessment of risk is an issue that has been recognised within the literature
of risk research. A matter of debate for many years has been whether the concept of risk
is an objective reality, a social construct, or a subjective individual perception (Lupton,
1999, p. 22).

If conceptual meaning is dependent on perceptual processes (Eysenck & Keane, 2005, p.
309), then objective risk, including its tools and methods, are necessarily dependent on
―subjective and assumption-laden‖ (Slovic, 1999, p. 690) risk perceptions. Despite the
subjectivity of perceived risk, this does not detract from the objective reality of risk. The
subjectivity of perceived risk does not infer that there is no danger in reality, but rather
that hazards are, in part, socially defined and distinguished by boundaries created by
social agents (Clarke & Short, 1993, p. 379; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982).

Explanations of the perception of risk through the anthropological lens has given rise to
several social theories of risk, such as Cultural Risk (Douglas, 1992), and the Social
Amplification of Risk which attempt to explain variations in risk perception as a product
of a society‘s collective beliefs, attitudes, and judgements about risk (Kasperson et al.,
1988). Other researchers have attempted to explain risk subjectivity through the
psychological view, an avenue which has given rise to the Psychometric paradigm of
perceived risk (Fischhoff, Slovic, Litchtenstein, Read, & Combs, 1978; Starr, 1969).
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2.3 Perspectives of Risk
In the 1960s, researchers began investigating social risk attitudes such as those expressed
towards voluntary and involuntary risks in order to understand the apparent disparity in
the estimation of risks between experts and lay people (Starr, 1969). From this initial
research, a psychological approach was developed based on concepts of heuristics and
biases in the information processing and decision making of individuals (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974). This approach in turn led to the development of the Psychometric
paradigm of risk perception.

Researchers of the Psychometric paradigm have developed a methodology for producing
―quantitative representations or cognitive maps of risk attitudes and perceptions‖ (Slovic,
1987). These cognitive maps employ two factors, Dread and Knowledge, to form a
spatial representation of risk perceptions (Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1982).
However, critics of the Psychometric paradigm have claimed that the Dread factor has
been inadequately quantified, that the model fails to explain much of the disparity
between lay and expert risk assessment, and that Psychometric risk can be identified as a
contributing factor to risk communication failures (Sjöberg, 2006a). Critics have also
argued that the Psychometric paradigm has a committed realist perspective that
essentially makes each man an island in terms of their risk perceptions, to the exclusion
of their cultural and social context (Cutter, 1993; Lupton, 1999; Wilkinson, 2001).
In contrast to the Psychometric paradigm‘s focus on individual risk perception, the
Cultural Theory of risk defines social groups, rather than individuals, as the basis of risk
perception and judgements and ―argues that risks are defined, perceived, and managed
according to principles that inhere in particular forms of social organisation‖ (Rayner,
1992, p. 84). Wilkinson (2001) eloquently summarises the central thesis of the theory of
Cultural Risk, describing it as a ―structural-functionalist interpretation of risk perception,
which proposes that what we conceive as the ‗reality‘ of risk is determined by our prior
commitments towards different types of social solidarity‖ (p. 1).
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The Cultural Theory of risk features four worldviews which are defined by their position
within ‗grid‘ and ‗group‘ topologies (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). The theory defines
worldviews as either high or low group, indicating degrees of binding to social groups,
and either high or low grid, indicating degrees of socially defined circumscription
(Thompson, Ellis, & Wildavsky, 1990). From the grid/group topologies emerge four
worldviews that are labelled Hierarchical, Individualist, Egalitarian, and Fatalist (Figure
2.1).

Figure 2.1

Cultural Risk‘s grid – group model (Oltedal, Moen, Klempe, & Rundmo,
2004, p. 19).

The Cultural Theory of risk claims that different risks will cohere with one of these
worldviews, and adherents of particular worldviews will bias their perceptions of risk
accordingly (Douglas, 1992). Criticisms of the Cultural Theory of risk include the failure
of the model to explain the potential for individuals to move between, or express more
than one of the four worldviews (Lupton, 1999; Marris, Langford, & O'Riordan, 1998),
as well as the lack of internal validity found by many researchers in the use of separate
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scales to measure worldviews (Kahan, 2008). The Cultural Theory of risk however, is not
the only model of risk perception to be developed with a view of incorporating the
myriad of elements which have been shown to impact on risk judgements.

The Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF) was developed in an attempt to
fuse the Psychometric Theory of risk, the Cultural Theory of risk, and theories of risk
communication into an integrated framework in order to overcome many of the
shortcomings of each of these theories. Kasperson, Kasperson, Pidgeon, and Slovic
(2003), state that the framework was developed to ―describe the various dynamic social
processes underlying risk perception‖ (p. 13). According to Kasperson, et al. (1988), the
framework incorporates Psychometric and Cultural factors to describe how these
elements influence the way risks are socially perceived en masse, by either amplifying or
attenuating the communication of risk (p. 177). Kasperson and Kasperson (2005) assert
that various ripples, or higher order impacts result from risk events, and serve to amplify
the adverse impact of the initial risk, creating a self-correcting system of societal risk
perception.

The amplification of perceived risk through individual, social, and cultural mechanisms
serves to more completely define the consequences of that risk, providing a collective
representation of the nature of the hazard. The SARF approach has been criticised,
especially from the constructionist perspective which, by effectively determining there to
be ―no risk in reality‖ (Ewald, 1991, p. 199), considers the very idea of a ‗risk event‘ to
be a flawed foundation. Furthermore, it is the impressionability or ―malleability of risk
perception‖ (Clarke & Short, 1993, p. 379) that must be fundamentally addressed. If
interpretation of an initial risk event is a product of perceived risk, then any amplification
or attenuation thereafter may actually have little bearing on the reality of the risk. The
need for a theory of risk that incorporates the anthropological view while reproducing the
explanatory success of the Psychometric approach has continued to be a central theme for
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risk perception researchers, and has led to the development of alternative theories, such
as Cultural Cognition.

Cultural Cognition is a conception of the Cultural Theory of risk, and a methodology
designed to empirically test the theory by using a similar approach to the Psychometric
paradigm. Cultural cognition is founded on two key premises, the first being that cultural
predispositions are better predictors of risk perceptions than gender, race, political, or
economic demographics (Kahan & Braman, 2005; Kahan, Slovic, Braman, & Gastil,
2006). The second premise is that there is a connection between an individual‘s cultural
outlook and their perception of risk based on identifiable psychological processes or
mechanisms, essentially addressing the question posed by Clarke and Short (1993) and
Kahan (2008) of why ―individuals are disposed to form risk perceptions‖ (p. 10).
The Cultural Cognition approach combines the Cultural Theory of risk‘s grid/group
topology with the Psychometric paradigm‘s two-axis spatial representation approach,
rather than the four scale approach typical of other conceptions of Cultural Theory. This
approach results in the two continuums of hierarchy-egalitarianism (high-low grid) and
individualism-communitarianism (low-high group). Cultural Cognition‘s two-scale
approach has been found to be reliable (Griffiths & Brooks, 2012; Kahan, 2008), and
solves the issues of multiple expressions of worldviews associated with other Cultural
Risk methodologies (Dake, 1991; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982).

The Cultural Cognition approach has also received criticism, however. One of the
shortcomings identified in the Cultural Cognition model, and to Cultural risk theories in
general, has come from one of the founders of the cultural approach. Douglas (2003)
explains that although Cultural approaches to risk offer ―a way of stratifying the public
according to their deepest allegiances‖ (p. 1350), it is these same deep allegiances in the
researchers that may bias the design of the research. Sjöberg (1996) asserts that the
Cultural approach to risk accounts for very little variation in risk perception, and that
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many of the results of statistical significance have little actual importance of any
substance.

Each of the abovementioned approaches to the assessment of perceived risk have
received fair criticism for their shortcomings, and none of them account fully for the
major findings of risk perception research (Sjöberg, 2006a). To assert that the concept of
risk ―is strongly influenced by our perceptions‖ (Hopkins, 2005, p. 114) offers little in the
way of understanding those perceptions or the major drivers behind risk perception. It
does, however, highlight the subjective nature of risk, an aspect which may be better
understood with reference to one of the key themes of modern psychology; the
subjectivity of perception (Weiten, 2005). Understanding how the perception of risk
influences risk assessment may be better addressed by focusing on attempts to understand
the major influences on risk perception. Research into cognition and decision making
offers some insight into the mechanisms underlying how perceptions are formed and
according to Slovic, Fischoff and Litchenstein (1985), ―risk perception research has been
and continues to be grounded in basic cognitive psychology‖ (p. 84).

2.4 Risk and Decision Making
The constructivist view of Cognitive Psychology asserts that a rapid process of forming
and testing hypotheses regarding percepts (or mental concepts) occurs in the process of
perception (Nickerson, 1998). While sensation provides a process for converting stimuli
into neural impulses, perception provides a method whereby sensory stimuli is processed,
compared and interpreted to give meaning (Simon, 1990). Burton, Westen and Kowalski
(2006), define perception as the ―process by which the brain selects, organizes and
interprets sensations‖ (p. 121). Essentially, the process combines sensation and
perception to aid the interpretation and understanding of the environment.
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Any discussion of the impact of perception on judgement must necessarily involve a
discussion of decision making. The method by which perceptions are interpreted and
ascribed meaning is instrumental to the decision making process, and therefore essential
to providing a clearer view of the nuances of risk assessment. Many theories have been
developed to understand the relationship between perception and decision making. Early
probability theory (later developed into Decision Theory), asserts that humans are
rational optimisers, making choices of the highest expected utility through estimations of
value and probability (Gardner, 2008). This view asserts that humans make decisions
based on rational calculation. According to Savage (1954):

To say that a decision is to be made is to say that one of two or more acts is to be
chosen, or decided on. In deciding on an act, account must be taken of the possible
states of the world, and also of the consequences implicit in each act for each
possible state of the world. A consequence is anything that may happen to the
person. (p. 5)

However, this classic version of Decision Theory was found to have limited descriptive
validity by economists, sociologists and psychologists, failing in many cases to explain
and predict behaviour. In 1956, Herbert Simon developed the theory of Bounded
Rationality, which attempted to capture the limitations of human cognitive capacity
(Simon, 1956). According to Richardson (1999), Bounded Rationality Theory asserts
that:

We make choices between alternatives in light of our goals, relying on incomplete
information and limited resources. As a consequence, PROBLEM SOLVING
cannot be exhaustive: we cannot explore all the possibilities which confront us, and
search must be constrained in ways that facilitate search efficiency even at the
expense of search effectiveness (p. 44).
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In Bounded Rationality Theory, decision alternatives are sought after until ―an alternative
is found that reaches or surpasses the aspiration levels on the goal variables‖ (Selten,
2002, p. 14). In the 1970s, Kahneman and Tversky (1974) sought to define the
boundaries theorised in Bounded Rationality, finding that ―people rely on a limited
number of heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities
and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations‖ (p. 1124).

Both Classic Decision Theory and Bounded Rationality Theory are based on the concept
of utility maximisation, and in the early 1980s, the Satisficing Heuristic came to
dominate the literature of utility maximisation (Cole & Withey, 1981). Bounded
Rationality is seen by some theorists as nothing more than the use of ―satisficing
strategies when capacities are overwhelmed‖ (Klaczynski, 2001, p. 858). The Satisficing
Heuristic encourages an individual to choose the first option that meets or exceeds
expectations when delay is not in their best interest. However, Selten (2002) argues that
the satisficing strategy does not adequately sum up Bounded Rationality Theory, as
aspiration levels are ―dynamically adjusted to the situation‖ (p. 14) depending on the ease
with which a satisfactory alternative can be found.

In response to the shortcomings of classic Decision Theory, the Ernst Strüngmann Forum
initiated a project in 2011 to develop a new Decision Theory that includes the two factors
of evolution and cognitive mechanisms which are disregarded in classic Decision Theory
(Ernst Strüngmann Forum, 2011). The consideration of evolutionary and cognitive
mechanisms in decision making takes into account that fact that humans are not rational
optimisers, but rather rely heavily on biases, emotions, expectation, misconceptions and
conformity in order to make decisions, including risk judgements. Essentially, human
decision making is a process of two minds.
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2.5 Apollo and Dionysus
Friedrich Nietzsche conceptualised the rational and emotional sides of human nature as
the mythical figures Apollo and Dionysus, where the Apollonian drive gives rise to
rationality and knowledge, and the Dionysian gives rise to the emotional and irrational
(Tarzwell, 2009). In a metaphysical sense, Apollo may be thought of as the systematic or
analytic system of human perception, and Dionysus as the experiential or heuristic
system. Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor (2011) assert that current cognitive
psychological theories also point to two fundamental systems by which risk is perceived
and understood.
The first is the slower more laborious Apollonian mental process called the ‗analytic
system‘, which is in contrast to the faster, automated and more intuitive Dionysian mental
process known as the ‗experiential system‘ that represents risk as a feeling (Sharot et al.,
2011). These two fundamental processes have parallels to the Heuristic-Systematic
information processing model (HSM), which presents risk judgment as a product of both
unconscious heuristic and conscious systematic processing (Trumbo, 1999). As the
persistence of rationality-based Decision Theories attest, the idea that good decisions are
made through rational, conscious thought has been a fundamental tenet of behavioural
inquiry for many years. According to Dijksterhuis et al. (2006), ―conscious deliberation is
the ideal (if not always attainable) way to approach a decision forms the backbone of
classic as well as contemporary perspectives on decision making and attitude formation‖
(p. 1005).

However, research into the role of subconscious deliberation has found that complex
decisions may be best left to subconscious heuristic based thought. In a series of four
studies, Dijksterhuis et al. (2006) found that ―purchases of complex products were
viewed more favourably when decisions had been made in the absence of attentive
deliberation‖ (p. 1005), whereas simple decisions were best aided by conscious thought.
It might be argued that there is a fundamental difference between the efficacy of
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subconscious deliberation on the purchase of complex products and the efficacy of the
same type of decision making in judging risk. Judgements of risk tend to carry more
severe consequences for poor decisions.
The finding of Dijksterhuis et al. (2006) agree with Simon‘s (1990) assertion that
heuristic based decisions are ―examples of rational adaptation to complex task
environments that take appropriate account of computational limitations—of bounded
rationality‖ (p. 11). This research would indicate that when faced with a complex
decision, the human mind is best adapted to employ subconscious heuristic-based
deliberation to arrive at a satisfactory solution. Simon (1990, p. 11) emphasises that the
heuristic system holds a great deal of explanatory power for understanding the human
capacity to make effective complex decisions, notwithstanding the computational
limitations imposed by Bounded Rationality.

2.6 Putting Your Heads Together
Despite the appeal of the concept of the human mind unconsciously distilling and
simplifying complex choices in order to make effective decisions, an increasingly held
view is that Systematic and Heuristic mental processes are not mutually exclusive.
Research suggests that risk judgments are formed by employing both Heuristic and
Systematic information processing together, rather than by using either of these
information processing models alone (Booth-Butterfield, Cooke, Pearson, Lang, & et al.,
1994). This view supports modern cognitive psychological theories which, according to
Slovic et al. (2011), assert that the ―rational and the experiential systems operate in
parallel and each seems to depend on the other for guidance‖ (p. 1).

The Heuristic-Systematic information processing model (HSM) presents risk judgment as
a product of both Heuristic and Systematic processing and provides a useful method for
evaluating risk judgment (Trumbo, 1999). Systematic processing occurs when an
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individual attempts to assess risk by analysing and comparing risk information.
According to Trumbo (1999), while Heuristic processing requires less effort and utilises
simple decision rules to arrive at a risk judgment, Systematic processing requires
individuals to exert ―considerable effort in a search for information and a scrutiny of
arguments, maintaining higher standards for the quality of information used in decision
making‖ (p. 392).

It appears, however, that an effortful scrutinising of information via the Systematic
processing system may be hampered by Optimism and Confirmation biases. These biases
use the Heuristic processing system to seek information that confirms, and to screen
information that disconfirms, existing beliefs. Sharot et al. (2011) conducted a study
where participants were presented with a series of descriptions of adverse life events and
were asked to estimate the likelihood of an event occurring to them. They were then
presented with the average probability of that event occurring to them. Not only did
participants consistently underestimate the likelihood of the risk, they also ―updated their
beliefs more in response to information that was better than expected than to information
that was worse‖ (Sharot et al., 2011, p. 1475).

Such bias towards the underestimation of risks indicates an evolutionary preference for
optimism in the face of reality. However, the tendency for individuals to continue to
underestimate risks in the face of evidence to the contrary is equivalent to what
Nickerson (1998) refers to as selective case building in which individuals unconsciously
gather selective information and give undue consideration to ―evidence that supports
one's position while neglecting to gather, or [discount], evidence that would tell against
it‖ (p. 175). The fundamental nature of this tendency to seek confirmatory evidence while
discounting facts to the contrary was also illustrated in a study by Westen, Blagov,
Harenski, Kilts, and Hamann (2006). The researchers found that different parts of the
brain are active when an individual processes information that runs contrary to strongly
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held beliefs, compared with the processing of neutral or positive information (Westen et
al., 2006).

This bias is referred to in the literature as the Confirmation Bias. According to Evans
(1989), the Confirmation Bias is the ―most widely accepted notion of inferential error to
come out of the literature on human reasoning‖ (p. 41). This type of error also extends to
numerical estimations. In a seminal study by Wason (1960), participants were presented
with three successive even numbers and were asked to determine the rule that would
predict the next three numbers in the sequence by asking if a particular number would fit
the rule. The correct rule was any three numbers in ascending order, however, most
participants determined the rule to be numbers increasing by two. Participants tended
only to ask if a particular number confirmed the rule they suspected, by rarely asked
whether a number which disconfirmed their rule would fit the pattern. When heuristics
and biases are considered within the context of risk perception, it raises the question of
how much of the assessment of risk is reliant on subjective and intuitive subconscious
reactions.

2.7 Mental Shortcuts to Risk Judgement
The literature suggests that intuitive risk appears to be fundamentally based in heuristic
processing and the application of rules formed via previously successful choices.
Heuristic processing is employed most often when ―probabilities or utilities are unknown
[and] multiple goals and ill-defined problems prevent logic or probability theory from
finding the optimal solution‖ (Gigerenzer, 2008, p. 20). The purpose of risk assessment is
to provide analysis and judgement of the unknown and the poorly defined, and as such, is
a particularly well placed activity for reliance on heuristics and their associated biases.
Because heuristic assessment occurs ―prior to any conscious thought... it shapes and
colours the thoughts that follow‖ (Gardner, 2008, pp. 222-223), a situation which makes
the study of the impact of heuristics on risk perception particularly challenging.
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Various researchers have established several intuitive judgement drivers as accepted
heuristic processes. According to Gilovich and Griffin (2002), the early research pointed
to three ―general-purpose heuristics – availability, representativeness, and anchoring and
adjustment – that underlie many intuitive judgements under uncertainty‖ (p. 5). These
early heuristics were developed within the bounded rationality model, and focused on
cognitive heuristic strategies (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Initially, these heuristic
processes were seen as evidence of the intuitive system being a ‗cognitive miser‘.
However, more recent evidence suggests that the heuristic processing system ―is always
in operation – not just when motivation is low and judgements are made on the cheap‖
(Gilovich & Griffin, 2002, p. 12). Despite the evidence of cognitive heuristics and their
potential impact on risk perception, some researchers felt that research into emotional, or
Affective, reactions to risk may reveal more about how perceptions of risk are formed.

According to Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor (2007), descriptive decision
research in general was focused for many years on cognitive processes, rather than
Affective impacts on decision making. One of the early proponents of the significance of
the role of emotion in decision making, was Zajonc (1980), who asserted that ―Affective
judgments may be fairly independent of, and precede in time, the sorts of perceptual and
cognitive operations commonly assumed to be the basis of these Affective judgments‖ (p.
151). Research into the pre-cognitive impact of emotion on risk judgements resulted in
the proposal of an Affect Heuristic (Slovic et al., 2007). In this context, the term Affect
refers to ―the specific quality of ‗goodness‘ or ‗badness‘ experienced as a feeling state
(with or without consciousness) and demarcating a positive or negative quality of a
stimulus‖ (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2007, p. 2).

The pre-cognitive view shed new light on the research of Fischhoff, et al. (1978), who
found a strong correlation between the way risks are perceived and the level of negative
Affect they elicit. In the early 1990s, risk researchers began to increasingly shift their
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focus away from cognitive heuristics, and began to inquire after the heuristic basis of
emotion. The view that emerged from research into the Affect Heuristic was that
―emotional reactions to risky situations often diverge from cognitive assessments of those
risks. When such divergence occurs, emotional reactions often drive behaviour‖
(Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001, p. 276). As a result, it is now widely
conceived among risk researchers that risk perception ―is mainly governed by emotional
processes‖ (Sjöberg, 2006b, p. 101).

2.8 The Affect Heuristic
The association of Affect with decision making has been well established in the literature.
According to Slovic et al. (2007), ―many theorists have given Affect a direct and primary
role in motivating behaviour‖ (p.4). This essential role of Affect in rational decision
making was made apparent by Damasio, Tranel, and Damasio (1990), who found that
patients suffering ventromedial frontal cortical damage to their brains were unable to
associate emotions with decision consequences, rendering them socially dysfunctional
and unable to make rational decisions. This finding suggested that ―feeling [is] an integral
component of the machinery of reason‖ (Damasio et al., 1990, p. XII). Damasio (1994)
concluded that ―emotions and feelings [are] connected, by learning, to predicted future
outcomes of certain scenarios‖ (p. 174). The judgement of consequences had previously
been illustrated as a major source of uncertainty in the risk assessment process, and the
impact of Affect was now centre stage.

Judgements of consequence values are not constant; they not only vary between
individuals, but also over time and place (Rowe, 1988). Estimating an accurate
consequence value ideally requires some historical data from which to infer the potential
magnitude of similar future events. It also provides a measure of the acceptability of the
risk to society, as well as a feel for the level of regulation required to accurately interpret
the needs and values of the risk agents being represented (Cole & Withey, 1981).
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However, risks with a very low probability of occurring and a very large consequence
value are particularly difficult to assess for two reasons. Firstly, the risk estimator is
unable to infer the consequence value from historical data if the event has not, or has very
rarely, occurred. Second, the highly subjective nature of consequence valuing means that
any assessment of such low probability risks becomes laden with Affective assumptions.
Cox (2009) asserts that these difficulties can result in risk assessments that are ―worse
than useless‖ (p. vii).

An example of the Affective influence on risk judgements can be illustrated by the
number of Americans who, post 9/11, dreaded flying due to the low-probability / highconsequence terrorist attack. As a result of the Affective influence on perceptions of
terrorism risk, these people now tended to choose driving over flying. Gigerenzer (2006),
examined road fatalities in the 12 months following the September 11 terrorist attacks
and found that, when compared with the previous five years of data, the number of fatal
traffic accidents in the United States increased for the 12 month period after the attacks.
The increase in the number of people killed on the roads in this period was six times
greater than the number of airline passengers killed in the attacks, providing support to
the hypothesis that the negative Affect created by the attacks caused a ―mediated
secondary death toll‖ (Gigerenzer, 2006, p. 350) by skewing risk perceptions and
therefore risk judgement.

Another factor that impacts estimations of consequence values is the propensity for
individuals to assign a higher consequence value to consequences that are experienced
personally (Rowe, 1988). Paradoxically, the larger the population that is exposed to a
risk, the lower the consequence value that will be assigned, due in part to the increasingly
impersonal nature of such large numbers of people, and the inability of the Affect
Heuristic to ‗feel‘ the magnitude of large numbers (Slovic et al., 2007). This degree of
personal separation from exposure to the consequences is not only influenced by Affect,
but also to the perceived degree of control over the risk. Note that it is not the real or
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actual amount of control, but the perception of control that makes this a ―major factor in
determining risk consequence value‖ (Rowe, 1988, p. 135).
Slovic, Peters, Finucane, and MacGregor (2005) demonstrated that ―when consequences
carry sharp and strong Affective meaning, as is the case with a lottery jackpot or a cancer,
variation in probability often carries too little weight‖ (p. 38). The impact of Affect on
consequence estimations is significant to risk perception research, in that it may alter
estimations of risk probability, which indicates that risk judgements under uncertainty are
sensitive to the possibility of outcomes, rather than the probability (Loewenstein et al.,
2001). Equally significant to the formal risk assessment is a finding by Slovic et al.
(2005), who state that if a high consequence / low probability risk is ―reduced but not
eliminated, the fear... may remain and continue to drive high-risk perceptions despite the
actual reduction of risk‖ (p. 38).
Unfortunately, confidence in one‘s own objectivity in formally assessing risks is of
limited value. In one study, Murphy and Zajonc (1993) showed an image of either a
smiling face, a frowning face or meaningless polygon to respondents a fraction of a
second before images of Chinese ideographs. Respondents generally rated the positively
primed ideographs as more preferable. However, none of the respondents reported feeling
any emotion, and the impression persisted, even after the positive and negative images
were switched. Taylor-Gooby and Zinn (2006a) assert that this type of Affective priming
provides a frame of reference through Affective experience, and that any assessment is
necessarily subject to context and framing.

2.9 Affect and Framing Consequences
Framing refers to the way a problem is presented and the impact this has on judgement.
Taylor-Gooby and Zinn (2006a) assert that ―although the concept of rationality assumes
that the same problem should always lead to the same result, even though the contexts
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differ, the formulation (framing) of a problem influences the judgement‖ (p. 28). By
definition, rational choice ―should satisfy some elementary requirements of consistency
and coherence‖ (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, p. 453); however, framing effects highlight
the fact that divergences from the ideal of rationality not only influence preferences in
decision making, but also perception.

In a seminal study on the influence of framing on decisions and the psychology of choice,
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) performed a series of surveys on university students in a
classroom setting, and presented them with problems with identical outcomes, framed
either in terms of gain or in terms of loss. The study found a ―pronounced shift from risk
aversion to risk taking‖ (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, p. 453) depending on how the
problem was framed. The preferences expressed in the presence of framing effects ―may
plausibly be explained by positing that human cognitive processes are in some aspects illsuited to dealing with complex social situations because they developed at an earlier
evolutionary stage‖ (Taylor-Gooby & Zinn, 2006b, p. 399). The overlap of Affect and
cognition has also been proposed as an explanation of such anomalies of rationality.

The influence of Affect on judgement and decision making may be thought of as
―nonrational associationistic thinking‖ (Epstein, 1994, p. 718) and may lead to
probability neglect and behaviour that is irrational. In a study demonstrating nonrational
associationistic thinking, respondents were presented with a vignette describing a rich
benefactor who promises $100 to each of three protagonists if they can each toss a coin
that comes up heads. In the scenario, only one protagonist does not flip heads, and the
respondents were asked to rate the emotions of the three protagonists. Most respondents
said that they thought the two successful protagonists would feel negatively towards the
unsuccessful one, that such behaviour was irrational, and that knowledge of probability
had no impact

(Epstein, 1994). Affective reactions to risk may not only prompt

probability neglect, but also heighten avoidance of risk consequences, depending on the
evaluability of the risk.

32

Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001) demonstrated the link between Affect, risk consequence,
and probability, finding that participants in their experiments were hypothetically willing
to pay $18 to avoid a 99% probability of losing $20, but only $1 to avoid a 1% chance of
losing $20. When the monetary loss was replaced with the probability of receiving an
electric shock, participants were willing to pay $10 to avoid a 99% probability, but would
pay $7 to avoid a 1% chance of electric shock. The visceral Affective reaction to the
thought of an electric shock prompted probability neglect and a focus on avoiding the risk
consequence, compared with the reaction to the money scenario. The evaluability of risk
judgement has been shown to be closely associated with Affective reactions, and these
reactions may trump the consideration of more justifiable factors.
Hsee‘s (1996a) notion of ‗evaluability‘ was based on the observation that ―when making
judgments, one may encounter not only justifiable factors… but also unjustifiable
factors‖ (p. 122). Hsee (1996a) defined justifiable factors as characteristics which the risk
evaluator thinks should be taken into account, and unjustifiable factors as those
characteristics which the risk evaluator wants to take into account. These findings were
further developed into the evaluability hypothesis, which posited that ―when two options
involving a trade-off between a hard-to-evaluate attribute and an easy-to-evaluate
attribute are evaluated, preference between these options may change depending on
whether these options are presented jointly or separately‖ (Hsee, 1996b, p. 265).
Hsee (1996a) observed that ―as long as there is a conflict between the ‗should‘ and the
‗want‘, elasticity in the situation will shift one‘s final decision toward the ‗want‘ side‖ (p.
128). This drive to take the unjustifiable into account in judgement is associated with the
precision of Affective impressions. In a between-groups study, Slovic et al. (2007) found
that support for an airport safety measure was higher when saving a percentage of 150
lives was proposed, than when a total of 150 lives was proposed, indicating that ―saving
150 lives is diffusely good, hence only weakly evaluable, whereas saving 98% of
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something is clearly very good because it is so close to the upper bound on the percentage
scale, and hence is readily evaluable and highly weighted in the support of judgment‖ (p.
19). Slovic et al. (2007) found that ―more precise Affective impressions reflect more
precise meanings (i.e. greater evaluability) and carry more weight in impression
formation, judgment, and decision making‖ (p. 20).
However, when risk consequences ―carry sharp and strong Affective meaning‖ (Slovic et
al., 2007, p. 19), feelings of dread and negative Affect have an all-or-none characteristic,
in that they ―may be sensitive to the possibility rather than the probability of negative
consequences‖ (Loewenstein et al., 2001, p. 276). Tversky and Kahneman (1981),
demonstrated the impact of Affectively ‗framing‘ risks, finding that ―framing influences
the experience of consequences‖ (p. 458). The Affective framing of risk consequences
not only influences the perception of those consequences, but it also alters the value of
risk probabilities in the mind of the perceiver. Sunstein (2004) suggested that the Affect
Heuristic has a major impact on the ability to correctly interpret probabilities, suggesting
that when risk consequences conjure vivid mental impressions, they tend to produce
visceral reactions where ―the question of probability is neglected‖ (p. xi).

Sensitivity to perceiving risk as all-or-none is not only Affectively driven, but is also
linked to the way that risk is expressed in language. When the meanings of risk were
examined by Hamilton, Adolphs, and Nerlich (2007), they found that risk is semantically
expressed as a ―degree of risk ranging from instances in which the risk is perceived to be
non-existent… to instances where it is perceived to be low… to those where it is
perceived to be high‖ (p. 174). The linguistic assessment of risks as either absent, low or
high underscores how precognitive Affective impressions of risk shape perceptions based
on good/bad or like/dislike (Zajonc, 1980), which are in turn mapped to estimations of
probability and severity of consequences.
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The view that Affective reactions are inextricably linked to linguistic meanings of risk
provides the Psychometric paradigm of risk with a vehicle for assessing risk perceptions.
Although Starr‘s (1969) seminal work on the perception of risk focussed on revealed
preferences, the Psychometric paradigm attempts to explain risk perception through
expressed preferences via standardised questionnaires (Fischhoff et al., 1978; Slovic et
al., 1985). Slovic et al. (2007) asserts that language has a significant impact on the Affect
Heuristic, stating that ―attempts at Affective manipulation often work directly on
language‖ (p. 32). How risks are expressed and framed in language has an impact on the
Affective meaning of the risk, influencing estimations of the probability and
consequences.

When risk consequences have strong Affective meaning, perceptions of probability carry
too little weight; however, when outcomes do not have strong Affective meaning,
perceptions of probability are highly evaluable (Slovic et al., 2007; Zajonc, 1980). The
pre-cognitive Affective impact results in a neglect of probability, and subsequent risk
judgement is based on the Affective reaction to the risk consequence (Zajonc, 1980).
However, the magnitude of a risk consequence may be weakly evaluable and convey
little meaning, as ―amounts of anything, no matter how common or familiar or
intrinsically important, may in some circumstances not be evaluable‖ (Slovic et al., 2007,
p. 20).
This is especially so for risks which carry a catastrophic potential that is ―seen as so
horrible or catastrophic that even the smallest probability acquires an unbearable
emotional weight‖ (Zinn & Taylor-Gooby, 2006a, p. 66), such as the belief that
vaccination causes autism, or that nuclear energy should be disregarded entirely due to
the vast impact that a serious nuclear accident may cause. Consideration of the disconnect
between emotion and rationality has been a somewhat thorny and neglected issue in risk
perception research (Loewenstein et al., 2001; Zinn & Taylor-Gooby, 2006a). The

35
overwhelming impact of Affective reactions on rational judgement often impedes
rationality, despite conscious awareness of the problem (Rolls, 2000).

2.10 The Impact of Affect on Risk Judgements
In terms of behavioural theories, Affect has only relatively recently been viewed as a
significant factor in judgement and decision making. In this context, Affect is viewed
both as a feeling state, and as a ―quality… associated with a stimulus‖ (Finucane,
Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000, p. 2). Finucane, et al. (2000) argue that the neglect
of Affect in risk perception research was due largely to the rationalistic and cognitive
roots of decision research, from which many theories of risk perception have grown.
From the work of Friedman and Savage (1948), who suggested that ―reactions of
individuals to risk can be rationalised by a rather simple extension of orthodox utility
analysis‖ (p. 279), to the reorientation of the field by Simon (1956), who suggested an
approach ―more closely related to psychological theories of perception and cognition‖ (p.
10), decision research was firmly anchored to the notion of the rational actor for many
years.
Tversky and Kahneman‘s (1974) work offered some departure from this view, by
demonstrating the frequent biases present in judgement, and the heuristic thinking
mechanisms which underlie many aspects of decision making under uncertainty.
Although casting doubt on the efficacy of the bounded rationality approach, the heuristic
mechanisms they described, such as availability, representativeness, and anchoring and
adjustment, were nevertheless cognitive heuristics. Zajonc (1980) was one of the first
researchers to assert that Affective reactions may precede and influence cognitive
assessments, although the significance of Affect in decision making and judgement was
slow to be recognised. For example, Shafir, Simonson, and Tversky (1993) conceded that
Affect may sometimes impact on judgement, stating that ―people's choices may
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occasionally stem from Affective judgments that preclude a thorough evaluation of the
options‖ (p. 32).

By 1994, however, Damasio (1994) had developed the somatic marker hypothesis, in
which it was asserted that the imagery of thought is labelled by the mind with markers of
either positive or negative Affect, leading to decisions based on liking or disliking which
are rationalised post-hoc. Sjöberg (2007) asserts that the term Affect, although commonly
used to denote emotion, may also mean evaluation. According to Alabarracín, Johnson,
and Zanna (2005), the term attitude may also be used to denote evaluation, in the sense of
judgement of the goodness or badness of an object or concept. However, this raises the
question of how much of what is commonly referred to as Affect is based on emotion,
and how much is based on attitude or evaluation.

This definitional quagmire results in a simpler connotation of Affect that fits well with
Damasio‘s (1994) hypothesis, as well as later research into the Affective impact on risk
judgement. Later research found that Affect could be reduced to feelings of like or dislike
for a particular activity, and was linked to the perceived benefit of the risk (Alhakami &
Slovic, 2006). Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor (2002) assert that if individuals
―like an activity, they are moved to judge the risks as low and the benefits as high; if they
dislike it, they tend to judge the opposite-high risk and low benefit‖ (p. 14). The somatic
marker hypothesis of Damasio (1994) and the role of Affect in motivating behaviour
espoused by Epstein (1994) led to the proposition of an Affect Heuristic by Finucane et
al. (2000). The Affect Heuristic, it was asserted, marked images with ―positive and
negative Affective feelings, [which] guide judgement and decision making‖ (Finucane et
al., 2000, p. 3).

Essentially, the proposed Affect Heuristic denoted a process whereby Affect is
consciously or unconsciously associated with objects and events, providing cues for
judgement, in much the same way as the cognitive heuristics described by Tversky and
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Kahneman (1974). Another stream of research which led to the proposition of the Affect
Heuristic, was the early findings that perceptions of risk were strongly associated with the
feelings of dread that a particular risk elicits (Fischhoff et al., 1978; Slovic, 1987; Slovic,
Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1980). The increase in research attention to the role of Affect
and its importance to risk judgement was bolstered by the prevailing view that
Psychometric Dread was a dominating factor in risk perception. As a basis for research
on Affect, however, the importance of Dread as an explanatory factor in perceived risk
raises some issues.

Sjöberg (2007) asserts that, as a factor in the Psychometric paradigm, Dread is somewhat
of a misnomer, and that only one of the ten items of the factor is related to emotion or
Affect. The single Affective item within the Dread factor, he argues, is ―only weakly
related to perceived risk‖ when tested in isolation, and that the bulk of the explanatory
power of Dread Risk is ―carried by the non-emotional content of the Dread factor‖
(Sjöberg, 2007, p. 2) related to the severity of risk consequence. However, whether
accurately captured by Psychometric Dread or not, there is evidence to suggest that
Affect as emotion does have some impact on perceptions of risk consequence, despite the
association being unclear.

When risk consequences increase in catastrophic potential, the Affective system is
increasingly unable to feel such large changes in magnitude. Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and
MacGregor (2004) assert that:

The Affective system seems designed to sensitize us to small changes in our
environment (e.g., the difference between 0 and 1 deaths) at the cost of making
us less able to appreciate and respond appropriately to larger changes further
away from zero (e.g., the difference between 500 and 600 deaths) (p. 9).
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Fetherstonhaugh, Slovic, Johnson, and Friedrich (1997) suggest that the inability to feel
the magnitude of a catastrophic loss of life is a form of psychophysical numbing, “a
phenomenon that could impair our ability to make consistent, equitable, and wise
decisions‖ (p. 284). Paradoxically, when risks with potentially catastrophic consequences
are considered, psychophysical numbing may dampen the Affective reaction, skewing its
association with risk and benefit.
Fetherstonhaugh et al. (1997) found that ―the perceived benefit of saving lives changes
when interventions saving the same number of people are implemented in tragedies that
differ in magnitude‖ (p. 285). Fetherstonhaugh et al. (1997) also found that differences in
the framing of the life-saving interventions changed the degree of numbing; when the
interventions were framed in terms of the magnitude of the consequences, psychophysical
numbing was frequent, but when the focus was on intervention outcomes, psychophysical
numbing was reduced (Fetherstonhaugh et al., 1997). The authors also suggest that
psychophysical numbing is due in part to an inadequacy in language to ―discriminate
among degrees of harm or destructiveness‖ (Fetherstonhaugh et al., 1997, p. 298). These
views cast doubt over the efficacy of rational decision making, particularly for
catastrophic risk consequences, and brings into focus one of the fundamental questions
concerning probability, consequence, and perceived risk.

2.11 Consequence and Perceived Risk
The mid-20th century saw a growing interest in probabilistic risk assessment of complex
technologies, due in a large part to the fact that catastrophic consequences of such
technologies were viewed as ―extremely low, assuming various design and operational
conditions‖ (Wynne, 2002, p. 467). It was this engineering perspective, involving a
strong conception of the article at risk, that provided the basis for defining risk as a
socially manageable product of consequence and probability (Wynne, 2002). However,
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when applied to other domains of risk management, this approach has highlighted some
limitations of the probability and consequence model.

This limitation is especially apparent in cases of risks where the probability of occurrence
is very low, but the consequences of the event are high. Pidgeon, Simmons, and
Henwood (2006) emphasise the difficulties in describing some risks in probabilistic
terms, and assert that descriptions of such risks ―often contain such uncertainty that
experts themselves disagree about the likelihoods and consequences‖ (p. 94). Conversely,
risks where the consequences of a risk event are uncertain but have the potential for
irremediable negative consequences are similarly problematic.

Such risks are often addressed using a precautionary principle that Taylor-Gooby and
Zinn (2006b) describe as a strategy of avoidance, ―promoted in order to manage
irresoluble uncertainties and provide a way of deciding which risks we are willing to
take‖ (p. 46). The issue of how problematic risks should be managed within the
prevailing probability and consequence paradigm, stems from discrepancies between
objective and subjective risk perspectives, and feeds back into the overarching problem
of decision making under uncertainty. Bernstein (1998), illustrates this point well, stating
that:

any decision relating to risk involves two distinct and yet inseparable elements: the
objective facts and a subjective view about the desirability of what is to be gained,
or lost, by the decision… the risk-averse make choices based on the consequences
without regard to the probability involved… the foolhardy make choices based on
the probability on an outcome without regard to its consequences. (p. 100)

The degree of uncertainty that is often present in risk assessments outside of technical
risk analysis is due in large part to the multifaceted and inimitable interactions that occur
between human actions and the consequences. As a result, perceptions of risk are far
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more multidimensional and sensitive to the overall context than technical definitions and
measures of risk account for (Bostrom, 1997).

Wynne (2002) asserts that the adoption of the technical probability/consequence
paradigm of risk has led to the development of a normative, yet ill-fitting framework,
which implies that modern risk analysis is an appropriate tool for the identification and
domestication of ―all significant future consequences of the relevant actions‖ (p. 469). In
this view, uncertainty, uncontrollability, and unforeseen consequences are outside the
current scientific body of knowledge, and are therefore conveniently disregarded, feeding
the myth that lack of full control and unpredictable consequences are somehow abnormal
(Wynne, 2002).

The misperception of risk analysis as a tool for maintaining full control of potential
consequences frames risk management as an arbiter between risk and normality. Such
misperception

persists,

despite

research

indicating

that

although

the

probability/consequence model provides an acceptable definition for technical risk
calculations, it also presents a misrepresentative view of risk as an objective reality
(Rayner & Cantor, 1987). Misperception of the nature and limitations of risk analysis has
led to much debate regarding the differences between perceived risk and formally
measured risk, and between lay and expert risk perceptions. Wynne (2002) asserts that
the description of these differences ―as a dichotomy between ‗perceived‘ versus ‗real‘
risk implies that the latter play a normative and prescriptive role, and that risk perceptions
are somehow flawed or incomplete‖ (p. 102).

The apparent discrepancies between lay and expert perceptions of risk have long been
documented (Fischhoff et al., 1978). Research has suggested that these dissimilarities are
a result of the differing conceptions of risk as they are used by experts and lay people.
Marris et al. (1998) affirm this view, suggesting that ―lay people and experts do not use
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the same definitions of ‗riskiness‘ when assessing risks‖ (p. 635), and that lay people tend
to also include qualitative dimensions in their assessment of risk.

However, to draw the conclusion from such findings that lay risk perceptions are
―somehow flawed or incomplete‖ (Wynne, 2002, p. 102) may simply be an artefact of an
artificially narrow conception of risk as solely a product of probability and consequence.
Braman and Kahan (2002) argues that research in this area has not adequately addressed
the true concerns underlying lay risk perceptions. Certain risky activities and objects may
be valued as symbols with both positive and negative associations, and perceptions of
risk may ―depend a lot on the social meanings… and not just on the consequences‖ with
which risks are framed (Braman & Kahan, 2002, p. 3).

In addition to the social meanings associated with risky activities, differences in lay and
expert perceptions of risk may also stem from differences in understandings of the
fundamental concepts associated with the probability/consequence conception of risk.
Sjöberg (2006a) supports this view, and asserts that ―probabilities are usually of little
concern to the public who find them hard to understand, based on questionable
assumptions, and irrelevant. Consequences are what should addressed, not probabilities‖
(p. 13). Botterill and Mazur (2004) also note that a disproportionate amount of public
attention is garnered by risks which have ―potentially severe consequences on people‘s
lives, even if the statistical likelihood of their occurrence is ‗insignificant‘‖ (p. 15);
however, this overweighting of risk consequence relative to probability is not the sole
domain of the lay public, nor is it unwarranted.

According to Smith and Brooks (2013), the consequence of an event may be considered
to be more significant that the probability, and should therefore be more heavily weighted
to reflect the greater ease with which individuals can relate, understand, and picture the
outcome of an event. However, Woodruff (2005) argues that a ―continued overemphasis
on consequences when making risk-based decisions will over time have a negative

42
impact… leading to risk averse… opinion formers, decision makers and practitioners
setting the agenda of what constitutes acceptable or tolerable risk‖ (p. 346).

The lay perception of risk may therefore be strongly influenced by risk consequences, an
influence which in turn may impact on expert risk analysis. Although a greater emphasis
on risk consequences may potentially generate more risk-averse assessments of hazards,
this does not imply that expert assessments reflect the true nature of risks, while lay risk
perceptions are ―flawed or incomplete‖ (Wynne, 2002, p. 102). There is therefore some
uncertainty as to whether expert risk assessment may be enhanced or weakened via
reference to lay risk perceptions and their use of additional qualitative factors. Wynne
(2002) asserts that ―this reflects more than mere uncertainty in propositional claims about
consequences‖ (p. 460).

2.12 Dread and Risk Consequence
The traditional assumption that people rationally evaluate risk as a cognitive function has
been shown to be misleading, as ―such cognitive evaluations have Affective
consequences, and feeling states also exert a reciprocal influence on cognitive
evaluations‖ (Loewenstein et al., 2001, p. 270). The idea that Affective reactions to risk
are one of the fundamental drivers of risk perception originated with the first
Psychometric Risk studies, which identified two main factors significant to risk
perception, one of which was labelled ‗Dread Risk‘ (Fischhoff et al., 1978; Slovic, 1987).
This research has led to the view that fear may influence risk judgments, and that ―people
will make their [risk] decision based on the dread of a particular event, rather than based
on the actual harm that may be inflicted‖ (Smith & Brooks, 2013, p. 55).
Schusterschitz, Schütz, and Wiedemann (2010) found that ―the explanatory power of the
Dread factor is strongly influenced by the severity of consequences‖ (p. 394), a sentiment
echoed by Sjöberg (2006a), who asserts that the fundamental presumption of
Psychometric risk that risky activities are important to risk attitudes is incorrect, and that
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it is the risk consequences that are ―much more important‖ (p. 12). Loewenstein et al.
(2001) describe the relationship between consequence and dread as a product of what
Sunstein (2002) refers to as probability neglect, stating that:

as the probability of an aversive event passes the zero threshold, a consequence that
was previously of no concern now becomes a source of worry. Subsequent
increments in probability, however, have little additional emotional impact and,
presumably for this reason, have little impact on choice. (p. 276)

The cognitive conception of risk, anchored in the engineering perspective, is based on a
view of risk assessment by rational actors and their assessments of probability, whereas
risk perception as a product of Affect appears to be primarily reliant on the possibility
rather than probability of the consequences of risk events. Renn (2008) has proposed the
rather literary title of ‗Sword of Damocles‘ for risks falling into this particular class,
based on the tale from Greek mythology, which illustrates the issue of the possibility
versus the probability of catastrophic consequences, stating that ―this risk class relates to
risk sources that have a potential for very high damage and, at the same time, very low
probability of occurrence‖ (p. 199).

Mythen and Walklate (2006) caution against this Affective distinction in the perception
of risk, stating that ―once we make the distinction between risk as possibility and risk as
harm, the universalising language of the risk-society narrative comes unstuck‖ (p. 387).
However, the concept of Psychometric Dread (specified as Affect) and its relationship to
probability neglect may be more discrete than a simple neglect of probability in the face
of severe consequences. Sjöberg (1999) for example, found that perceived risk is related
to probability, while ―demand for risk reduction was related mostly to the expected
severity of consequences‖ (p. 129).
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The literature makes clear that the conception of risk as probability and consequence is
primarily a cognitive view of risk judgement. It also shows that the Affective influence
on risk perception is recognised as being of great importance, while at the same time
being poorly understood. Ropeik (2004) makes the point that any influence on risk
perceptions that lead to risk misperceptions is a hazard that must be understood,
quantified, and reduced like any physical hazard. Thus it is insufficient to advocate for
the inclusion of the Psychometric Dread factor in the risk analysis process on the basis
that Dread holds great explanatory power (Fischhoff et al., 1978; Slovic, 1987).
Not only is it unclear how such factors should be incorporated into ―decision
frameworks‖ (Gregory & Mendelsohn, 1993, p. 259; Merkhofer, 1987), the importance
and significance of Dread risk to perceived risk is also unclear. Sjöberg (2000b) for
example, states that a hazard may be defined as the risk generating activity itself, or as a
consequence of such an activity depending on the way the risk is framed. This in turn has
a bearing on how much Affect an activity elicits, the demand for mitigation, and expected
severity of consequences. Palmer (1996) agrees that it is risk consequence that is of
primary importance to perceived risk, and asserts that this may be ―a biological
adaptation since it is the severity of the consequences that, ultimately, defines how
dangerous an event is‖ (p. 32).

In terms of the evolution of the Psychometric paradigm of risk perception since its
inception, it is somewhat perplexing that ‗severity of risk consequences‘ was not
recognised earlier as the predominant concept driving the factor that came to be known as
Dread risk. Perhaps the most incriminating evidence for this view comes from one of the
seminal papers of Psychometric risk perception research, where the item Severity of Risk
Consequence was shown to have the highest factor loading in the factor analysis of
‗Dread‘ risk (Fischhoff et al., 1978).
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Sjöberg (2003a), cites this finding as evidence to support a somewhat overhauled
conception of what has come to be known as Dread risk, arguing that the empirical
evidence in Psychometric risk research points to severe consequences as having the most
explanatory power within the Dread risk factor, and showing that ―emotional risk
reactions were not significant‖ (p. 6). Sjöberg (2000a) has also criticised the focus of
Psychometric researchers on ―risky activities rather than risky events‖ (p. 291), and has
cited this as a potential reason for a focus on Affect, rather than severe consequences.
The estimation of risk consequence may therefore be dependent on whether a risk is
presented as a hazardous activity, such as the use of nuclear energy, or as a risky event,
for example, a nuclear reactor accident. The mental image of risky events are more
accessible and are more easily visualised than risky activities, and this kind of
visualisation or imagery ―matters a great deal to people‘s reactions to risks‖ (Sunstein,
2002, p. 81).

In a study of the interpretation of high and low risk information, Viscusi (1997) found an
asymmetry where individuals tended to interpret high risk information as more
informative than low risk information, regardless of the information source. Sunstein
(2002) argues that this alarmist bias can be accounted for by ―emotional reactions to risk,
and probability neglect‖ (p. 81), stating that concern over risks may be heightened, even
for very low probability risks, if the risk is easily visualised. Sunstein (2002) also notes
that there is some inherent difficulty in ascertaining whether it is probability neglect
driving such behaviour. He argues that it is difficult to know whether ―visualization
makes the issue of probability less relevant or even irrelevant‖ (Sunstein, 2002, p. 82), or
whether it is the availability heuristic leading the decision maker to substitute a question
of statistical risk for one of ease of visualisation.

The difficulty in separating the mechanisms of the Affect Heuristic from the Availability
Heuristic were evident, if not overtly noted, in the seminal studies on availability. For
example, Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischhoff, Layman, and Combs (1978) found that more
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highly publicised causes of death were overestimated in terms of frequency, compared
with the underestimation of those which were relatively underpublicised. However,
Slovic et al. (2004) note that the more highly publicised causes of death ―appear to be
more Affectively charged, that is, more sensational, and this may account both for their
prominence in the media and their relatively overestimated frequencies‖ (p. 7).

The literature suggests, therefore, that estimations of risk consequence may not only be
related to framing effects, but may also be subject to complex interrelations between a
range of heuristics and biases and estimations of probability that are influenced by
cognitive and emotional stimuli. As Klaczynski (2001) notes, ―judgments arrived at
heuristically feel intuitively correct, but the basis for this feeling is often difficult to
articulate‖ (p. 846).

Disentangling the emotional and cognitive impacts on risk probability and consequence
judgements is far more complex than simply viewing risk-as-feelings, or Dread risk, as
―an alternative description of the psychological processes underlying decision making‖
(Loewenstein et al., 2001, p. 271). Risk consequence estimation is vulnerable to a range
of common factors that influence intuitively constructed risk narratives, especially the
vividness of imagined risk impacts, which in turn impact probability assessments
(Hughes, Kitzinger, & Murdock, 2006; Kahan, Hoffman, & Braman, 2009; Loewenstein
et al., 2001).

Although the vividness with which risk consequences may be imagined may be
dependent on emotional reactions, Loewenstein et al. (2001) assert that ―cognitive
assessments of risk… tend to depend on more objective features… such as… assessments
of outcome severity‖ (p. 271). The overall picture to be drawn from the literature is that
the perception of risk is seldom based on a rational cognitive process. Rather, it is the
product of a complex interplay between estimations of harm and probability, emotion and
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cognition, between thoughts and feelings, coloured by framing effects, heuristics, and
biases.

2.13 Conclusion
A review of the literature on risk perception and the research surrounding it provides an
account of the attempts to understand and quantify human behaviour in response to risk.
The literature provides a history of the effort to understand the predictably irrational
nature of human decision making. The body of research shows the extent to which the
modern world is uncontrollable and unmasks the pervasive illusion that future events are
predictable and manageable, and that risk judgements are logical and objective.

The intention of this chapter was to offer a contextual foundation for risk perception in
general, and the Psychometric Theory of Risk specifically. In addition, the purpose of the
chapter was to provide justification for the study‘s Research Questions and methodology,
to address the gaps in the current understanding of perceived risk, and to demonstrate
how these relate to the Psychometric Theory of Risk perception. This review began by
discussing the nature of risk and the fundamental subjectivity of the concept. Major
theories of risk perception were examined in terms of their

ationalization and main

criticisms, before turning to perception, cognitive psychology and theories of decision
making.

The complex interplay between emotion, cognitive heuristics and the impact of framing
effects on risk judgements were then outlined, leading the discussion to a discussion of
these influences on perceived risk, assessments of probability and consequence.
References were made throughout the literature review to the relationship of the concepts
to Psychometric Dread. This discussion highlighted a specific gap in the literature
relating to the accuracy of the widely accepted conception of Psychometric Dread risk,
and its efficacy and appropriateness as predictor of perceived risk.
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The overall picture drawn from the literature is that the perception of risk is seldom based
only on a rational cognitive process. Rather, it is the product of a complex interplay
between estimations of harm and probability, emotion and cognition, between thoughts
and feelings which are coloured by individual context and experience as illustrated by
framing effects, heuristics and biases. The literature suggests that estimations of risk
consequence are inextricably linked with these complex interrelations and influenced by
cognitive and emotional stimuli, which in turn impact on estimations of probability and
overall perceptions of risk.

The literature highlights the resulting subjectivity of risk perception, especially in regards
to intuitive interpretations of risk, and the value-laden construction of risk perception
categories. A major issue that emerges from the risk perception literature therefore, is the
difficulty in determining how the subjectivity of risk perception influences the overall
risk assessment process.

Several key theories have been proposed to explain the findings of risk perception
research, including the Heuristics and Biases approach, the Psychometric Theory of Risk,
the Cultural Theory of Risk, and the Social Amplification of Risk Framework. Each of
these approaches has received fair criticism for their shortcomings, however, and none of
them account fully for the major findings of risk perception research. The literature
indicates that humans are not rational optimisers, but rather are heavily reliant on biases,
emotions, expectation, misconceptions and conformity in order to make risk judgements.
It is clear from a review of the relevant literature that an understanding of decision
making is inextricably linked to an accurate conception of risk judgement.

The method by which perceptions are interpreted and ascribed meaning is critical to the
decision making process, and therefore essential to providing a clearer view of the
nuances of risk assessment. However, despite various concepts such as Utility
Maximisation and the Satisficing Heuristic coming to dominate the literature at different

49
times, Decision Theory in general has been found to have limited descriptive validity,
failing in many cases to explain and predict behaviour.

When heuristics and biases were first considered within the context of risk perception, it
raised the question of how much of the assessment of risk is reliant on subjective and
intuitive subconscious reactions. Despite much evidence in the literature for cognitive
heuristics and their potential impact on risk judgements, some researchers have felt that
research into emotional or Affective reactions to risk, may reveal more about how
perceptions of risk are formed. The view that eventually emerged from research into
emotional Affect was initially one of a divergence of emotional reactions and cognitive
assessments of risk. The reality, however, appears to be far more complex.

Despite emotional processes now being widely conceived as the major governing factor
in risk perception, the literature suggests a complex interrelationship between the
engineering-centric view of risk as consequence and probability, and the dual aspects of
emotional reactions and cognitive risk assessments. The evaluability of risk judgement
has been shown to be closely associated with Affective reactions, and these reactions may
trump the consideration of more justifiable factors and heighten avoidance of risk
consequences. Framing effects reported in the literature highlight this issue, showing that
divergences from the ideal of rationality not only influence preferences in decision
making, but also in perception. The Affective framing of risk influences consequence
perception and alters the value of risk probabilities in the mind of the perceiver.

The literature also makes clear that the conception of risk as probability and consequence
is primarily a cognitive and rationalistic view of risk judgement. The Affective influence
on risk perception, although recognised as being of great importance, is at the same time
poorly understood. For example, it is unclear how much of what is commonly referred to
as Affect is based on emotion, and how much is based on attitude or evaluation. Other
complexities associated with risk judgement also emerge from the literature. For
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example, estimating an accurate consequence value ideally requires some historical data
from which to infer the potential magnitude of similar future events. Judgements of
consequence values, however, are not constant, as they vary over time and place, and
even between individuals.

Another key issue that emerges from the literature is that risks with a very low
probability of occurring and a very large consequence value are particularly difficult to
assess. The Psychometric Dread factor is frequently cited as having great explanatory
power, especially in this area. This view is primarily driven by a conception of
Psychometric Dread as a quantification of emotional Affect; however, as a basis for
research on Affect, the importance of Dread as an explanatory factor in perceived risk
raises some issues.

A major gap that emerges from the literature is whether the explanatory power of the
Psychometric Dread risk factor is strongly influenced by the severity of consequences,
and that emotion is of comparatively minor importance. Thus it may be concluded that it
is insufficient to advocate for the inclusion of the Psychometric Dread factor in the risk
analysis process on the basis that Dread (specified as emotional Affect) holds great
explanatory power. In order to provide a greater understanding of the development of the
Psychometric Theory of Risk and the history of the Dread factor, the following chapter
will provide an examination of this theory which underpins this study. The chapter
explores the development, triumphs, and its criticisms of the Psychometric Theory of
Risk, and provides a contextual exploration of the concept that has come to be known in
risk perception research as Dread.
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CHAPTER 3: THEORY SUPPORTING THE STUDY
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter provided a contextual foundation for the study and offered
justification for the Research Questions through a discussion of the definition and nature
of risk and the fundamental aspects of perception. This chapter highlights the significant
findings in Psychometric risk perception research, as well as outlining the criticisms of
the approach. The chapter also provides a deeper understanding of the Psychometric
Paradigm, Dread risk and the association with Affect. The chapter traces risk perception
research to the development of the Psychometric Risk Paradigm, and details the
significance of the approach to concepts of consequence, Dread and Affect. The
discussion leads to criticisms of the Psychometric Paradigm, and of Dread risk
specifically, highlighting the identified gap in the knowledge.

3.2 The Birth of Risk Perception Research
Research into the perception of risk is inherently difficult to draw a boundary around. It
has been characterised by research that is ―eclectic in its epistemological roots‖
(Breakwell, 2007, p. 41). Studies into the perception of risk began in the 1970s and 1980s
in response to the concerns of policymakers over increasing public anxiety surrounding
the impact of new technologies on the environment, particularly nuclear power (Pidgeon,
Simmons, & Henwood, 2006). Although the main drivers behind the early research into
risk perception had their basis in public policy issues, the research objectives were
primarily theoretical and empirical (Pidgeon & Gregory, 2004).

Taylor-Gooby & Zinn (2006) suggest that the urgency of policymakers over the question
of public risk perception was great, and the task of addressing the issue was given to
Chauncey Starr, a leading electrical engineer and expert in nuclear energy, turned
academic. Starr, who had previously worked as president of the Atomic Division of
Rockwell International, completed the seminal study by analysing public responses to
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risk using a quantitative methodology to provide decision makers with a ―functional
answer‖ (Starr, 1969, p. 1233) to the question of how safe the technology would need to
be to gain widespread acceptance among the public.

Starr (1969) used what has become known as a revealed preference approach by equating
the perceived benefit of the risks with percent of income spent on the hazard and
approached the problem by comparing the risks associated with nuclear power with the
publicly accepted conventional power plant risks. He suggested that the expected gains in
addition to the lower risks associated with the nuclear power option, which he estimated
to be 1 in 200 compared to 1 in 40 for conventional power risks, would equate to a high
level of public support and acceptance of nuclear power (Starr, 1969). Along with this
assessment, Starr (1969) also provided some general guidelines for decision makers to
guide them in assessing public perceptions of risk.

True to his engineering background, Starr (1969) expressed his findings in a very specific
statistical terms, stating that the public would be willing ―to accept ‗voluntary‘ risks
roughly 1,000 times greater than ‗involuntary‘ risks‖ (p. 1237). Starr (1969) also found a
tendency for the public to use the risk of death as a psychological yardstick, and that risk
acceptability appeared to be ―crudely proportional to the third power‖ (p. 1237) to the
expected benefits. Although somewhat optimistic in hindsight, Starr‘s (1969) findings
offered social and cognitive psychologists ―the possibility of an empirical understanding
of some of the judgements and beliefs underlying this highly visible and complex social
and public policy issue‖ (Pidgeon et al., 2006, p. 96).

This initial study paved the way for sociology and psychology researchers to move to the
fore in the study of risk perception, and in doing so they shifted the research away from
technical issues towards ―questions of acceptability and the prediction of public
response‖ (Taylor-Gooby & Zinn, 2006b, p. 26). From the engineering perspective, the
management of risk was predominantly a technical issue ―of calculation and public
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acceptance‖ (Taylor-Gooby & Zinn, 2006b, p. 27), whereas for behavioural economists
and cognitive psychologists, the problem was rooted in decision-making. This shift from
a technical approach to a cognitive and behavioural approach resulted in the framing of
risk perception research within either a cognitive scientific or a sociocultural context.
Thus the cultural and psychological methodologies came to dominate the study of risk
perception, a situation which persisted from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s ―with
relatively little interaction between the two‖ (Pidgeon et al., 2006, p. 96).

Cognitive psychologists, meanwhile, had been developing another influential stream of
research as early as 1948 in the examination of gambling and risky choices (Cohen &
Hansel, 1956; Friedman & Savage, 1948; Simon, 1956). Using a model of rational action,
behavioural economists and cognitive psychologists ―examined how people deviate from
theoretical assumptions‖ (Taylor-Gooby & Zinn, 2006b, p. 27). The research in this area
came to dominate the early studies into the perception of risk, primarily in the form of the
Heuristic and Biases approach pioneered by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1974, 1981). They proposed several mental short-cuts or
Heuristics such as Availability, Representativeness, and Anchoring and Adjustment,
which lead to systematic biases in the estimation of probabilities (Kahneman, Slovic, &
Tversky, 1982).

Einhorn and Hogarth (1981) argued, however, that the Heuristics and Biases approach
was limited by its roots in Bayesian decision theory and restricted in its conceptualisation
of risk as subjective probability; however, the approach would lay the groundwork for
another influential theory stemming from the cognitive psychological tradition which
would come to dominate the research domain. Although borrowing the Heuristics and
Biases interpretation of lay peoples ―irrationality in the face of true risks‖ (Pidgeon et al.,
2006, p. 96), this new approach ―promised to give access to the understanding of public
risk preferences which was urgently needed by politicians and other decision-makers‖
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(Taylor-Gooby & Zinn, 2006b, p. 29). It was on this premise in a climate of urgency that
the Psychometric Paradigm of risk perception originated.

3.3 The Psychometric Paradigm of Risk Perception
Following the work of

Starr (1969) and Tversky and Kahneman (1973), the

Psychometric Paradigm was rapidly developed by researchers at the University of
Oregon‘s Decision Research Group, with the aim of establishing stable risk perception
factors that could inform policy makers on public risk attitudes (Fischhoff, Slovic,
Litchtenstein, Read, & Combs, 1978; Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1982). The
Psychometric Paradigm was first proposed in 1978 in a paper reporting the results of a
study in which participants rated their perception of the risks associated with a range of
30 hazardous activities (Fischhoff et al., 1978). The activities ranged from unfamiliar and
involuntary risks, such as nuclear power, to voluntary risks with which participants would
be far more familiar, such as bicycle riding (Fischhoff et al., 1978).

A range of hazard characteristics were proposed to account for risk perceptions, and
participants in the study rated the hazardousness of each of the activities in relation to
these characteristics (Fischhoff et al., 1978). The proposed hazard characteristics were
determined by using an approach developed in Personality Theory, where the hazards
were evaluated against a series of characteristics proposed to influence risk perception
(Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischhoff, Layman, & Combs, 1978). The characteristics included
voluntary choice in exposure to the risk; the immediacy of fatal effect; personal
knowledge of the risk; the extent to which the risks were known to science; personal
control over the level of risk exposure; the newness and novelty of the risk; whether the
risk was considered chronic, killing one person at a time, or catastrophic, killing many at
once; whether the risk was considered to be common and was thought about calmly, or
whether the risk was one that people dread; and the severity of the risk consequences
(Lichtenstein et al., 1978).
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Whilst Starr‘s (1969) approach was to examine perceived risk through revealed
preferences, the Psychometric Paradigm employed standardised questionnaires to elicit
expressed preferences (Fischhoff et al., 1978). The aim of the Psychometric Paradigm
was to quantify and model the factors and interrelationships that influence individual risk
perceptions ―in order to illuminate the responses of individuals and their societies to the
hazards that confront them‖ (Slovic, 2001, p. xxiii). Researchers quickly became aware
of apparent differences between expert and lay perceptions of the same hazards.
Psychometric Paradigm researchers asserted that the ―conceptual models of reality people
construct… differ from those based on expert knowledge‖ (Taylor-Gooby & Zinn,
2006b, p. 27) and viewed lay perceptions of risk as being faulty and a result of general
human cognitive limitations (Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1977). This assumption
stemmed from concepts of Bounded Rationality (Simon, 1957) and the Heuristics and
Biases approach, which proposed that ―people rely on a limited number of heuristic
principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting
values to simpler judgemental operations‖ (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, p. 1124). The
assumption also stemmed from a study by Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein (1979), who
found that the assessments of a relatively small sample of experts were in better
agreement with known risks than were assessments of laypeople.

Experts, unlike laypeople, were assumed to base their decision making on the rational
ideal proposed by economists, psychologists, and Decision Theory researchers (TaylorGooby & Zinn, 2006a), despite evidence that experts were subject to the same biases as
laypeople (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). It was asserted that if a Positivistic solution
existed, it was obscured by confounding cultural and political influences (Wynne, 1982).
The Positivistic approach taken by the Psychometric Paradigm frequently meant that
failures in risk management were attributed to human fallibility in judgement and
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decision making, leading to flawed risk management recommendations (Taylor-Gooby &
Zinn, 2006a).

Sociologists however, rejected of Positivistic science, arguing that the approach was
enmeshed in cultural and political conceptions of power and authority (Wynne, 1982).
Despite evidence indicating that risk perception was more complex than the approach
allowed for (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), the assertion of Psychometric risk researchers
of the reality of the divide between lay and expert risk judgements persisted until the
early 2000s (Rowe & Wright, 2001), and messy ideas of confounding sociological
influences were largely ignored. The runaway success of the Psychometric Paradigm also
meant that other shortcomings at the foundation of the Theory were overlooked.

Breakwell (2007) explains that the Psychometric risk tradition typically uses data from a
large number of participants to establish any significant structure in risk perception.
Although this may be true for many subsequent studies, the early studies from which the
Psychometric Paradigm was established employed relatively small samples to determine
the foundational elements of the approach. For example, the study by Lichtenstein et al.
(1978) from which many of the risk characteristics of the Psychometric Paradigm were
determined consisted of two groups of subjects comprising of 111 for the first group and
77 subjects for the second. Likewise, the seminal study by Fischhoff et al. (1978) in
which the Psychometric Paradigm was first proposed employed a sample of 76
participants.

Despite these shortcomings in its foundation, it is widely accepted that the Psychometric
risk approach allows for a wide range of analytic techniques, such as assessing the mean
profiles of hazards or Psychometric Risk factor items (Fischhoff et al., 1978; Slovic,
1987). Breakwell (2007) asserts that the most striking conclusion to emerge from these
seminal studies ―stemmed from subjecting the ratings of the characteristics of hazards to
a factor analysis‖ (p. 31). Through factor analysis, the Psychometric theory proposed two
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unrelated factors which accounted well for the variability in the correlations. The first
factor comprised of uncontrollable, new, involuntary, poorly known and delayed
consequences while the second factor encompassed certain to be fatal, dreaded, and
catastrophic (Fischhoff et al., 1978).

This initial Psychometric risk study by Fischhoff et al. (1978) paved the way for many
further studies in which the methodology of the Psychometric Paradigm was extended by
sampling different populations, employing different risk characteristics and surveying
different hazards. One of the first of these expansions to the initial work of Fischhoff et
al. (1978) was published by Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein (1980) who extended the
original research to include a range of 90 hazards and 18 risk characteristics. Their results
showed a three factor solution comprising of Dread, Familiarity, and the number of
people exposed, which differed from the two-dimensional structure obtained by Fischhoff
et al. (1978).
According to Breakwell (2007), the major difference between Fischhoff et al.‘s (1978)
study and Slovic et al.‘s (1980) research was that the risk characteristics (or items)
relating to voluntary choice in and personal control were no longer linked to novelty and
knowledge of the risk, but to dread and the severity of risk consequence. The two primary
dimensions of Slovic et al.‘s (1980) three factor solution found in their expanded study
―has become the benchmark‖ (Breakwell, 2007, p. 34) for much of the Psychometric risk
perception research that has followed (Slovic, 1987, 1992; Slovic et al., 1980; Slovic,
Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1981, 1985, 1986). Other researchers who have closely
replicated Slovic et al.‘s (1980) procedures have found similar two and three factor
solutions (Breakwell, 2007; Renn & Rohrmann, 2000).
However there has not always been agreement with Slovic et al.‘s (1980) factor structures
or labelling of the two principal factors. Fife-Schaw and Rowe (1996), for example,
found a two factor solution in their Psychometric risk study of public perceptions of food
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hazards, which they labelled as severity and awareness. Although a different factor
structure to Slovic et al.‘s (1980) three factor solution, Fife-Shaw and Rowe‘s (1996) two
factors of severity and awareness may arguably mirror Slovic et al.‘s (1980) two primary
factors of Dread and Knowledge in all but semantics. Breakwell (2007) asserts that any
departures from Slovic et al.‘s (1980) factor structure in subsequent studies may simply
be a product of differences in participants, hazards or characteristics used.

Since being introduced by Slovic et al. (1980), the Dread factor has been widely regarded
as the most important factor to emerge from the Psychometric Paradigm of risk
perception (Taylor-Gooby & Zinn, 2006a). Sjöberg (2006a) explains that the implication
of the early research that risk perception was strongly determined by Novelty and Dread
was a product of its apparent explanation for strong negative reactions to nuclear
technology, and thus ―similar conclusions were drawn about other kinds of more or less
hazardous technologies‖ (p. 4).

The Novelty and Dread version of the Psychometric Paradigm became the most
commonly used model, and suggested that risk perception was driven by several
qualitative characteristics in addition to the engineering-centric view of risk as a product
of probability and consequence (Pidgeon & Gregory, 2004). Risk perceptions were
understood to be ―richer and more complex than expert conceptions‖ (Pidgeon &
Gregory, 2004, p. 97), and to include factors such as fear, voluntariness, equity and
catastrophic potential (Slovic, 1998; Wynne, 1996).

An expanded version of the Psychometric Paradigm of risk perception appeared in the
early 1990s, suggesting that Social Trust was another influential factor in risk perception
(Slovic, Flynn, & Layman, 1991). In addition to the conception of perceived risk as
Novelty and Dread, the Social Trust factor implied that public reactions to hazardous
technologies relied on the degree of public trust that was invested in the authorities
responsible for risk management (Sjöberg, 2006a, p. 5). In continuing the exploration of
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risk perception using the Psychometric Paradigm, researchers began to assert that the role
of emotion (or Affect) in risk judgements was among the key questions in the research
domain (Breakwell, 2007).

By the early 2000s, Affect and feelings about risk were widely considered to be central to
the understanding of perceived risk (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001) which
furthered research into Affective reactions to risk. This led to the development of an
Affect version of the Psychometric Paradigm and the proposal of an Affect Heuristic
(Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000; Peters & Slovic, 1996; Rottenstreich &
Hsee, 2001; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002, 2004, 2007; Slovic, Peters,
Finucane, & MacGregor, 2005).
Sjöberg (2006a) asserts that the strong evidence for ―a correlation between attitudes and
perceived risk‖ (p. 5) found in Affect Heuristic research (Finucane et al., 2000; Slovic et
al., 2007), together with the traditional conception of the Dread factor as driven by
emotion rather than severity of risk consequence, has resulted in widespread support for
the idea that emotion plays a significant role in risk perception. Sjöberg (2006b) however,
argues that confusion has arisen from the broadening of the meaning of Affect to include
the concept of Attitude, and resulted in the findings of Affect Heuristic research being
linked to the concept of Dread.

3.4 Criticisms of the Psychometric Paradigm
Starr‘s (1969) seminal study of risk perception paved the way for the development of new
approaches to research of risk perception and the Psychometric Paradigm‘s promise of
providing a more accurate picture of public risk perceptions to policy makers was, in part,
based on the criticisms Starr‘s (1969) approach attracted. Starr‘s (1969) critics cited
problems with the way his approach interpreted acceptable and accepted risks as being
equivalent, the study‘s focus on lethal outcomes as the sole consequence measure and the
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use of quantitative pecuniary measures that theoretically derived revealed preferences of
risks and hazards (Taylor-Gooby & Zinn, 2006a).
Researchers of the Psychometric Paradigm sought to improve upon Starr‘s (1969)
approach by eliciting expressed preferences through direct questioning. One of the
criticisms of the expressed preference method is ironically based on a central finding of
the Psychometric Theory of risk; the assumption that laypeople generally have flawed
perceptions of risk. Breakwell (2007) however, argues that the risks studied are often not
fully understood by anyone, and that the Psychometric approach simply captures an
―appreciation of the risk that [participants] have at the moment of the study and in a way
that they can articulate at that time‖ (p. 41).

The debate regarding lay and expert risk perceptions relies somewhat on the Positivist
assumption of expert objectivity and rationality, a view that was called into question by
Wynne (1982) early in the development of Psychometric risk research. Taylor-Gooby and
Zinn (2006) note that the ―dismantling of Positivistic accounts of science and their…
impact on risk problems [has] strengthened the view that citizens‘ understanding of risk
has an equivalent validity and rationality to that of the accredited experts‖ (p. 34).
Despite Wynne‘s (1982) early criticism of the Positivistic view of expert objectivity in
risk assessment, the received wisdom that expert assessments are more veridical than
those of laypeople has persisted (Cole & Withey, 1981; Sandman, Weinstein, & Klotz,
1987; Siegrist, Keller, Kastenholz, Frey, & Wiek, 2007; Slovic, 1999; Wright & Bolger,
1992). Rowe and Wright (2001) assert that the initial research findings supporting this
view (Slovic et al., 1979) and many that followed are based on weak evidence.

Sjöberg (2006a) notes that Slovic et al.‘s (1979) study surveyed only 15 experts, and
argues that ―their claim to expertise is very dubious‖ (p. 11). Rowe and Wright (2001)
echo this sentiment, arguing that the early studies ―made little attempt to ensure that
experimental tasks posed to experts were… appropriately matched to… expertise‖ (p.
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354). They also assert that the question of whether differences between expert and lay
risk perceptions exist, or whether expert risk judgements are more veridical than lay
judgements cannot be ascertained from the body of research due to extensive
methodological issues (Rowe & Wright, 2001).

Sjöberg (2006a) cautions that expert risk perceptions are much like those of laypeople in
structure, and that ―experts make much lower risk judgments of a technology whenever
their professional role involves a responsibility for handling that very technology, but not
otherwise‖ (p. 7). One received message to come from the lay/expert debate within
Psychometric risk research, is that perceived risk is an interpretation of reality that
encompasses far more than simply probability and consequence as espoused by the
technical-statistical approach (Taylor-Gooby & Zinn, 2006a).

Wilkinson (2001) argues that there is a disconnect between the perception of risk
measured in Psychometric research and the reality of actual responses to risk. Other
critics argue that there is little recognition of the impact of feelings, values and
knowledge, and that these contexts must be elucidated before Psychometric risk research
findings can be generalised (Taylor-Gooby & Zinn, 2006a). This issue is compounded by
the neglect of differences between individual risk perceptions, as the Psychometric
Paradigm is traditionally based on aggregate data.

A significant debate surrounds the original methodology of the Psychometric Paradigm
and its use of group (or aggregate) data based on mean ratings, neglecting the influence
of individual differences in risk perceptions. According to Breakwell (2007),
Psychometric risk researchers tend to use aggregated data, reducing the three dimensional
conception of risk data (figure 3.1) to a two dimensional conception (figure 3.2).
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Figure 3.1

Three dimensional conception of risk data (adapted from Breakwell, 2007)

Figure 3.2

Two dimensional conception of risk data (adapted from Breakwell, 2007)

The traditional use of Principal Components Factor Analysis (PCA) in the Paradigm has
been criticised as being somewhat unsuitable to explore social and cultural framing of
risks (Langford et al., 1999; Willis, DeKay, Fischhoff, & Morgan, 2005). Siegrist, Keller,
and Kiers (2005) used a three-way principal component analysis (based on the three
dimensional model of risk data) to determine whether the two dimensional model
neglected individual differences in risk perception. The analysis revealed that individuals
differ in their perception of different hazards, especially in terms of how unobservable or
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old hazards are perceived as unknowable, unpredictable and dreaded (Siegrist et al.,
2005). Gardner and Gould (1989) had previously performed an individual difference
analysis using a probability sample to study six hazards and three Psychometric risk
factors (Catastrophic, Dread, and Known to Science). These approaches were in contrast
to the traditional mean score analysis, as in Slovic‘s (1987) oft cited study.

Sjöberg (2006a) asserts that the aggregate data methodology artificially inflates the
amount of variance in perceived risk that the traditional model accounts for, which he
cites as one of the main reasons that the Psychometric Paradigm was initially viewed as
―common sense and… readily accepted as giving a correct analysis of perceived risk and
related attitudes‖ (p. 5). He argues that ―means… have much less random error than
individual values and therefore can be expected to be more readily accounted for than
individual values… ‖ (Sjöberg, 2006a, p. 5). Breakwell (2007), however, argues that
these two approaches actually answer two different questions, maintaining that ―the
Slovic [1987] approach analyses why people on average judge technologies differently
[while] the Gardner and Gould [1989] approach analyses why different people judge the
same technologies differently‖ (p. 46).

The techno-statistical view of risk generally involves a calculation using the probability
or likelihood of the risk and an estimation of the consequence or impact, should the risk
eventuate. The former is closely related to perceived risk and the concept of probability
neglect (Sunstein, 2002, 2003). Sjöberg (1999) however, asserts that attitudes such as
demand for risk mitigation are largely related to the severity of risk consequences, and
that the strongest correlations between perceived risk and mitigation relate to fatal risks.
The Psychometric Paradigm‘s basis in the judged frequency of potentially fatal events
(Lichtenstein et al., 1978) has resulted in a tradition of using fatality as an index of risk.
However, the question of to whom the lethal consequences may apply relates to another
criticism of the Psychometric approach; that of personal versus general risks.
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There tends to be a clear separation between the way individuals perceive risks to
themselves as opposed to those impacting on others (Sjöberg & Drottz, 1987). This
difference between the perception of risks as general or personal is related to Weinstein‘s
(1980) proposed Optimism bias, where personal risks are viewed with unrealistic
positivity. Risks are also generally perceived to be lower when framed in personal or
voluntary terms, than they are when framed in general or involuntary terms (Sjöberg,
2003a). In addition, personal risk taking has been shown to be unrelated to estimates of
risk probability (McKenna & Horswill, 2006).
Essentially, there is a separation ―between the level of risk perceived and the willingness
to take the risk… [and] risk-taking [is] not mediated by some cognitive mechanism which
reduces the perceived risk involved‖ (Breakwell, 1996, p. 51). The root of this criticism
of the Psychometric risk tradition is that ―hazards and hazardous activities are mixed‖
(Breakwell, 2007, p. 51), impersonalised, and not easily interpreted as voluntary or
involuntary activities, resulting in framing-dependent hazards. Sjöberg (2006a)
summarises the argument succinctly, stating that ―the psychometric tradition got a wrong
start by studying the type of risk least relevant for policy issues‖ (p. 6).

3.5 Criticisms of Dread Risk
The Psychometric Dread risk factor has long been held to be the main determiner of risk
perception and one of the most robust predictors of perceived risk for a wide range of
hazards (Bouyer, Bagdassarian, Chaabanne, & Mullet, 2001; Conrad, 1980; Fischhoff et
al., 1978; Jenkin, 2006; von Winterfeldt, John, & Borcherding, 1981). More recent work
has refined the concept of Dread risk as the emotional factor of Psychometric risk
perception research, principly in light of research highlighting the importance of the
Affect Heuristic to percieved risk (see Finucane et al., 2000; Peters & Slovic, 1996;
Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001; Slovic et al., 2002, 2004, 2007; Slovic et al., 2005).
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Since Starr‘s (1969) influential study, risk research has revealed perceived risk to be the
product of complex psychological processes, eclipsing the initial rationalistic view of
how risks are perceived. Much of the success in the field of risk perception research may
be attributed to the Psychometric Paradigm, but despite this, the approach has been
keenly criticised for failing to take into account the significance of fundamental
methodological issues.

The view that Psychometric Dread risk is a major determinant of perceived risk may be
disputed on methodological grounds based on aggregated versus individual data analysis
(Langford et al., 1999; Marris, Langford, Saunderson, & O' Riordan, 1997; Willis et al.,
2005); although this criticism may in turn be contested on the basis that the methodology
employed in the study of risk perception is dependent on the question which the research
is attempting to answer (Breakwell, 2007). Even the protracted debate regarding the
validity of differences between expert an lay perceptions of risk may be surmised as a
dispute concerned with the pros and cons of scientific Positivism (Taylor-Gooby & Zinn,
2006a).

Many of these criticisms such as those relating to the nature of the hazards used, the
questions asked about those hazards, the participants used and the data analysis approach
may all be viewed as overly simplistic, as the initial Psychometric risk studies ―were
conducted in full appreciation of their methodological limitations‖ (Breakwell, 2007, p.
42). According to Breakwell (2007), many critiques of the Psychometric Paradigm ―often
merely represent clashes of worldviews, battles between paradigms‖ (p. 42), and argues
that it is important to evaluate the Psychometric Theory of risk in terms of ―the system of
basic assumptions that guide work in [the] tradition‖ (p. 42).

There is a problematic issue however, that emerges from the foundation of the
Psychometric Paradigm of risk with repercussion for risk management, communication
and policy; that of whether the prevailing interpretation of Dread risk as a measure of
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risk-as-feelings is a valid view. The critical point here is the link between Dread and risk
consequence. In Fischhoff et al.‘s (1978) seminal study, their first factor was labelled
Severe; in Slovic et al.‘s (1980) subsequent expansion of the work, they labelled the
equivallent factor as Dread.
Slovic et al.‘s (1980) Dread factor was found to be linked to control over the risk, and
was made up of items (or characteristics) such as dreaded, catastrophic, hard to prevent,
fatal, inequitable, threatening to future generations, not easily reduced, increasing and
involuntary. Sjöberg (2006b) argues that Slovic et al.‘s (1980) Dread factor is a
heterogeneous assortment of risk characteristics dominated by items related to severe
consequences, containing only one item relating to emotion. He asserts that the ‗Dread‘
label is, at best, a misnomer, and at worst, may have ―unwanted policy implications‖
(Sjöberg, 2006b, p. 101).

It may also be argued that the dominance of severe consequences and the link to Dread
found in many Psychometric risk studies may be a by-product of the Psychometric
Paradigm‘s epistemological roots. Many of the characteristics used in the tradition are
based on Lichtenstein et al.‘s (1978) study of the judged frequency of lethal events,
which arguably represent the most severe of consequences. It is thus unsurprising that
subsequent Psychometric risk studies have identified several contextual elements related
to the perceived severity of risk consequence, such as the expected number of fatalities
and the catastrophic risk potential (Jungermann & Slovic, 1993; Renn, 1983). Severe
consequences have also been shown to be related to estimations of probability, as
demonstrated by von Winterfeldt et al. (1981), who found that low probability/high
consequence risks are perceived as having a greater likelihood than more probable risks
with lower consequences.

Interestingly, consequence characteristics of risk have become embedded within the
Dread factor, a concept that has since become inextricably linked to the role of emotion
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in risk judgement. The association of the Dread risk concept with emotional or instinctive
reactions to risk through the widening the meaning of Affect (Sjöberg, 2006a) has caused
some risk researchers to marvel that the importance of Affect was not recognised earlier,
given the initial recognition of the importance of Dread risk. This bridging of Dread and
Affect has led to the view that fear is the major determinant in risk judgments and that
―people will make their [risk] decision based on the dread of a particular event, rather
than based on the actual harm that may be inflicted‖ (Smith & Brooks, 2013, p. 55).
However, this widely held view has more recently been called into question.
Schusterschitz, Schütz, and Wiedemann (2010) found that ―the explanatory power of the
Dread factor is strongly influenced by the Severity of Consequences‖ (p. 394), an
interpretation previously advocated by Sjöberg (2006a), who asserts that ―a close look at
the definition of Dread shows that it is measured wholly, or mostly, with non-emotional
components which can be best summarised as measuring the perceived severity of
consequences‖ (p. 7). In clarification of this criticism, he states that ―this finding does not
imply that emotions are not important in risk perception, only that the evidence for their
importance is lacking in the Psychometric Paradigm‖ (Sjöberg, 2006a, p. 7).

Sjöberg‘s (2006b) view of the Dread factor is bolstered by the results reported in
Fischhoff et al.‘s (1978) seminal paper, where the Severity of Risk Consequence item
was found to have the highest factor loading of all of the Dread factor items. Palmer
(1996) agrees with the interpretation that risk consequence is of primary importance to
perceived risk, theorising that the primal response that Dread risk captures may be
attributed to an evolutionary instinct that provides an intuitive definition of potential
danger.

Although it may be argued that the role of Affect should have been recognised earlier
given the success of Dread as a determiner of risk perception, the nature of Dread risk as
Affect or consequence remains under debate. The same argument could be made for the
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Severity of Risk Consequences as having gone unrecognised as the predominant
characteristic of Dread risk. Sjöberg‘s (2006b) assertion that the Dread factor is a
heterogeneous blend of different risk characteristics, rather than a quantitative measure of
Affective risk reactions, is supported by Pidgeon et al. (2006) who argue that many of the
Dread characteristics tap into concerns unrelated to Affect. This view is supported by
Schusterschitz et al. (2010), who found that ―the explanatory power of the Dread factor is
strongly influenced by the Severity of Consequences‖ (p. 394).
However, Slovic and Peters (2006) assert that ―evidence of risk as feelings was present in
early studies of risk perception [and] those studies showed that feelings of Dread were the
major determiner of public perception and acceptance of risk for a wide range of hazards‖
(pp. 322-323). This highlights the need for an investigation of the Affective relationship
to Dread risk characteristics, as these dimensions ―may have a relationship to emotional
processes but they are not emotional per se and their emotional significance remains to be
documented‖ (Sjöberg, 2003b, p. 109). This demonstrates the gap in the knowledge.
Whether the prevailing interpretation of Dread risk as a measure of risk-as-feelings is a
valid view, or whether Dread risk is a measure of severe consequences is a question of
Affect.

3.6 Conclusion
This chapter discussed the significant findings in Psychometric risk perception research
as well as outlining the criticisms of the approach, providing a deeper understanding of
the Psychometric Paradigm, Dread risk and the association with Affect. Research into the
perception of risk is inherently difficult to draw a boundary around, with roots in many
disciplines. Many schools of thought contributed to the initial studies which paved the
way for sociology and psychology researchers to move to the fore in the study of risk
perception. Much of the success in the field of risk perception research may be attributed
to the Psychometric Paradigm, and to Dread risk in particular.
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Research has refined the concept of Dread risk to an emotional factor, principly in light
of research stressing the importance of the Affect Heuristic to perceived risk (Finucane et
al., 2000; Slovic et al., 2002, 2007; Slovic et al., 2005). However, there is debate over the
nature of Dread risk, which has implications for the way in which Psychometric risk
findings are interpreted. The assertion of Dread as Affect (Slovic & Peters, 2006) is in
contrast to a conception of Dread as severe consequences (Sjöberg, 2003b), and reveals
the gap in the knowledge this study sought to investigate.

The methodology used to address this gap in the knowledge is detailed in the following
chapter, which explains how the research problem was approached and describes the
reasoning behind the choice of methods used. The chapter discusses the sample
population and sampling strategy used in the study and outlines the reasoning behind the
approaches taken. The study design is discussed, showing how each of the approaches
taken were justified. The materials, methods and procedures used in the collection and
analysis are detailed, providing an overview of how the methodology was applied to the
research problem. The methodological limitations are discussed, outlining how they were
approached and how they impact the study results. The chapter summarises the methods
used to elicit and measure the Affective reaction to risk, and the approach taken to
establish the Affective association with estimations of risk consequence.
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY
4.1 Introduction
The problem of the nature of Psychometric Dread risk and its relationship to the
perception and estimation of risk consequence is a complex one. The problem was
characterised through a review of the literature and the theory supporting the study, as
well as through establishment of the research problem and Research Questions. The study
required a methodology that would address the Research Questions adequately and
thoroughly, and in a way that would not rely on any previous assumptions about the
nature of Psychometric Dread risk. This chapter explains how this goal was attained, how
the established research problem was approached, and describes the reasoning behind the
choice of methods used.

The discussion begins with an explanation of the sampling strategy that was employed,
and how the selection of this strategy was intended to maximise the reliability of the
results. The reasoning behind a three phase approach to the study is also discussed, and
how the selection of this approach was consistent with the aim of establishing an accurate
understanding of the nature of Dread risk, and its relationship to the estimation of risk
consequence. The methods and procedures used in the collection of data on the
perceptions of hazards via Dread risk and severity of risk consequence are described, as
are the approaches taken to analyse the data. It is noted that the research methodology
was not devoid of limitations. The manner in which each of the identified limitations
were addressed is discussed, together with their impact on the overall study.

From the review of the literature, it was established that one of the most significant
aspects in understanding the nature of Psychometric Dread risk is firmly anchored in the
concept of Affect and its impact on risk consequence perception. This chapter explains
the methods used to elicit and measure the Affective reaction to risk, and the approach
taken to establish the Affective association with estimations of risk consequence. The
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methods used to gain a clearer understanding of the nature of Psychometric Dread risk
are also discussed, and it is shown how the study sought to establish internal and external
validity through the use of appropriate sampling, data analysis, and comparison with
previous work in the area of Psychometric risk perception research.

4.2 Participants
It was established early in the study that the determination of an appropriate target
population and sample size would be essential in obtaining significant and valid results
from which confident conclusions could be drawn. By the very nature of the
investigation, obtaining data from a sample population that would be as representative as
possible would require an inventive approach if the study were not to suffer from the
limitations of previous Psychometric risk research. These past studies often relied largely
on the perspectives of small groups of respondents sampled for convenience rather than
representativeness.

The Psychometric Theory of Risk posits that the perceptions that drive risk judgements
are generalisable. According to Birnbaum (1999), the ―basis for generalisation is
similarity of an experiment to the domain of intended generalisation‖ (p. 245). As this
study employed Psychometric Risk elements in the research instruments, it was
determined that a general population of respondents would be sampled with as few
restrictions as possible. It was clear that in order to confidently assert that the results
obtained could be generalised to wider populations, then no specific demographic
restrictions could be placed on the populace from which the samples were drawn. It was
reasoned that using traditional methods such as the recruitment of undergraduate
university students to complete the research instruments, would be insufficient if the
study outcomes were to contribute new knowledge to the body of research on
Psychometric risk and risk perception.
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The solution came in the form of online crowdsourcing, defined as ―the practice of
obtaining needed services… by soliciting contributions from a large group of people…
especially from the online community‖ (Merriam-Webster, n.d.). Participants were
sourced via Amazon Mechanical Turk, an online service which crowd-sources tasks that
―require human intelligence to complete‖ (Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010, p. 411).
This service is increasingly being embraced as a feasible alternative for the collection of
data, allowing fast, anonymous recruitment of participants (Paolacci et al., 2010). In a
demographic study of 1000 Amazon Mechanical Turk users, Paolacci et al. (2010)
received responses from 66 different countries, and respondents were shown to be ―at
least as representative... as traditional subject pools‖ (p. 414).

Using this method, the study attracted participants from 28 countries including Canada,
India, Egypt, Indonesia, Jamaica, Koli, Romania, Sri Lanka, United Arab Emirates,
Argentina, Australia, Ghana, Guadalupe, Mexico, New Zealand, Pakistan, Russia,
Germany, Kenya, Macedonia, Panama, Serbia, South Korea, Haiti, Mauritius, Poland, the
United Kingdom, and the United States of America. The majority of participants were
based in the USA or India. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 71. This method
provided a solution to obtaining a suitably large and diverse sample of respondents. It
also provided tools to reduce any potential biases in the data set, such as
overrepresentation of a particular demographic, by allowing for a range of pre-screening
and demographic restrictions to be restricted or open.

However, it was recognised that the use of this method of participant recruitment might
result in simple non-random self-selection if participants were able to choose which
survey to complete. As a result, the research instruments were made available one at a
time, and no indication of the differences between them were made apparent in the
descriptions. The method was thus justified as providing the best solution to the general
population problem. The method also had the advantage of involving respondents who
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would likely have a greater commitment to the subject being studied, and who would
potentially afford greater thought and insight to their responses.

Further consideration of the sampling strategy then led to the issue of how best to
determine an appropriate representative sample size from a population with no definite
boundaries. To overcome this limitation, it was reasoned that a representative sample size
could be established from the results of Phases One and Two using statistical Power
Analysis. Such a method of determining the sample size required for a significant chance
of detecting the minimum value of interest (Kraemer & Thiemann, 1987) could then
inform the required sample size of the third Phase of the study, where the methodology of
the first two Phases could be replicated.

In order to satisfy the requirements for calculating a sample size in this way, several
values had to be estimated. These estimations were not arbitrary, but based on the results
of the Phase One and Two data analysis. It was reasoned that if Affect were associated
with risk perceptions, then Affective responses would be expected to be significantly
different from the neutral responses. This difference was used as the critical effect size in
the Power Analysis for sample size, informing the study of what probability to assign to
maximize the chance of detecting a significant result (Kraemer & Thiemann, 1987). As a
result, the first two study Phases employed a total sample size of N=200. Based on the
results of the Power Analysis, the third study Phase total sample size was N=1638.

4.3 Research Design
The Psychometric Theory of Risk falls within the positivist, objectivist paradigm of risk
and ―has produced valuable insights into risk perception and decision making (Zinn &
Taylor-Gooby, 2006b). Positivism makes the assumption of a set of universal laws that
underlie social interactions (Wardlow, 1989), and that these laws were ―understandable
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through empirical investigation‖ (Kim, 2003, p. 11). Popkewitz (1980) outlines five
fundamental assumptions of positivistic research, which include:

1. Researchers are able to understand social interactions in the same way that the
properties of the physical world can be examined and understood.
2. Theory is fundamental tool for inferring and describing behaviour and phenomena
that is generalisable across settings.
3. Study participants are assumed to have an independent existence from the
researcher.
4. Knowledge is formalised through theory.
5. Theorised knowledge is ―tested by the quantification of observations and by the
use of statistical analyses‖ (Kim, 2003, p. 10).

According to Kim (2003), ―the taxonomy of positivism should be considered the methodof-choice relative to interpretive and critical science because of its ability to uphold best
the validity of findings and generalisability of results‖ (p. 9). Given that the Psychometric
theory falls within the positivist, objectivist paradigm of risk, a quantitative methodology
was developed with a positivist research approach.

The study design was conceived as a three Phase process. The first Phase of the study
involved surveying two cohorts of respondents using a Psychometric Dread risk research
instrument. One cohort would respond to a neutral worded survey, while the other cohort
would respond to a survey designed to elicit an Affective response. The neutral and
Affective data collected would then be analysed using descriptive statistical analysis,
Independent Samples t-tests, Factor Analysis, and Multidimensional Scaling. The
analysis was expected to also result in neutral and Affective Dread risk spatial maps
which would be compared with each other, and with previous Psychometric Risk studies
(figure 4.1).
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Figure 4.1.

Phase One study design.

The second Phase of the study involved a neutral-worded and an Affective-worded Risk
Consequence Task. In this survey, respondents were asked to estimate the seriousness of
the risk consequences associated with the six hazards used in Phase One. The collated
data was analysed and compared with the Phase One data using several statistical
measures including descriptive statistics, Independent Samples t-tests, multiple regression
analysis and reliability analysis (figure 4.2).
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Figure 4.2.

Phase Two study design.

Phase Three largely replicated the procedure of Phases One and Two, with some
modifications to address the identified limitations in the first two Phases. The third Phase
recruited a larger sample size than the first two Phases, and enlisted four separate groups
of participants rather than two. The Phase Three Risk Consequence surveys also included
questions asking respondent‘s to estimate of the amount of harm and benefit associated
with each hazard.

The need to confirm that Affect had actually been manipulated was addressed by
examining whether the Phase Three Affective cohort displayed a greater inverse riskbenefit association compared with the neutral cohort (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and
MacGregor, 2002). This provided Phase Three of the study with an indicator that a
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greater level of Affect had been elicited in the Affective cohort than the neutral cohort. In
addition, the Risk Consequence Task included Affective framing statements for each
hazard. The data analysis for Phase Three included descriptive statistics, Independent
Samples t-tests, Multidimensional Scaling, and reliability analysis (figure 4.3).

Figure 4.3.

Phase Three study design.
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4.4 Research Instruments
In order to build upon established theory, the initial conception of the research
instruments were as a series of surveys based on the Dread aspect of Psychometric risk
used within a between-subjects framework. According to Trumbo (1996), Psychometric
risk research has shown that there are several important dimensions to risk perception,
particularly Dread and Knowledge. As Dread risk is commonly viewed as the emotional
factor, it was determined that the study would focus on the Dread risk factor alone. The
study would also draw on previous Psychometric risk research by focusing on six
different hazards. The locations of these hazards within the Dread spectrum were
established via reference to Slovic‘s (1987, p. 282) spatial representation of 81 hazards,
chosen due to their dispersion across the Dread risk axis (figure 4.4).

Figure 4.4.

Psychometric Dread risk locations of six hazards (adapted from Slovic,
1987, p. 282).

The Psychometric Dread risk research instruments (Appendix A) utilised the set of ten
Psychometric Dread risk factor items identified by Slovic (1987), upon which to base
questions regarding the six different hazards (table 4.1).
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Table 4.1
Dread factor items used in the research instruments

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Dread Factor Items
(Slovic, 1987)
Uncontrollable
6. Future generations
Dread
7. Not easily reduced
Consequences Fatal
8. Risk increasing
Not Equitable
9. Involuntary
Catastrophic
10. Global Catastrophic

In order for the study to maintain an accurate context of Dread risk, it was determined
that all ten of Slovic‘s (1987) Dread risk factor items would be used in the research
instruments. The reasons for this were twofold. First, all ten Dread factor items were
deemed necessary in order for a valid assessment of the potential Affect associations to
be made. Second, in order to ascertain the level of reliability and validity of the collected
data, a method consistent with that used by Slovic (1987) was considered essential.
However, the conception of Dread risk attained from the review of the literature
highlighted the heterogeneous nature of the ten items making up the factor, and some
delineation of emotional and severity of consequence items had to be made.

It was reasoned that perceptions of the six hazards would be driven by some combination
of the Dread risk characteristics. For this reason, the Dread risk factor items were
theoretically categorised into emotional and severity of consequence items. The
categorisation of the severity of consequence items was based on whether the item could
conceivably be used to rate the severity of a risk consequence using a unit of magnitude.
The decision to split the Dread item from the rest of the Dread factor was based on
semantics, an approach identical to that used by L. Sjöberg (personal communication,
October 28, 2011) in his investigations into the Dread risk factor (Sjöberg, 2006b).
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In addition to the separation of emotional and severity of consequence Dread risk items, a
third aspect to the Dread risk factor emerged from this process. This third aspect was
made up of the items Uncontrollable, Not Equitable, and Involuntary (table 4.2).
Table 4.2.
Split of the Dread Factor items
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Original Dread Factor
Items (Slovic, 1987)
Uncontrollable
Dread
Consequences Fatal
Not Equitable
Catastrophic
Future generations
Not easily reduced
Risk increasing
Involuntary
Global Catastrophic

Severity of Consequence
Items

Emotional
Items

Other Items
Uncontrollable

Dread
Consequences Fatal
Not Equitable
Catastrophic
Future generations
Not easily reduced
Risk increasing
Involuntary
Global Catastrophic

With this determination of the character of the Psychometric Dread risk factor to be used
in the study, along with the simplification of its heterogeneous nature into three logical
aspects, the next stage was to develop the research instruments and determine how they
would be employed in each of the study‘s three Phases.

The data collection instruments for the study comprised of a Psychometric Dread risk
research instrument and a simple Risk Consequence Task. The Psychometric Dread risk
instrument utilised the ten Dread risk factor items identified by Slovic (1987) for use in
the first and third Phases of the study. The ten Dread risk questions were worded around
each of the six hazards, resulting in 60 Psychometric Dread risk questions (Figure 4.5).
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Figure 4.5.

Psychometric Risk survey format.

This instrument was then refined into two versions; a neutral-worded version and an
Affective-worded version, based on words selected from the Affective Norms for English
Words (ANEW) list (Bradley & Lang, 2010). The Affective Norms for English Words
(ANEW) list is produced by the University of Florida and provides a ―set of normative
emotional ratings for a large number of words in the English language‖ (Bradley & Lang,
2010, p. 2). The ANEW list is essentially a set of ―verbal materials that had been rated‖
(Bradley & Lang, 2010, p. 2) in terms of pleasure (happy/unhappy), arousal
(calm/excited), and dominance (control/in-control). The wording chosen for the
Psychometric research instruments was required to be either emotionally provocative or
emotionally neutral, and were selected for their potential impact on perceptions of risk
consequences.

This process involved the comparison of the wording of the Psychometric Dread risk
questions used by Slovic (1987) with alternative words found in the ANEW list (Bradley
& Lang, 2010). The wording used in Slovic‘s (1987) version of the ten Psychometric
Dread risk questions were examined, and any words that had mean ANEW valences that
were very high (positive words) or very low (negative words) were identified. These were
replaced with neutral words of an average valence from the ANEW list (Bradley & Lang,
2010), resulting in a 60 question neutral Psychometric Dread risk research instrument in
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which the wording was Affectively neutral, and therefore less likely to influence hazard
perceptions via emotional influence.

The next step in the development of the research instruments was to produce an
Affectively worded version of the Psychometric Dread risk survey. The survey was
developed by reviewing the newly produced neutral-worded instrument against the
ANEW list (Bradley & Lang, 2010) and identifying words which could be replaced with
negative Affective words for the Affective version of the instrument. The final result was
two 60 question Psychometric Dread risk surveys, one with neutral wording, and one
with negative Affective wording.
In order to replicate the method in which Slovic‘s (1987) survey asked participants to
respond to the questions, a seven-point Likert scale was used. As with previous
Psychometric risk studies (Fischhoff, Slovic, Litchtenstein, Read, & Combs, 1978;
Slovic, 1987; Slovic, Malmfors, Mertz, Neil, & Purchase, 1997; Trumbo, 1996), the
category labels for the Psychometric risk instruments were located at the extremes (1 and
7), and were altered from question to question, depending on which hazards and risk
characteristics were being referred to.

The process of selecting neutral and Affective words was repeated for the creation of the
simple Risk Consequence Task instruments utilised in Phases Two and Three of the
study. The seven-point Likert scale of the Risk Consequence Task instruments employed
the term ‗serious‘ as the basis for the category labels. The term ‗serious‘ has a mean
ANEW valence of 5.08 (Bradley & Lang, 2010), making it a word of relatively neutral
emotional arousal. This ensured that any potential influence of the category label wording
on respondents‘ estimations of risk consequences was controlled and consistent. In
addition, neutral cohort were asked what they thought about the hazards while the
Affective cohort were asked how they felt.
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The neutrally and Affectively worded Risk Consequence Task instruments (Appendix B)
produced for Phase Two required respondents to simply estimate the severity of the
consequences of each of the same six hazards used in the Psychometric Dread risk
surveys. The Phase Three Risk Consequence Task survey included questions relating to
perceptions of harm and benefit. Respondents were asked to estimate the potential
amount of harm caused by the hazard, as well as perceptions of benefit in addition to the
severity of risk consequence.

In addition, each hazard was introduced with a simple framing statement which
highlighted either the negative or positive aspects of each risk. The negative aspects of
the six hazards were presented in the Affective version of the instrument, and the positive
aspects were highlighted for the neutrally worded version of the instrument. These
modifications were made to the Phase Three Risk Consequence Task research
instruments after the analysis of the Phase One and Two results, in order to further
explore the relationship between Dread, Affect and consequence independently of the
Psychometric approach. The framing statements were included to further elicit an
Affective reaction to the six hazards to better assess the role Affect might play in the
estimation of risk consequence, and its relationship to the concept of Dread.

4.5 Data Collection
The research instruments for the three study Phases were developed into online versions
using the using Qualtrics software (Qualtrics, Provo, UT, 2014). The Amazon
Mechanical Turk service (Amazon.com, 2014) was used to recruit participants, who were
then redirected to the Qualtrics online surveys. Phases One and Two of the study were
executed simultaneously, and involved two independent cohorts in a between-subjects
design. The first cohort (n=100) completed the neutral Psychometric Dread risk survey
and the neutral Risk Consequence Task, while the second cohort (n=100) completed the
Affective versions of the same research instruments.
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The participants recruited using the Amazon Mechanical Turk service via the link from
the Amazon Mechanical Turk website to the online surveys. They were provided with an
electronic participant information sheet (Appendix C) and consent document (Appendix
D) upon volunteering to participate in the study. Using Paolacci et al.‘s, (2010, p. 412)
assessment of average Amazon Mechanical Turk task earnings as a guide, respondents
were offered US$0.30 per completed survey. This approach proved to be a successful
estimate in Phases One and Two, and generated N=222 responses within one week. Once
participants had completed the survey, they were paid for their participation through the
Amazon Mechanical Turk system. Once the initial Phase One and Two quota of N=200
participants was exceeded, the survey was closed and the data was downloaded into a
spreadsheet program in preparation for cleansing.

Phase Three of the study replicated the research instruments from Phases One and Two,
but with some improvements. In Phase Three, four independent cohorts of respondents
were used, rather than the two cohorts used in Phases One and Two, employing
independent cohorts of respondents for each of the Psychometric Dread risk and Risk
Consequence Task surveys. Based on a two-tailed a-priori Power Analysis which was
conducted at the end of Phases One and Two, a sample size of n=481 for each of the four
cohorts in Phase Three was required to achieve 80% statistical Power, yielding a total
sample size target of N=1924. The final number of valid responses was N=1638. These
consisted of neutral (n=370) and Affective (n=401) cohorts for the Psychometric Dread
risk survey, as well as a neutral (n=434) and Affective (n=433) cohorts for the Risk
Consequence estimation survey.
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4.6 Data Analysis
The data from Phases One and Two were collated into a spreadsheet and analysed using
the SPSS Statistics package version 21 (IBM Corp., Armonk, NY). The Phase One data
was analysed first by way of descriptive statistics, Independent Samples t-tests,
Multidimensional Scaling Analysis and Factor Analysis. The variables under
measurement included the ten Dread risk characteristics as well as the average overall
dread risk perception for each hazard. In addition, estimations of the severity of risk
consequence, harm and benefit were measured. Each of these variables were measured
for the neutral and Affective cohorts. Each variable was measured on a seven-point Likert
scale.

The descriptive statistical analysis provided an assessment of the mean risk perceptions
and the variability among the surveyed cohorts. The Independent Samples t-tests
provided a method of assessing whether any differences between the risk perceptions of
the Affective and neutral cohorts were statistically significant. The Multidimensional
Scaling Analysis was used to compare the data with previous Psychometric studies,
thereby allowing for an assessment of the external validity of the results. This measure
also provided an additional method of comparison of the neutral and Affective results.
Factor analysis was used as a method of exploring the Psychometric Dread risk factor,
and identifying the constructs that arose from the ten Dread factor items, and how these
constructs related to Affect, Dread, and severity of risk consequence. Upon completion of
the Phase One data analysis, the results of Phase Two were assessed.

The analysis of the Phase Two data involved descriptive statistical analysis, Independent
Samples t-tests, and Multiple Regression analysis. In order to compare Psychometric risk
perceptions and estimations of risk consequence, a measure of multiple correlation was
obtained using the standard Multiple Regression analysis model. This analysis allowed
for an assessment of the degree of association between the responses to the ten Dread
factor items form Phase One and the neutral and Affective responses to the Risk
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Consequence Task from Phase Two. The Phase two data analysis also included a
determination of the sample size required for Phase Three via the use of statistical Power
Analysis. The results obtained from the analysis of the Phase One and Two data allowed
for any limitations to be identified and addressed before the initiation of the third and
final Phase of the Study.

Phase Three of the study was largely designed to replicate the analysis of Phases One and
Two, with the aim of either confirming or refuting the results found in the initial Phases
using a more robust sample size and with appropriate modifications to the methodology.
The first two study Phases also indicated which statistical measures yielded the most
significant results related to answering the Research Questions. Phase Three therefore
applied many of the same statistical measures as Phases One and Two. These included
descriptive data analysis, Independent Samples t-tests, Multidimensional Scaling and
Factor Analysis. Each of the study Phases also included assessments as to the validity and
reliability of the results, determined through Cronbach‘s Alpha Coefficient, and
comparison of the results between the Three Phases. A comparison of the results obtained
with the previous Psychometric work on which the study was based (Slovic, 1987) also
allowed for a measure of external validity to be obtained.

4.7 Reliability and Validity
Validity may be defined as the careful use of sampling, instrumentation and statistical
analysis of the data (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2007, p. 112) to accurately measure
what is intended to be measured. In order to demonstrate internal validity, the study
needed to provide evidence that it was the measured variables that were contributing to
the results and not extraneous variables (Graziano & Raulin, 2004, p. 138). Consistency
in instrumentation was maintained so that changes in measurement methods would not be
a factor in weakening internal validity. As the study involved comparison of the
responses in a between-groups design, functional equivalence of the groups was
maintained so that any differences in risk judgements would more likely be a product of
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response to the variables, reducing the potential for bias in this area. Finally, participants
were unaware that the results obtained were to be compared with another group, or to
which group they belonged, mitigating self-selection bias.
Reliability may be defined as ―dependability, consistency, and replicability over time,
over instruments, and over groups of respondents‖ (Cohen et al., 2007, p. 146). In order
to determine the reliability of the results, several measures were used, including
comparison of results within the study and with previous research, as well as the use of
Cronbach‘s alpha coefficient, which provides ―a unique estimate of the reliability of a
given test‖ (Gliem & Gliem, 2003, p. 84).

The test yields an alpha coefficient between 0 (unreliable) and 1 (perfectly reliable)
(Cohen et al., 2007, p. 506), and was used as a measure of the internal consistency and
reliability of the data. The Multidimensional Scaling Analysis was compared with the
results of Slovic‘s (1987) Psychometric study of 81 hazards to determine the reliability
and external validity of the results obtained. This method also provided a measure of the
reliability and validity of the results through triangulation of the spatial maps obtained in
Phases One and Three with each other and Slovic‘s (1987) results.

4.8 Limitations of the Methodology
The following is a summary of the limitations of the methodology. An issue that was
identified early in the conception of the research project was that the theory underpinning
the study placed very few restrictions on the way risks are perceived. As the target
population was defined as a ‗general population‘, the boundaries were unclear. It was
recognised that if the study were not to suffer from the limitations of previous
Psychometric risk research, which often relied largely on the perspectives of small groups
of respondents sampled for convenience rather than representativeness, then a more
robust methodology would be required. This limitation was addressed using statistical
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Power Analysis which determined an appropriate sample size for Phase Three from the
general population of Amazon Mechanical Turk users based on the initial data collected
in Phases One and Two. The use of Amazon Mechanical Turk for recruitment of
participants raised the question of whether using such a method may introduce a degree
of self-selection bias. It was recognised that the use of this method of participant
recruitment might result in simple non-random self-selection if participants were able to
choose which survey to complete.

As a result, the research instruments were made available one at a time, and no indication
of the differences between them were made apparent in the descriptions. The method was
thus justified as providing the best solution to collecting an appropriate number of
responses from a sufficiently diverse population. It was also considered that there was a
potential for inconsistencies in the logic used to ascribe meaning (semantics) to the
neutral and Affective words, given that the target population was sourced globally, with
participants likely to have come from diverse cultural and linguistic backgrounds.
Although it was anticipated that the use of words from the ANEW list (Bradley & Lang,
2010) would provide a level of consistency in interpretation, the potential remained for
differences in word interpretation to influence reported perceptions of risk.

This limitation was considered to be present, but somewhat mitigated by the increase in
the sample size in Phase Three, which indicated remarkably similar results to those found
in the first two Phases of the study. The influence of individual concentration on the
survey as it was completed was also identified as a potential limitation in Phase one and
Two. As a result, the Phase Three subjects were asked a concentration check question to
mitigate concentration loss during completion of the research instruments. Any incorrect
answers to a simple question (for example, how many days in one week) were eliminated
from the data set.
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4.9 Conclusion
The review of the literature highlighted that Psychometric Dread risk is largely
considered to be centred around the concept of Affect. The focus of this Thesis was to
understand the impact of Affect on Dread risk characteristics and risk consequence
perception. A methodology was sought that could provide an avenue to make such an
assessment.

This chapter explained the methods used to elicit and measure the Affective relationship
to Dread risk characteristics, and the approach taken to establish the Affective association
with estimations of risk consequence. The chapter also demonstrated how the study
sought to establish internal and external validity through the use of appropriate sampling,
data analysis, and comparison with previous work in the area of Psychometric risk
perception research.

The following chapter describes the results and data analysis of the first Phase of the
study, which was an assessment of the nature of Psychometric Dread risk. The
relationship between Affect and risk perception via Psychometric Dread risk
characteristics was the focus of Phase One. The first Phase of the study assessed Dread
risk in its purported role as Affect, while also providing an assessment of the factor
without this assumption.
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CHAPTER 5: PHASE ONE
5.1 Introduction
The previous chapter demonstrated how the methodology was conceived and designed in
order to meet the aims and objectives of the study and to develop a response to the
Research Questions. This chapter details the implementation of the first study Phase,
including the design, procedure and data analysis. This Phase involved participants
completing either a neutral-worded or an Affective-worded Psychometric risk survey in a
between-subjects design. The analyses of data using various statistical measures are
presented, together with a summary of the results. The limitations identified in this initial
Phase are also outlined, together with improvements for the second and third Phases of
the study. This chapter concludes with a summary of the Phase One design,
implementation, and outcomes.
.
5.2 Phase One Sample
Participants for the study (N=200) were sourced via Amazon Mechanical Turk, an online
service which crowd-sources tasks that ―require human intelligence to complete‖
(Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010, p. 411). This Phase of the study attracted
respondents from eleven countries, including Canada, China, Egypt, Germany, Hungary,
India, Israel, Italy, Philippines, Taiwan, United Kingdom, and the United States of
America. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 67 years old.

5.3 Phase One Design
The between-subjects design of Phase One required that two separate research
instruments be developed for the two cohorts. These consisted of neutral-worded and
Affective-worded Psychometric Dread risk surveys (Appendix A). The neutral and
Affective cohorts were independent, and responses were gathered on two different
occasions. Care was taken to ensure that one participant could not complete both surveys.
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The Dread risk perceptions of the two cohorts were then compared through statistical
analysis. The results were recorded and the limitations of the phase noted.

5.3.1 Phase One Research Instruments
The study‘s aim to assess Affective associations with Dread risk characteristics meant
that the instruments focused on the items making up the Dread risk factor identified by
Slovic (1987), while ignoring the Knowledge risk factor. The Psychometric risk surveys
referred to six different hazards which have been found in previous work to be located
across the Dread risk spectrum, ranging from low Dread to high Dread. The locations of
Aspirin, vaccines, smoking, fossil fuels, uranium mining and nuclear reactor accidents
within the Dread risk spectrum were established via reference to Slovic‘s (1987, p. 282)
spatial representation of 81 hazards.

The Phase One Psychometric risk research instruments utilised a set of ten Dread risk
factor items (or characteristics) identified by Slovic (1987) upon which the questions
regarding the six different hazards were based. The ten Dread risk questions were worded
around each of the six hazards, resulting in 60 Psychometric Dread risk questions. This
instrument was then refined into two versions; a neutral-worded version and an
Affective-worded version, based on words selected from the Affective Norms for English
Words (ANEW) list (Bradley & Lang, 2010).
The ANEW list is a set of ―verbal materials that have been rated‖ (Bradley & Lang,
2010) in terms of their emotional valence (happy/unhappy), arousal (calm/excited), and
dominance (control/in-control). The wording chosen for the Psychometric research
instruments was intended to either elicit negative Affect or to be emotionally neutral, and
were selected for their potential impact on perceptions of risk consequences. Using the
ANEW list, the difference between the neutral and Affective emotional valences of word
choices for each Dread risk item could be assessed and selected accordingly.
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5.3.2 Phase One Procedure
Using a between-subjects design, two independent cohorts of Phase One respondents
were surveyed (N=200). The first cohort (n=100) completed the Affective-worded
Psychometric instrument, while the second cohort (n=100) completed the neutral-worded
version of the same instrument. Participants were sourced from the Amazon Mechanical
Turk service and were able to complete the research instrument created with Qualtrics
online survey software. Participants were directed to the Qualtrics survey via the Amazon
Turk service.

Respondents rated their perceptions of ten Psychometric Dread risk characteristics for six
different hazards. As with previous Psychometric risk studies (Fischhoff, Slovic,
Litchtenstein, Read, & Combs, 1978; Slovic, 1987; Slovic, Malmfors, Mertz, Neil, &
Purchase, 1997; Trumbo, 1999), responses most closely representing respondents‘ risk
judgements were recorded on a seven-point Likert scale.

5.4 Phase One Data Analysis
Analysis of the data collected during Phase One employed several statistical measures to
describe the data, compare the groups of respondents, and determine any association of
Affect with Dread risk characteristics. The results of the completed surveys were first
collated and subjected to an initial data cleanse. In order to ensure accuracy and validity
of the data, each individual‘s results were inspected for completeness and any obvious
errors. Data based on descriptive statistics were generated from a small sample of
respondents to estimate the average time taken to complete the instruments. Any
respondent completing the survey in a very short time was eliminated from the data. Of
222 responses, 22 were rejected. The main reasons for response rejection were
incomplete surveys or invalid responses (such as responses with only 7‘s or 1‘s for all
questions).
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5.4.1 Descriptive Analysis
Once the data had been cleansed, the distributions of all data sets were tested for
normality using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic with a Lilliefors significance level.
This first step was essential, as the outcome would have a direct impact on the type and
power of the statistical tests that could subsequently be applied. A subset of thirty simple
random samples of the neutral and Affective data sets was generated using the Statistics
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS).

The distribution of these samples were then tested for normality using the KolmogorovSmirnov statistic with a Lilliefors significance level, and through inspection of the
normality plots and histograms (Coakes, Steed, & Ong, 2010, p. 41). The results of these
tests indicated that the data were normally distributed (p>.05) for all hazards except the
Affective responses to the Vaccine hazard. However, inspection of the histograms and
normality plots associated with the Vaccine hazard indicated that the assumption of
normality had not been violated (table 5.1).

Table 5.1
Kolmogorov-Smirnoff statistic for each neutral and Affective hazard data
Hazard
Aspirin
Vaccines
Smoking
Fossil Fuels
Uranium Mining
Nuclear Reactor Accidents

Affect (p)
.144
.012
.2
.2
.2
.2

Neutral (p)
.2
.2
.2
.2
.2
.2

Confirmation of the assumption that the data were normally distributed provided
justification for the use of parametric statistical tests. Parametric tests ―make assumptions
about the wider population‖ (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2007, p. 318), and allow the
comparison of sub-populations within the wider population.
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Measures of central tendency were then calculated via the mean and the standard
deviations to test for variability. The overall mean of the neutral Psychometric Dread risk
scale was calculated to be M=4.49 (SD=1.66). The Affective data had a mean of M=4.43
(SD=1.86). The mean and standard deviation was then calculated for each hazard on all
questions/Dread items for the neutral research instrument (table 5.2).
Table 5.2
Descriptive statistics for the neutral instrument by hazard and Dread item
Aspirin

Vaccines

Smoking

Fossil Fuels
M

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

Uncontrollable

3.6

1.80

3.96

1.55

3.90

1.73

Dread

3.57

1.57

3.62

1.53

4.86

Consequences
Fatal

3.93

1.65

3.86

1.42

Not Equitable

4.12

1.61

4.48

Catastrophic

3.56

1.75

Future
generations

3.83

Not easily
reduced

Uranium
Mining

SD

M

4.52

1.56

4.9

1.64

4.45

1.46

5.64

1.24

4.88

1.50

4.63

1.53

3.86

1.54

4.72

1.69

4.24

1.47

3.54

1.64

3.86

Risk increasing

4.37

1.22

Involuntary

2.98

Global
Catastrophic

3.26

SD

Nuclear
Accidents
M

SD

1.64

4.96

1.63

4.75

1.53

5.34

1.41

1.35

5.42

1.25

5.90

1.29

4.42

1.57

4.61

1.40

4.46

1.66

1.54

4.67

1.32

5.06

1.46

5.68

1.29

4.92

1.55

4.91

1.42

5.22

1.52

5.66

1.36

1.50

4.50

1.58

4.7

1.47

4.87

1.58

5.41

1.46

4.12

1.30

5.14

1.40

5.2

1.24

4.93

1.42

5.30

1.31

1.37

3.0

1.25

2.88

1.35

3.9

1.65

3.73

1.57

4.33

1.89

1.64

3.86

1.55

4.40

1.51

5.08

1.32

5.30

1.26

5.51

1.43

The results for the neutral Psychometric instrument showed the Dread item Involuntary to
consistently have the lowest mean all hazards, suggesting that perceptions of voluntary
choice were relatively positive, although fossil fuel, uranium mining and nuclear reactor
accident hazards were seen as less voluntary. Smoking, uranium mining and nuclear
reactor accidents were all previewed to have fatal consequences. Neutral Dread item
means generally increased overall from low Dread hazards such as Aspirin and vaccines
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to the high Dread hazards, uranium mining and nuclear reactor accidents. The two
hazards located closest to the centre of the Dread risk spectrum were smoking and fossil
fuels.

The standard deviation was also calculated for each neutral Dread item in each hazard to
determine the amount of variance in the risk perceptions. The greatest variations in risk
perceptions were found in the Dread item Uncontrollable for the hazards Aspirin,
vaccination, smoking and uranium mining and in Involuntary for the fossil fuel and
nuclear reactor accident hazards. This indicated less agreement over these characteristics
of the risks. The Dread items which demonstrated the most uniform perceptions of risk
were Risk Increasing for Aspirin and fossil fuels, Consequences Fatal for smoking,
uranium mining and nuclear reactor accidents, and Involuntary for the vaccination
hazard. The means and standard deviations were then calculated for each hazard on all
Dread items for the Affective research instrument (table 5.3).
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Table 5.3
Descriptive statistics for the Affective instrument by hazard and Dread item
Aspirin

Vaccines

Smoking

Fossil Fuels

Uranium
Mining

Nuclear
Accidents

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

Uncontrollable

3.18

2.06

3.61

1.88

3.51

1.97

4.61

1.82

5.16

1.59 5.22

1.64

Dread

3.34

1.69

3.16

1.77

4.79

1.66

4.02

1.76

4.70

1.67 5.32

1.49

Consequences
Fatal

3.32

1.76

3.11

1.69

5.38

1.44

4.33

1.78

5.02

1.62 5.95

1.38

Not Equitable

4.26

1.58

4.33

1.78

4.81

1.64

4.12

1.74

4.74

1.75 4.60

1.70

Catastrophic

3.23

1.88

3.24

1.96

4.55

1.91

4.39

1.61

5.40

1.37 5.70

1.45

Future
generations

3.91

1.80

4.15

1.75

4.86

1.77

4.83

1.65

5.45

1.43 5.84

1.49

Not easily
reduced

3.33

1.75

3.62

1.80

4.52

1.76

4.79

1.55

5.03

1.65 5.47

1.43

Risk increasing

4.32

1.36

3.82

1.57

5.23

1.44

5.34

1.26

4.98

1.35 5.18

1.46

Involuntary

3.13

1.55

3.75

1.77

4.88

1.81

4.12

1.93

3.98

2.03 4.24

2.28

Global
Catastrophic

3.26

1.72

3.81

1.74

4.48

1.80

5.20

1.39

5.17

1.51 5.58

1.42

The results for the Affective Psychometric instrument indicated that Aspirin and fossil
fuel hazards were associated with increasing risk, while vaccination was not seen as an
equitable hazard. The consequences smoking hazard and nuclear reactor accidents were
perceived as being Fatal, and concern for Future Generations in regards to uranium
mining was evident. Examination of the lowest means indicated perception of choice in
exposure to Aspirin, uranium mining and nuclear reactor accidents. Vaccines were not
perceived to have Fatal Consequences and smoking was seen as a controllable risk. Dread
was found to be of least concern to fossil fuels. For each hazard, the standard deviation
was also calculated for each Dread item for the Affective cohort in order to determine the
amount of variance in the risk perceptions.
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The Dread items demonstrating the greatest variations in risk perception were
Uncontrollable for Aspirin and smoking, Involuntary for fossil fuels, uranium mining and
nuclear reactor accidents, and Not Equitable for the vaccination hazard. The most
uniform perceptions of risk were found in the Dread risk item Risk Increasing for all
hazards except fossil fuels and uranium mining, for which Consequences Fatal was found
to have the lowest standard deviation. A summary table of the mean Psychometric Dread
Risk perceptions for each hazard was then constructed (table 5.4)

Table 5.4
Summary of neutral and Affective Descriptives by hazard and Dread item
Neutral
Mean
SD

Affective
Mean
SD

Aspirin

3.68

1.59

3.53

1.72

Vaccines

3.89

1.46

3.66

1.77

Smoking

4.76

1.51

4.5

1.72

Fossil Fuels

4.67

1.44

4.58

1.65

Uranium Mining

4.88

1.46

4.96

1.6

Nuclear Accidents

5.26

1.47

5.31

1.57

The mean Affective and neutral Dread risk responses were then plotted graphically to
visualise any differences between neutral and Affective perceptions for each hazard
(figure 5.1).
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Figure 5.1.

Mean neutral and Affective Dread risk perceptions of each hazard.

Compared with the neutral responses, the results showed lower mean Affective Dread
risk perceptions for the four lower Dread hazards, but marginally higher mean Affective
responses for uranium mining and nuclear reactor accidents.

5.4.2 Independent Samples t-test
In order to ascertain the significance of the differences in the mean perceptions of Dread
risk characteristics, an independent samples t-test was conducted. The t-test is a robust
parametric measure ideal for between-subjects studies (Coakes et al., 2010). The purpose
of the test was to determine whether the differences between the mean neutral and
Affective responses to each hazard were statistically significant.

In addition to requiring a between-subjects study design, the independent samples t-test
relies on the assumption that the two surveyed cohorts are drawn from population with
equal variances, determined via the Levene test for equality of variances (Coakes et al.,
2010). The results of the Levene‘s test for equality of variances indicated that for each
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hazard, the t-test should be interpreted with equal variances assumed (p>.05). The results
of the independent samples t-test on the overall mean Dread risk factor for each hazard
indicated that none of the mean Affective Dread risk responses to the six hazards were
significantly different to the mean neutral Dread risk perceptions.

In order to more closely examine the individual characteristics making up the Dread risk
factor, a second one-tailed independent samples t-test was performed on the mean Dread
factor items for each hazard, as opposed to the overall Dread risk factor mean. Initial
analysis revealed that equal variances could be assumed for the significant results, as
indicated by Levene‘s test for equality of variances (p>.05).

The results indicated statistically significant medium to strong differences between some
neutral and Affective items for some hazards. The Consequences Fatal item was found to
be significantly different for the Affective compared to neutral mean responses for
Aspirin (t(174) = 2.36, p=.04, d=.36), vaccines (t(174) = 3.18, p=.02, d=.48), and fossil
fuels (t(174) = 2.32, p=.04, d=.35). Affective responses to Involuntary was also found to
be significantly different to the neutral responses for the vaccination hazard (t(174) = 3.27, p=0.2, d=.49), as was the Catastrophic item (t(174) = 2.34, p=.04, d=.35 ). This
indicated that Affect was associated with Fatal, Catastrophic and Involuntary Dread risk
characteristics.

5.4.3 Multidimensional Scaling Analysis
It was anticipated that the Multidimensional Scaling Analysis (MDS) would produce
low-dimensional plots, or spatial maps, of the neutral and Affective Dread risk data. The
neutral and Affective spatial maps would be compared with one another, as well as with
the low-dimensional plots produced by previous Psychometric studies. This would
indicate whether Affect was associated with the locations of the hazards within the Dread
risk spectrum.
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The MDS was completed in two stages. First, the Psychometric data was analysed via
Multivariate Analysis of Variance using a multi-factor design, which allowed for the
exploration of several variables without artificially inflating the significance level (Hand
& Taylor, 1987). Next, the Psychometric data was transformed using multidimensional
scaling to perform an ordination of the data, placing it in a low-dimensional coordinate
system (Johnson & Wichern, 2002). The resulting spatial map demonstrated the
Psychometric Dread risk locations of the six neutral and Affective risk hazards in a single
Dread dimension (figure 5.2).

Figure 5.2.

Neutral and Affective hazard locations within the Dread spectrum.

When the spatial maps of the neutral and Affective data sets were overlayed, it was
anticipated that id Affect were associated with Dread risk perceptions, the Affective
locations would be shifted towards higher Dread locations in comparison to the neutral
locations. However, where vaccines, uranium mining and nuclear reactor accidents
demonstrated slightly higher Dread locations, Aspirin, smoking and fossil fuels occupied
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slightly lower Dread locations in the Affective condition compared with the neutral
(figure 5.3).

Figure 5.3.

Low-dimensional spatial locations of the six hazards.

The resulting low-dimensional plot was then compared with Slovic‘s (1987, p. 282)
spatial map from which the study‘s six hazards arose (figure 5.4).

Figure 5.4.

Slovic‘s locations of six hazards within the Dread spectrum (adapted from
Slovic, 1987, p. 282).

102
In order to compare Slovic‘s (1987) Dread risk locations of the six hazards with the
spatial maps produced in the Phase One MDS, the relative locations of each hazard along
the Dread factor was determined by dividing the Dread axis of the Phase One spatial map
into the same 20-point increments and then identifying the relative locations of each
hazard on each map. The locations of the six hazards on both of the spatial maps were
recorded and graphically plotted to highlight any similarities or differences (figure 5.5).

Figure 5.5.

Spatial locations of hazards from Phase One MDS compared with Slovic
(1987).

The results showed the neutral Dread risk perceptions of smoking occupied the same
locations reported by Slovic (1987), whereas the Aspirin, vaccines and fossil fuel hazards
were located in slightly higher Dread risk locations. Larger differences were found for
uranium mining nuclear reactor accidents which location lower Dread risk locations than
that which was reported by Slovic (1987). These differences could be accounted for by
the shift in risk perceptions over time. Overall, the results indicated that the locations of
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the six hazards were consistent with the Dread risk locations identified by Slovic (1987).
These results indicated that Affect was not associated with Dread risk as an overall
factor, and the validity was supported by the findings of Slovic (1987).

5.4.4 Factor Analysis
Factor Analysis was performed to determine whether the ten Dread factor items were
―tapping into the same construct‖ (Coakes et al., 2010, p. 133). This would indicate
which risk characteristics were dominant in the Dread risk factor. An initial exploratory
Factor Analysis was completed fist. Initially, the factorability of the ten Dread items for
the neutral condition was examined. All ten Dread items correlated at least .3 with
another item, signifying sound factorability.

The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was > .6 for all hazards, and
Bartlett‘s test of sphericity was significant for Aspirin (2 (45)=402.82, p<.05), vaccines
(2 (45)=267.30, p<.05), smoking (2 (45)=208.40, p<.05), fossil fuels (2 (45)=337.12,
p<.05), uranium mining (2 (45)=328.57, p<.05), and nuclear reactor accidents (2
(45)=342.28, p<.05). The diagonals of the anti-image correlation matrix were largely
>.5, supporting the inclusion of each of the ten Dread items in the Factor Analysis.
Finally, the communalities were largely >.3, further confirming a large common variance
among the items. Supported by these overall indicators, Factor Analysis was conducted
with all ten neutral Dread items for the neutral hazards.

The initial eigenvalues indicated that the first factor explained approximately 50% of the
variance for each hazard, and the remaining factors accounted for approximately 10% of
the variance. Solutions were examined using oblimin rotations of the factor loading
matrix, as the ten Dread items are considered to measure a single construct and a high
correlation of factors was expected (Coakes et al., 2010, p. 142). A summary table of
factor loadings >.75 was constructed for the neutral condition. The intention of this
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summary was to draw attention to the Dread items which explained the greatest amount
of the variance observed in the extracted primary factors (table 5.5).

Table 5.5
Primary Neutral explanatory factor loadings for Dread items by hazard
Neutral Condition Hazard

Dread Item

Factor
Loading

Communality

Aspirin

Global Catastrophic
Catastrophic

.87
.87

.73
.72

Vaccines

Global Catastrophic
Consequences Fatal
Catastrophic

.83
.79
.78

.65
.72
.65

Smoking*

Global Catastrophic

.79

.78

Fossil Fuels

Catastrophic
Consequences Fatal
Future Generations

.86
.83
.78

.75
.76
.65

Uranium Mining

Catastrophic
Risk Increasing
Not Easily Reduced

.83
.80
.79

.68
.69
.62

Nuclear Reactor Accidents*

Catastrophic
Global Catastrophic

.82
.76

.69
.54

Note. Factor loadings < .75 are suppressed
* no rotation

Overall, the analysis of the primary factor indicated that of the ten Dread factor items
used, the items Global Catastrophic and Catastrophic explained the greatest variance in
neutral risk perceptions of the six hazards in the primary factors.

Further statistical Factor Analysis was then performed on each of the ten Dread factor
items for each of the six hazards in the Affective condition. In testing the assumptions of
the Factor Analysis for each hazard, all ten Dread items correlated at least .3 with another
item, suggesting sound factorability.
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The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was >.6, and Bartlett‘s test of
sphericity was significant for Aspirin (2 (45)=523.27, p<.05), vaccines, (2 (45)=438.81,
p<.05), smoking, (2 (45)=263.81, p<.05), fossil fuels, (2 (45)=300.05, p<.05), uranium
mining (2 (45)=333.71, p<.05), and nuclear reactor accidents (2 (45)=283.41, p<.05).

The diagonals of the anti-image correlation matrix were almost all over .5, supporting the
inclusion of each of the ten Dread items in the Factor Analysis, and the communalities
were almost entirely above .3. Supported by these overall indicators, a principle
components Factor Analysis was employed using oblimin rotations of the factor loading
matrix, to examine all ten Affective Dread items for each hazard. A summary table of the
factor loadings >.75 was constructed in order to highlight those Dread items with the
greatest potential for driving perceptions of risk for the Affective condition (table 5.6).

Table 5.6
Primary Affective explanatory factor loadings for Dread items by hazard
Affective Condition Hazard

Dread Item

Factor
Loading

Communality

Aspirin

Dread
Catastrophic

.93
.82

.81
.83

Vaccines

Catastrophic
Dread

.84
.83

.77
.76

Smoking

Consequences Fatal
Risk Increasing

.82
.80

.63
.59

Fossil Fuels

Catastrophic
Global
Catastrophic

.82
.78

.77
.69

Uranium Mining

Consequences Fatal
Dread
Catastrophic

.92
.92
.82

.78
.76
.67

Nuclear Reactor Accidents

Catastrophic
Dread
Consequences Fatal

.87
.82
.81

.78
.58
.64

Note. Factor loadings < .75 are suppressed
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Overall, these analyses of the primary Affective factors indicated that the items
Catastrophic and Consequences Fatal explained the highest percentage of the variance in
Affective risk perceptions of five of the six hazards in the primary factors, with the Dread
item holding explanatory power in the two lowest and highest Dread risk spectrum
hazards. This indicated that Affect had some association with the Dread item, however,
severe consequences still dominated the factor.

Upon completion of the initial exploratory Factor Analysis of the Dread items for each
hazard in the neutral and Affective conditions, a Factor Analysis was performed as an
exploratory data reduction technique to determine whether the mean of the ten Dread
factor items across the six hazards were demonstrating related constructs. This Analysis
would inform the study of which Dread factor items the data suggested were most likely
responsible for driving overall perceptions of risk across the Dread spectrum in the
neutral and Affective conditions.

The individual Dread item scores were first averaged across the six hazards for the
neutral and the Affective Psychometric data. The factorability of the ten mean Dread
items for the neutral condition was examined. All ten Dread items correlated at least .3
with another item, indicating sound factorability, and the diagonals of the anti-image
correlation matrix were all >.5, supporting the inclusion of all ten Dread items in the
Factor Analysis. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was >.6, and
Bartlett‘s test of sphericity was significant for (2 (45)=374.42, p<.05). A factor scree
plot was created to ascertain the number of factors to be extracted using Kaiser‘s criterion
which asserts that factors should be extracted until their eigenvalues fall below 1 (Bahr,
1999) (figure 5.6).
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Figure 5.6.

Neutral scree plot of eigenvalues with Kaiser‘s Criterion of > 1.

The Factor Analysis resulted in the extraction of three neutral factors. The initial
eigenvalues indicated that the first factor explained 45% of the variance, the second
factor accounted for 12%, and the third factor explained 10% of the variance. Solutions
were examined using oblimin rotations of the factor loading matrix. A summary table of
the factor loadings was then constructed for the neutral condition (table 5.7).
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Table 5.7
All neutral explanatory factor loadings for Dread items by hazard
Dread Item

Factor 1
Loading

Factor 2
Loading

Factor 3
Loading

Communality

Catastrophic

.82

.65

Risk Increasing

.78

.61

Global Catastrophic

.76

.63

Not Easily Reduced

.75

Consequences Fatal

.71

.57

Future Generations

.7

.52

Dread

.59

.41

Voluntary

.34

.17

Control

.46

Equity

.44

.58

.69

.37

.34

.27

The results showed that all items had primary loadings over .5, with the exception of
Voluntary and Control. The results indicated that items making up the theorised ‗severity
of consequence‘ factor (see Chapter 4, section 4.4) explained a greater amount of
variance in the neutral Dread risk perceptions of the six hazards than did the ‗emotional‘
(Dread) item, or Voluntary, Control, or Equity items. The communalities revealed the
proportion of variation in each Dread item that was explained by the three factors. The
results again indicated that items making up the ‗severity of consequence‘ factor
explained a greater proportion of the variation than did the ‗emotional‘ (Dread) item, or
Voluntary, Control, or Equity items.

Overall, the analyses of the primary factor indicated that of the ten Dread factor items,
Catastrophic, Risk Increasing, Global Catastrophic, Not Easily Reduced, Consequences
Fatal and Future Generations met the internal consistency criterion of a factor loading >.7
(Salkind, 2006, p. 58). This indicated that these were the Psychometric Dread risk
characteristics that were driving perceptions of risk in the neutral condition. The second
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and third factors failed to meet this criterion, or the criteria for retaining factors proposed
by O‘Rourke, Hatcher and Stepanski (2005, pp. 449-454) where, in addition to having an
eigenvalue >1 and accounting for more than 10% of the variance, a minimum of three
items are required to establish a factor.

The factorability of the ten Dread items for the Affective condition was examined. All ten
Dread items correlated at least .3 with another item, indicating sound factorability and the
diagonals of the anti-image correlation matrix were all >.5, supporting the inclusion of all
ten Dread items in the Factor Analysis. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling
adequacy was >.6, and Bartlett‘s test of sphericity was significant for (2 (45)=374.42,
p<.05). A factor scree plot was created to ascertain the number of factors to be extracted
using Kaiser‘s criterion which asserts that factors should be extracted until
their eigenvalues fall below 1 (Bahr, 1999) (figure 5.7).

Figure 5.7.

Affective scree plot of eigenvalues with Kaiser‘s Criterion of > 1.
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A Factor Analysis using oblimin rotations resulted in the extraction of two Affective
factors. The initial eigenvalues indicated that the first factor explained 55% of the
variance in Affective risk perceptions, and the second factor accounted for 12%. A
summary table of the Affective factor loadings was constructed (table 5.8).

Table 5.8
All Affective explanatory factor loadings for Dread items by hazard
Dread Item

Factor 1
Loading

Factor 2
Loading

Communality

Catastrophic

.89

.8

Consequences Fatal

.85

.72

Not Easily Reduced

.81

.63

Global

.77

.67

Dread

.72

.59

Risk Increasing

.71

.51

Future Generations

.71

.44

.59

Control

.65

-.36

.51

Voluntary

.48

.45

.33

Equity

.45

Catastrophic

.32

The analysis revealed that the items making up factor one with loadings >.7 were
identical to those items identified in the neutral Factor Analysis, but with the addition of
the Dread item. The analysis also showed that only the items Catastrophic and
Consequences Fatal had communalities explaining more than 70% of the proportion of
variation.
Factor one and two met O‘Rourke, Hatcher and Stepanski‘s (2005, pp. 449-454) criteria,
where the factor must have eigenvalues greater than one for each item, account for more
than 10% of the variance, and contain a minimum of three items. The analyses of the
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primary factor indicated that of the ten Dread factor items, seven items met the internal
consistency criterion of a factor loading >.7 (Salkind, 2006, p. 58). These were
Catastrophic, Consequences Fatal, Not Easily Reduced, Global Catastrophic, Dread, Risk
Increasing and Future Generations. This indicated that these were the primary
Psychometric Dread risk items that were driving perceptions of risk in the Affective
condition.

In order to create predictor variables for use in the Phase Two analysis, the primary
neutral and Affective factors extracted in the Factor Analysis were labeled. Using Neill‘s
(1994) proposed method for labeling factors, the top one or two items were used to form
a factor label. Factors two and three were disregarded, given their failure to achieve the
criterion proposed by O‘Rourke, Hatcher and Stepanski (2005, pp. 449-454). The items
with factor loadings of >.7 were included in a factor which was labeled Neutral Severity
of Consequences.
The label was given due to the factor‘s inclusion of the same items theorised in the
‗severity of consequences‘ factor from the Dread split analysis. Items with factor
loadings of >.7 in the Affective condition were grouped as a factor and labeled Dread
Severity of Consequences. The composition of the Affective factor was identical to the
Neutral Severity of Consequences factor, with the exception of the inclusion of the Dread
item in the Affective version. The items in factor two did not meet the criterion of
achieving factor loadings in excess of .7, and this factor was discarded.

Finally, composite scales that balanced the Psychometric items appropriately according
to their influence on risk perceptions were created. Unit-weighted z-scores of the Dread
Severity of Consequences and Neutral Severity of Consequences factors were used to
from stable measures of the underlying items. This provided a linear composite of the
component variables, and resulted in weighted neutral and Affective scales, where items
with larger standard deviations had greater weighting. These composite scales were used
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in the Phase Two data analysis as predictor variables for the multiple regression analysis
to indicate the degree of association between Psychometric Dread risk and risk
consequence estimations.

5.5 Reliability and Validity
A reliability analysis was conducted using Cronbach‘s Alpha Coefficient, a statistical
measure which, according to Gliem and Gliem (2003), provides ―a unique estimate of the
reliability of a given test‖ (p. 84). Reliability may be defined as ―dependability,
consistency, and replicability over time, over instruments, and over groups of
respondents‖ (Cohen et al., 2007, p. 146). The original Psychometric ten item Dread scale
was found to be highly reliable in the neutral condition (α=.85) and in the Affective
condition (α=.89). The reliability of the ten item Dread scale for each of the six hazards
was then examined, and the results again indicated that the scales were highly reliable in
both the neutral and Affective conditions (α >.7) (table 5.9).

Table 5.9
Cronbach‟s Alpha Coefficient for neutral and Affective Dread
Neutral scale α

Affective scale α

Aspirin

.88

.87

Vaccines

.78

.84

Smoking

.73

.74

Fossil Fuels

.79

.76

Uranium Mining

.78

.78

Nuclear Reactor Accidents

.81

.79

Hazard

Validity may be defined as the careful use of sampling, instrumentation and statistical
analysis of the data (Cohen et al., 2007), providing evidence that it is the measured
variables that are contributing to significant results and not extraneous variables
(Graziano & Raulin, 2004). The Psychometric research instrument used in Phase One is
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widely regarded as a robust and valid measure of perceived risk (Slovic, 1987), and the
ten Dread factor items used in Phase One are related to the defined theory and concepts
of the Psychometric Paradigm. This approach provided the study with construct validity.
All 10 of Slovic‘s (1987) Dread factor items were included in the research instruments,
supporting translational content validity.
Comparison of the multidimensional scaling results with Slovic‘s (1987) work also
provided a measure of external validity. When the Phase One spatial maps were
compared with Slovic‘s (1987, p. 282) findings, each of the six hazards were located in
remarkably similar locations, supporting confidence in the external validity of the
Multidimensional Scaling Analysis results and the integrity of the data. In terms of the
subjective assessment that is face validity however, the Phase One results suggested that
the Dread risk factor overall may not be a reliable measure of Affective reactions to risk,
as is suggested in the literature (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000;
Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Peters & Slovic, 1996; Slovic, Finucane,
Peters, & MacGregor, 2007; Visschers & Siegrist, 2008), but Affect may be associated
with some characteristics of the factor.

5.6 Phase One Limitations and Improvements
Several limitations of the study were identified in Phase One. The issue of detecting
respondents who had selected their answers via random selection on the Likert scale was
identified as a limitation of the Phase One methodology. It was conceived that an
improvement to the methodology would be to include ‗integrity‘ questions in the body of
the survey, where only one answer is correct (for example, by asking how many days are
in one week?). Respondents who incorrectly answered an integrity question would be
eliminated from the data set. Another issue was that although it was assumed that the
Affective wording would be sufficient to induce Affect, the lack of any evidence to
confirm that Affect had actually been manipulated was also identified as a limitation.
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The results of the Phase One analysis indicated that Affect was of minor importance to
overall Dread risk perceptions of the six hazards. However, the Phase One methodology
offered no confirmation that the Affective survey had elicited more Affect than the
neutral survey. In order to improve upon this limitation, a method of confirming
Affective manipulation was required. It was conceived that a solution to this issue my lie
in the inverse relationship between risk and benefit observed in risk perception research
(Alhakami & Slovic, 2006; Finucane et al., 2000; Gardner & Gould, 1989; Gregory &
Mendelsohn, 1993).

The research suggests that the inverse relationship of perception of risk and benefit may
be explained by way of the influence of Affect on risk judgements. This view is
supported by the work of Finucane et al. (2000), who suggested that ―perceived risk and
benefit are linked via some sort of Affective commonality‖ (p. 14). It was conceived that
by increasing the likelihood that Affect would play a role in the responses of participants
in the Affective cohort via the use of Affective wording and framing, a greater inverse
risk-benefit association would be observed.

This would provide the study with an indicator that a greater level of Affect had been
elicited in the Affective cohort than the neutral cohort. It was decided therefore, to
include questions relating to the perceived benefit and harm of each hazard in Phase
Three of the study. If an increase in perceived benefit and a decrease in perceived harm
was observed in the Affective cohort compared with the neutral cohort, this would
provide evidence that greater Affect had been elicited in the Affective condition and
therefore support any conclusions made regarding the role of Affect.
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5.7 Conclusion
Phase One of the study took the shape of a between-subjects design, which consisted of
neutral-worded and Affective-worded surveys which focused on the Psychometric Dread
risk factor (Slovic, 1987). The surveys centered around six different hazards which were
located across the Dread risk spectrum, ranging from low Dread to high Dread. Two
independent cohorts of respondents were surveyed (N=200). The first cohort completed
an Affective-worded Psychometric risk perception instrument, while the second cohort
completed the neutral-worded version of the same instrument. Responses most closely
representing respondents‘ risk judgements were recorded on a seven-point Likert Scale.

Analysis of the data collected during Phase One required that several statistical measures
be utilised to describe the data, compare the groups of respondents, and determine the
impact of Affect on risk perceptions and Dread risk characteristics. The statistical tests
used included descriptive analysis, Independent Samples t-tests, Multidimensional
Scaling, Factor Analysis, and Cronbach‘s Alpha Coefficient.

The overall mean of the neutral Psychometric Dread risk scale was calculated to be
M=4.49 (SD=1.66). The Affective instrument had a mean of M=4.43 (SD= 1.86).
Initially, this result appeared to indicate that the Affective research instrument had not
elicited more Dread as one would expect, but rather revealed a lower mean Dread
response. When the mean Dread risk factor was examined for each hazard, the results
indicated that the Affective responses had lower mean ratings than the neutral responses
for all hazards except uranium mining and nuclear reactor accidents. However, the
differences between the mean Affective and neutral Dread risk responses for each hazard
were not found to be statistically significant when examined using the Independent
Samples t-test. Comparison of the neutral and Affective spatial maps created in the Phase
One Multidimensional Scaling Analysis also indicated that the Affective wording
appeared to have no association with the Dread spectrum spatial locations of the hazards.
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When the means and standard deviations were calculated for each hazard individually, it
was found that the item Consequences Fatal had the greatest mean for the majority of
hazards in the neutral condition. This indicated that when Affect was not being
manipulated, it was the fatal consequences of risks that generally elicited the most
concern. In the Affective condition, Aspirin and fossil fuel hazards were associated with
increasing risk, while vaccination was not seen as an equitable hazard. The consequences
smoking hazard and nuclear reactor accidents were perceived as being Fatal, and concern
for Future Generations in regards to uranium mining was evident.

The Factor Analysis suggested that a distinct factor driven largely by severity of
consequence characteristics was underlying the perception of risk for both the Affective
and neutral conditions. As per the conceived ‗Dread factor split‘ (see Chapter 4), this
indicated that severe consequence items formed the primary construct responsible for the
risk perception of the six hazards. The Affective factor revealed the same items as a
related construct, but with some influence from the Dread (or ‗emotional‘) item. The
results of the Independent Samples t-test on the individual Dread risk factor items also
indicated that Affect had some impact on particular risk characteristics associated with
risk consequence in some hazards. The Independent Samples t-test also suggested
statistically significant differences between the neutral and Affective Consequences Fatal
and Catastrophic items for three of the six hazards.

Taken together, these results suggested that Dread as a Psychometric item was associated
with, Affect, a finding supported by previous Psychometric risk studies (see Finucane et
al., 2000; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Peters & Slovic, 1996; Slovic et al., 2007; Visschers
& Siegrist, 2008). However, severity of risk consequence items dominated the Dread risk
factor overall. The results also suggested that the Affective association with Dread risk
characteristics was minor in the overall Affective perceptions of the hazards, a finding
consistent with Sjöberg‘s (2006), assertion that ―when tested empirically, emotions by
themselves play a minor role.‖ (p. 106).
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In summary, the Phase One results suggested that although the Dread item appeared to be
associated with Affect, there was no significant difference between the responses of the
two groups. There was some indication that the Affect Heuristic may influence the
perception particular risks in very specific ways associated with severe and fatal
consequences, however the emotional aspect of the Dread risk factor did not appear to be
influencing risk perceptions to the degree suggested in the literature. The next Phase of
the study involved assessing the impact of Affect on estimations of risk consequence and
the relationship of these two concepts to Dread risk. Although the findings of the first
Phase appeared to indicate that Dread risk is primarily a measure of perceptions of
severity of risk consequence, the aim of the second Phase was to assess whether this
finding would remain consistent with the Phase Two data.
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CHAPTER 6: PHASE TWO
6.1 Introduction
This chapter details the design, procedure and data analysis of Phase Two of the study.
This Phase involved participants completing either a neutral-worded or an Affectiveworded Risk Consequence Task in a between-subjects design. The results of the various
statistical measures are presented and the identified limitations are also outlined together
with improvements for the third Phase of the study. The chapter concludes with a
summary of the Phase Two design, implementation, and outcomes.

6.2 Phase Two Sample
The same participants sourced via Amazon Mechanical Turk who completed the Phase
One neutral and Affective research instruments also completed the Phase Two
instruments (N=200). Participants were sourced via Amazon Mechanical Turk from
eleven countries and ranged in age from 18 to 67 years old. The respondents who
completed the neutral Phase One instrument also completed the neutral Phase Two
instrument. Likewise, the Phase One and Two Affective instruments were completed by
the same second group (table 6.1).

Table 6.1
Summary of research instrument distribution.
Cohort One
Phase 1 Affective worded Psychometric instrument

X

Phase 1 Neutral worded Psychometric instrument
Phase 2 Affective Worded Risk Assessment Task
Phase 2 Neutral Worded Risk Assessment Task
N=200

Cohort Two

X
X
X
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6.3 Phase Two Design
As with the first Phase of the study, Phase Two maintained the tradition of Psychometric
risk research by employing a positivist research approach together with a quantitative
methodology. Phase Two was executed as a between-subjects study involving a neutralworded and an Affective-worded Risk Consequence Task (Appendix B). This Phase
involved respondents estimating the seriousness of the risks associated with the six
hazards used in Phase One.

The research instruments were again created using the Qualtrics online survey software,
with participants being directed to the survey via the Amazon Mechanical Turk service.
The collated data was cleansed and then analysed using several statistical measures.
These included descriptive statistics, Independent Samples t-tests, multiple regression
analysis and Cronbach‘s Alpha.

6.3.1 Phase Two Research Instruments
The between-subjects design of the Phase Two required that two research instruments be
developed. These consisted of a neutral-worded and an Affective-worded simple Risk
Consequence Task survey (Appendix B) based on words selected from the Affective
Norms for English Words (ANEW) list (Bradley & Lang, 2010). Using the emotional
valence ratings of the ANEW list, wording was chosen for the neutral and Affective risk
consequence instruments to be either emotionally provocative or emotionally neutral.
The instruments used a seven-point Likert scale with the term ‗serious‘ as the basis for
the category labels. The term ‗serious‘ has a mean ANEW valence of 5.08 (Bradley &
Lang, 2010) making it a word of relatively neutral emotional arousal. Such neutrality
deemed necessary to avoid any potential influence of the category label wording on
respondents‘ estimations of risk consequences, and to ensure consistency. The Risk
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Consequence Task required respondents to estimate the severity of the consequences of
each of the six hazards used in the Phase One.

6.3.2 Phase Two Procedure
The procedure for Phase Two was modeled closely on the procedure for Phase One of the
study. Using a between-subjects design, two cohorts of Phase Two respondents were
surveyed (N=200). The first cohort (n=100) completed the neutral version of a simple
risk consequence task, while the second cohort (n=100) completed the Affective-worded
task. Responses most closely representing respondents‘ consequence estimations were
recorded on the seven-point Likert scale.

6.4 Phase Two Data Analysis
The initial stages of the second Phase data analysis utilised a similar range of statistical
tests to those employed in Phase One. These tests included descriptive statistics,
Independent Samples t-tests and multiple regression analysis on the neutral and Affective
versions of the consequence estimation task data.

6.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Once the data had been cleansed, the distribution of the Phase Two data sets were tested
for normality using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic with a Lilliefors significance level,
and through inspection of the normality plots and histograms (Coakes, Steed, & Ong,
2010), determining the type and power of the statistical tests that could be applied. These
tests indicated that both neutral and Affective data sets were normally distributed (p>
.05), providing justification for the use of parametric statistical tests. Measures of central
tendency were first calculated via the mean, and the standard deviation was used to test
for variability. The tests were performed for each of the six hazards, for both the neutral
data and the Affective data (table 6.2).
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Table 6.2
Phase Two descriptive statistics calculated for each hazard
Neutral
Mean
SD

Affective
Mean
SD

Aspirin

4.04

1.74

4.16

1.86

Vaccines

4.24

1.51

3.98

1.73

Smoking

5.41

1.31

5.55

1.23

Fossil Fuels

5.0

1.21

5.23

1.45

Uranium Mining

5.33

1.27

5.66

1.42

Nuclear Accidents

5.91

1.1

6.12

1.19

The mean for each hazard in the neutral condition indicated that the perception of the
severity of risk consequence increased in general agreement with the locations of the six
hazards in the Dread spectrum, with the exception of the smoking hazard. Neutral
perceptions of the severity of risk consequence ranged from Aspirin as the lowest
severity to nuclear reactor accidents as having the most severe consequences. The
standard deviation was used to measure ―the typical difference between each value and
the mean‖ (Burdess, 1994, p. 50), indicating the amount of variation in opinion for each
hazard. Variations in the perception of neutral risk consequence were greatest for Aspirin,
but became more uniform as the perception of the severity of risk consequence increased.
Nuclear reactor accidents presented the most uniform neutral perception of risk
consequence.

The mean for each hazard in the Affective condition indicated that the perception of the
severity of risk consequence also increased in general agreement with the six Dread
spectrum locations. Although vaccines rather than Aspirin was the hazard perceived as
least severe, smoking was again perceived as having the most severe consequences.
Affective perceptions of the severity of risk consequence ranged from vaccines as the
lowest severity to nuclear reactor accidents as the most severe. The data from the
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Affectively worded risk consequence task showed that the perception of the severity of
consequence had increased in the Affective condition in all hazards, with the exception of
vaccines.

The standard deviation was also used to measure the amount of variation in opinion for
each hazard for the Affective cohort. As with the neutral survey responses, variation in
the perception of Affective risk consequence was greatest for Aspirin, but most uniform
for nuclear reactor accidents. The Affective perception of risk consequence was
consistently more varied for each hazard than the neutral perception, with the exception
of the smoking hazard.

6.4.2 Independent Samples t-test
In order to determine whether the difference between the mean neutral and mean
Affective responses to each Risk Consequence Task was significant, an Independent
Samples t-test was used. The results of the Levene‘s test for equality of variances
indicated that for each hazard, the t-test should be interpreted with equal variances
assumed (p>0.05), with the exception of fossil fuels (p=.049), where equal variances
would not be assumed. The results of the two-tailed t-test indicated that there were no
significant differences in the mean perceptions of the severity of risk consequence
between the neutral and Affectively influenced cohorts for any of the hazards (p > .05).

6.4.3 Multiple Regression Analysis
In order to ascertain the degree of association between the ten Dread factor items and the
neutral and Affective responses to the Risk Consequence Task, a measure of multiple
correlation was obtained using the standard multiple regression analysis model. The
analysis would indicate how much variability in estimations of risk consequence could be
accounted for by Psychometric Dread. The criterion or dependent variable describing the
subject of measurement for this multiple regression analysis was the means of the neutral
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and Affective risk consequence estimations. Responses to the Psychometric Dread risk
items were assessed against the risk consequence estimations for each hazard.

The results of the multiple regression analysis for the neutral cohort indicated that
Consequences Fatal was the Dread risk characteristic that most significantly predicted the
neutral consequence estimations of Aspirin, vaccines, smoking, fossil fuels and uranium
mining. Catastrophic was identified as the Dread characteristic that most significantly
predicted the neutral risk perceptions of nuclear reactor accidents. However, when Affect
was manipulated via the use of Affective wording, Risk Increasing and Catastrophic were
the Dread risk characteristics which most significantly predicted perceptions of Aspirin
and vaccine risk respectively. For the remaining Dread risk hazards, the analysis
indicated that Consequences Fatal most significantly predicted the Affective risk
perceptions. Overall, this result showed that the dominance of severe consequence
characteristics in the Dread risk factor was not significantly related to Affect (table 6.3).
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Table 6.3
Multiple Regression analysis of Dread and risk consequence
Condition
Neutral

Affective

R2

F

p

Dread Item

β

p

Aspirin

.69

18.31

.01

Consequences Fatal
Voluntary

.31
.24

.01
.01

Vaccines

.56

11.34

.01

Consequences Fatal
Dread
Future Generations

.39
.23
.28

.01
.01
.01

Smoking

.41

5.55

.01

Consequences Fatal
Risk Increasing

.42
.26

.01
.02

Fossil Fuels

.41

5.43

.01

Consequences Fatal
Not Easily Reduced
Global Catastrophic

.35
.32
.26

.02
.01
.04

Uranium Mining

.57

10.36

.01

Consequences Fatal

.34

.01

Nuclear Accidents

.62

12.69

.01

Catastrophic
Future Generations

.33
.29

.01
.01

Aspirin

.56

9.46

.01

Risk Increasing

.19

.04

Vaccines

.48

6.85

.01

Catastrophic
Not Easily Reduced
Voluntary

.47
-.35
.25

.01
.01
.01

Smoking

.53

8.52

.001

Consequences Fatal
Not Easily Reduced
Control

.48
.28
-.34

.01
.01
.01

Fossil Fuels

.49

7.18

.01

Consequences Fatal
Catastrophic
Future Generations
Risk Increasing

-.26
.33
.23
.46

.04
.01
.05
.01

Uranium Mining

.4

5.07

.01

Consequences Fatal
Future Generations

.32
.27

.04
.02

Nuclear Accidents

.62

12.47

.01

Consequences Fatal
Future Generations

.25
.34

.01
.01

Hazard

The next analysis was conducted using the Affective and neutral composite scales created
in the Phase One factor analysis as predictor variables, while the neutral and Affective
risk consequence estimation data were used as dependent variables. Neutral estimations
of risk consequence were analysed via the neutral composite factor and the mean Dread
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risk factor, while Affective estimations of risk consequence were analysed using the
Affective equivalents. For comparison, the means of the neutral and Affective
Psychometric ten item Dread risk responses from Phase One were also examined against
the neutral and Affective responses to the risk consequence task (table 6.4).
Table 6.4
Multiple Regression analysis of Composite Scales and consequence
Neutral Severity of
Risk Consequence
Composite

Neutral
Psychometric 10
item Dread risk
Factor

Dread Severity of
Risk Consequence
Composite

Affective
Psychometric 10
item Dread risk
Factor

R2

.54

.42

.5

.47

F

103.49

63.82

84.89

74.85

p

.01

.01

.01

.01

β

.74

.65

.71

.69

p

.01

.01

.01

.01

The results of the analysis indicated that 54% of the variance in the surveyed risk
perceptions was explained by the weighted composite Neutral Severity of Consequences
factor extracted in Phase One (R2=.54, F(1,88)=103.49, p<.05). The results also indicated
that this factor significantly predicted perceptions of the severity of risk consequences
(β=.74, p<.05).
The explanatory power of the Neutral Severity of Consequences factor was also shown to
be greater than the explanatory power of the neutral version of the original ten item
Psychometric Dread risk factor. The original neutral Dread factor explained only 42% of
the variance in perception of risk consequence (R2 =.42, F(1,88)=63.82, p<.05) and did
not predict perceptions of the severity of risk consequences (β=.65, p<.05) as well as the
composite Neutral Severity of Consequences factor.
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The results of the multiple regression analysis on the Affective composite scale indicated
that 50% of the variance in the surveyed risk perceptions was explained by the Dread
Severity of Consequences factor (R2=.5, F(1,84)=84.89, p<.05) when the factor items had
been combined into a weighted composite scale. The factor also significantly predicted
Affective perceptions of the severity of risk consequences (β=.71, p<.05). As with the
neutral factors, the Affective-worded Psychometric Dread risk factor was shown to
explain less of the variance in the Affective perceptions of risk consequences than did the
Dread Severity of Consequences composite scale (R2 =.47, F(1,84)=74.85, p<.05). The
Affective-worded version of the original Dread factor explained 47% of the variance in
Affective perceptions of risk consequence, and did not predict Affective perceptions of
the severity of risk consequences as well as the Neutral Severity of Consequences
composite scale (β=.69, p<.05).
The next multiple regression analysis focused on the two factors (rather than the
composite scales) derived from the factor analysis in Phase One (see Chapter 5, section
5.6.4). Once again, analysis was conducted for the neutral responses and Affective
responses separately. For both the neutral and Affective cohorts, mean estimations of risk
consequence were used as the dependent variables, together with the Neutral Severity of
Consequences and Dread Severity of Consequences factors extracted in the Phase One
factor analysis as predictor variables (table 6.5).
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Table 6.5
Multiple Regression analysis of Consequence factors and consequence
Neutral Severity of
Risk Consequence
Factor

Neutral
Psychometric 10
item Dread risk
Factor

Dread Severity of
Risk Consequence
Factor

Affective
Psychometric 10
item Dread risk
Factor

R2

.53

.42

.49

.47

F

97.57

63.82

79.54

74.85

p

.01

.01

.01

.01

β

.73

.65

.7

.69

p

.01

.01

.01

.01

The results indicated that the Neutral Severity of Risk Consequence factor and the Dread
Severity of Risk Consequence factor explained only marginally less of the variance in
perceptions of risk consequences than did the weighted composite scales derived from the
two factors. The Neutral Severity of Risk Consequence factor explained 53% of the
variability (R2=.53, F(1,88)=97.57, p<.05), and significantly predicted perceptions of risk
consequences (β=.73, p<.05). Similarly, in the Affective condition, the Dread Severity of
Risk Consequence factor explained 49% of the variance (R2=.49, F(1,84)=79.54, p<.05),
and significantly predicted Affective perceptions of risk consequences (β=.7, p<.05).
As with the results of the multiple regression analysis on the composite scales, this
analysis indicated that the Neutral Severity of Risk Consequence and the Dread Severity
of Risk Consequence factors were better predictors, and explained a greater amount of
the variance than either the neutral or the Affective versions of the ten item Psychometric
Dread risk factor. The multiple regression analysis between the Phase One and Phase
Two data also indicated that the Dread Severity of Consequences factor explained less of
the variance in Affective risk perceptions than the Neutral Severity of Consequences
factor. The major difference in the composition of the two extracted factors was the
inclusion of the Dread item in the Dread Severity of Consequences factor.
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Overall, the results indicated that the dominance of severity of risk consequence items in
the Dread factor meant that this dimension was a better predictor of consequences for the
neutral and Affective cohorts, and that inclusion of the Dread item reduced predictive
power. These results support the conception of Dread risk as severe consequences, rather
than a factor strongly associated with Affect.
6.5 Reliability and Validity
The Affective and neutral Phase Two data was examined using Cronbach‘s Alpha
Coefficient in order to determine the level of reliability of the risk estimation scales,
yielding an alpha coefficient between 0 (unreliable) and 1 (perfectly reliable) (Cohen,
Manion, & Morrison, 2007). Alpha Coefficients were calculated for both the Affective
and neutral Risk estimation scales. The results indicated an acceptable level of reliability
for both the neutral (α=.62) and the Affective scales (α=.68), although the scales
consisted on only 6 items each, which is likely to have reduced the Alpha.

6.6 Phase Two Limitations and Improvements
A major limitation for the first two Phases of the study was the low statistical power
(P=.2) based on the sample size used. In order to detect any significant influence of
Affect on estimations of risk consequences, a larger sample would be required for Phase
Three. The Psychometric paradigm places few demographic restrictions on the perception
of risk, creating difficulties in establishing an appropriate and representative sample size.
This limitation was overcome by establishing the sample size for Phase Three using a
post-hoc statistical Power Analysis on the data from Phases One and Two. Power
Analysis is a statistical method that determines the sample size required for a significant
chance of detecting the minimum value of interest (Kraemer & Thiemann, 1987).

A two-tailed post-hoc Power Analysis was conducted using G*Power statistical software
(Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) to determine the achieved power in Phases One
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and Two. An effect size was calculated based on the difference between neutral and
Affective responses found in Phases One and Two. The resulting effect sizes were
averaged for a total effect size (ρ=0.127). Based on this measurement, the achieved
power for Phases One and Two was P=.25. This result indicated that the sample size
needed to be increased for Phase Three in order to detect a statistically significant result.
A two-tailed a priori Power Analysis was then conducted to compute the required sample
size for Phase Three, based on the calculated effect size. As per convention, statistical
Power was set at 80% (Araujo & Froyland, 2007) and Alpha set to .05. The results
indicated that a sample size of n=481 for each of the four groups would be required to
achieve 80% statistical Power in Phase Three, yielding a total sample size of N=1924.

It was also determined that the lack of any significant difference indicated by the t-test
between the neutral and Affective estimations of risk consequence in Phase Two could
conceivably be a result of a low statistical power. This issue would be rectified in Phase
Three using the Power Analysis calculations for an increased sample size. However, the
result of no significant differences between neutral and Affective estimations of risk
consequence also raised the question of whether or not it could be argued that Affect had
indeed been manipulated at all. Therefore additional questions relating to the harm and
benefit of each hazard would be included in the Risk Consequence Task for Phase Three,
together with ‗framing‘ statements to increase the likelihood that Affect would play a role
in the responses of participants. Using this improved methodology, it was anticipated that
a greater inverse risk-benefit association would be observed in the Affective condition,
indicating that a greater level of Affect had been elicited in the Affective cohort than the
neutral cohort.
Another limitation that was identified was the possibility of linguistic variations in the
way respondents ascribed meaning to the terminology used in the surveys. Given that the
surveys were intended to manipulate Affective reactions to some degree, the large
number of participants sourced from countries with a primary language other than
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English raised some concerns. To ascertain whether linguistic variations had any impact
on the responses, it was decided that an independent samples t-test would be performed
in Phase Three between the neutral and Affective responses of native-English speakers
and non-native English speakers.

6.7 Conclusion
Phase Two was executed as a between-subjects study involving a neutral-worded and an
Affective-worded risk consequence estimation survey where respondents (N=200)
estimated the seriousness of the risks associated with the six hazards used in Phase One.
The initial descriptive statistics from the Phase Two data indicated that variations in the
perception of neutral and Affective risk consequence were greatest at the low end of the
Dread Risk spectrum, but became more uniform as the hazard locations (and severity of
risk consequence) increased.

Mean Affective risk consequence estimations were generally ranked higher than neutral
risk consequence estimations, although the difference was not found to be statistically
significant when examined using an independent samples t-test. This finding supported
the Phase One t-test results, which also indicated no significant difference between
neutral and Affective risk perceptions.

The results of the multiple regression analysis indicated that the severity of risk
consequence items Consequences Fatal and Catastrophic most significantly predicted
neutral risk perceptions. When Affect was manipulated, Risk Increasing and Catastrophic
most significantly predicted perceptions at the lower end of the Dread risk spectrum.
However, for the remaining medium to high Dread risk hazards, the analysis indicated
that Consequences Fatal most significantly predicted the Affective risk perceptions.
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The analysis conducted using the Affective and neutral composite scales and factors from
Phase One indicated that Neutral Severity of Consequences explained the greatest
amount of the variance in the surveyed risk perceptions, and that the Neutral Severity of
Consequences factor significantly predicted risk consequence estimations. The original
Psychometric Dread risk factor was shown to explain less of the variance in both neutral
and Affective perceptions of risk consequences than did the Severity of Consequences
factors and composite scales formed in Phase One. These results may be taken to suggest
that risk characteristics relating to severity of consequences were generally better
predictors of perceived risk in both the Affective and neutral conditions than the original
Dread risk factor. However, the delineation between risk characteristics was unclear, and
the association with Affect was difficult to assess. In considering these results, it was
decided that multiple regression analysis did not provide a great deal of additional value
in responding to the Research Questions, and this statistical test was not used in Phase
Three.

Overall, the results suggested that although manipulation of Affect through emotive
wording may have induced minor modifications to risk consequence estimations, Dread
risk characteristics relating to the severity of risk consequence still held the most
explanatory power for consequence estimations, whether Affect was manipulated or not.

In order to address the limitation of poor statistical Power, an increased sample size
would be introduced in Phase Three to increase the statistical Power of the tests, and raise
the probability of detecting any significant differences between neutral and Affective
estimations of risk consequence. The inclusion of questions relating estimations of harm
and benefit in the Phase Three risk consequence task would provide confirmation that
increased negative Affect was being induced via the risk-benefit relationship.

The next chapter details Phase Three of the study which combined and replicated Phases
One and Two with improvements to the methodology. As the findings of the first and
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second Phases of the study appeared to be in agreement in indicating that Dread risk is
primarily a measure of severity of risk consequence, the aim of the Third Phase was to
determine whether these findings would remain consistent with the more rigorous and
robust Phase Three methodology.
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CHAPTER 7: PHASE THREE
7.1 Introduction
This chapter details the design, procedure and data analysis of Phase Three of the Study.
The third Phase involved participants completing either a neutral-worded or an Affectiveworded Psychometric risk survey, as well as a neutral-worded or an Affective-worded
risk consequence survey, in a between subjects design. The analysis of various statistical
measures are presented, together with an summary of the results. This chapter concludes
with a summary of the Phase Three design, implementation, and outcomes.

7.2 Phase Three Sample
Participants for the study were sourced via Amazon Mechanical Turk and attracted
respondents from 28 countries, including Canada, India, Egypt, Indonesia, Jamaica, Koli,
Romania, Sri Lanka, United Arab Emirates, Argentina, Australia, Ghana, Guadalupe,
Mexico, New Zealand, Pakistan, Russia, Germany, Kenya, Macedonia, Panama, Serbia,
South Korea, Haiti, Mauritius, Poland, the United Kingdom, and the United States of
America. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 71. Based on a two-tailed a-priori Power
Analysis which was conducted at the end of Phases One and Two, a sample size of
n=481 for each of the four cohorts in Phase Three was required to achieve 80% statistical
Power, yielding a total sample size target of N=1924.

7.3 Phase Three Design
The between-subjects design of Phase Three required four research instruments be
developed for Phases One and Two. Four different groups of participants completed the
four research instruments (N=1638). These consisted of a neutral-worded (n=370) and an
Affective-worded (n=401) Psychometric Dread risk survey (Appendix A), as well as a
neutral-worded (n=434) and an Affective-worded (n=433) Risk Consequence estimation
survey (Appendix B). As with Phase One of the study, the Psychometric risk surveys
focused solely on the Dread Risk factor, identified by Slovic (1987).
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In addition to estimations of the seriousness of the risk consequences associated with
each of the six hazards, the Phase Three Risk Consequence surveys also included
questions asking respondents to estimate the harm and benefit of each hazard. In addition,
each hazard was introduced with a simple framing statement which highlighted either the
negative or positive aspects of each risk. The negative aspects of the six hazards were
presented in the Affective version of the Risk Consequence instrument, and the positive
aspects were highlighted for the neutrally worded version. The framing statements were
included to further elicit an Affective reaction to the six hazards to better assess the role
Affect might play in the estimation of risk consequence and its relationship to the concept
of Dread.

The analysis of the Psychometric Dread Risk factor largely mirrored the Phase One data
analysis, while the analysis of the Phase Three Risk Consequence Task data followed the
Phase Two analysis but with the additional examination of estimations of harm and
benefit. All four of the surveys were centered around six different hazards which are
located across the Dread risk spectrum, ranging from low Dread to high Dread. The
locations of these hazards within the Dread spectrum were established via reference to
Slovic‘s (1987) spatial representation of 81 hazards, and formed the basis for both of the
Phase Three Psychometric Risk research instruments, and the Phase Three Risk
Consequence Task surveys.

7.3.1 Phase Three Research Instruments
The Phase Three Psychometric Risk research instruments utilised the same set of ten
Psychometric Dread Risk factor items used in Phase One. The ten Dread Risk questions
were then worded around each of the six hazards, resulting in 60 Psychometric Dread
Risk questions. As with Phase One of the study, this instrument was then refined into two
versions; a neutral-worded version and an Affective-worded version, based on words
selected from the Affective Norms for English Words (ANEW) list (Bradley & Lang,
2010). The wording chosen for the Psychometric research instruments was intended to
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either elicit negative Affect or to be emotionally neutral, and were selected for their
potential impact on perceptions of risk consequences.

To mirror Phase Two of the study, the Phase Three between-subjects design required that
two Risk Consequence Task research instruments be developed. These consisted of
neutral-worded and Affective-worded simple risk consequence surveys, but differed to
the Phase Two surveys, in that questions relating to the harm and benefit for each of the
six hazards were also included. The Phase Three Risk Consequence Task instruments
were then refined into two versions; a neutral-worded version and an Affective-worded
version, based on words selected from the Affective Norms for English Words (ANEW)
list (Bradley & Lang, 2010). Using the emotional valence ratings of the ANEW list,
wording was chosen for the neutral and Affective Risk Consequence instruments to either
elicit negative Affect or to be emotionally neutral

Analysis of the data collected during Phase Three required that several statistical
measures be utilised to describe the data, compare the groups of respondents, and
determine the impact of Affect on risk perceptions and estimations of risk consequence
and harm. The initial stages of the Phase Three data analysis utilised a similar range of
statistical tests to those employed in Phases One and Two. These included using
descriptive statistics, Independent Samples t-tests, multiple regression analysis,
Multidimensional Scaling, and reliability analysis.

Using a between-subjects design, four independent cohorts of Phase Three respondents
were surveyed (N=1638). The first cohort completed the Affective-worded Psychometric
instrument, while the second cohort completed the neutral worded version of the same
instrument. A third and fourth cohort completed the neutral version of a Risk
Consequence Task and the Affective-worded task respectively. Participants were again
sourced from the Amazon Mechanical Turk service, and were able to complete the
research instrument online.
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The Phase Three Psychometric Dread risk surveys required respondents to rate their
responses to ten Psychometric Dread risk items for six different hazards. As with
previous Psychometric risk studies (Fischhoff, Slovic, Litchtenstein, Read, & Combs,
1978; Slovic, 1987; Slovic, Malmfors, Mertz, Neil, & Purchase, 1997; Trumbo, 1999),
responses most closely representing respondents‘ risk judgements were recorded on a
seven-point Likert scale. The Phase Three Risk Consequence Task surveys required
respondents to rate the seriousness of the consequences and harm of the six hazards, as
well as indicating the harm and benefit. Responses most closely representing
respondents‘ consequence, harm, and dread estimations were also recorded on a sevenpoint Likert scale.

The results of the four completed surveys were then collated and subject to an initial data
cleanse. Of the total N=1924 participants surveyed, 286 surveys were discarded based on
several factors. Each of the Phase Three research instruments included a ‗concentration
check‘ question to eliminate those respondents who were likely to be simply clicking
though the questions without reading them. For example, one of the concentration check
questions was ―How many days in a week?‖, for which any response other than seven
was discarded. Any respondents completing one of the surveys at an unlikely speed were
also discarded, as were incomplete surveys and any responses containing only one
number (for example, responses where all questions were rated as 7 or as 1) were also
eliminated from the data sets.

7.4 Phase Three Data Analysis
Analysis of the data collected during Phase Three required that several statistical
measures be utilised to describe the data, compare the groups of respondents, and
determine the association of Affect with risk perceptions and estimations of risk
consequence and harm. The initial stages of the Phase Three data analysis utilised a
similar range of statistical tests to those employed in Phases One and Two. These
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included using descriptive statistics, Independent Samples t-tests, Multidimensional
Scaling, and reliability analysis.

7.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Once the data had been cleansed, the distribution of all Phase Three data sets were tested
for normality using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic with a Lilliefors significance level,
and through inspection of the normality plots and histograms (Coakes, Steed, & Ong,
2010, p. 41). This would determine the type and power of the statistical tests that could
subsequently be applied. The distribution of the data was calculated via the mean across
the six hazards. These tests indicated that all data sets were normally distributed (p >
.05). Confirmation that the data were normally distributed provided justification for the
use of parametric statistical tests, which allow assumptions to be made regarding the
wider population from which the samples came, as well as comparisons of subpopulations within the wider population. (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2007, p. 318).

An initial descriptive investigation was then conducted for the Psychometric data for
which a neutral cohort (n=370) and an Affective cohort (n=401) of respondents rated
their perceptions of risk according to the ten Psychometric Dread risk items for each of
the six hazards. Measures of central tendency were calculated via the mean, and the
standard deviation was used to test for variability. The mean and standard deviation was
calculated for each hazard on all Dread items for the neutral research instrument (table
7.1).
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Table 7.1
Neutral descriptive statistics by hazard and Dread item
Aspirin

Vaccines

Smoking

Fossil Fuels

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

Uncontrollable

2.39

1.80

3.22

1.87

2.84

2.07

4.71

1.75

Dread

2.6

1.78

2.55

1.66

4.51

2.15

3.46

Consequences
Fatal
Not Equitable

3.24

1.72

3.04

1.68

6.04

1.1

4.05

1.93

4.11

1.93

4.89

Catastrophic

2.71

1.8

2.9

1.77

Future
generations
Not easily
reduced
Risk increasing

3.18

2.01

3.62

2.68

1.86

4.04

Involuntary
Global
Catastrophic

Uranium
Mining
M

Nuclear
Accidents

SD

M

SD

4.81

2.01

5.39

1.82

1.82

4.5

1.95

5.0

1.99

3.95

1.77

5.56

1.49

6.14

1.31

1.94

4.06

1.94

4.53

1.92

4.85

2.04

4.8

1.88

4.55

1.84

5.36

1.62

6.02

1.43

1.96

5.37

1.73

5.44

1.57

5.61

1.39

6.17

1.23

3.29

1.85

4.02

2.23

4.8

1.59

4.93

1.86

5.62

1.6

1.29

3.58

1.77

5.06

1.5

5.11

1.44

4.9

1.39

5.01

1.69

2.49

1.8

3.21

1.92

2.72

1.99

4.92

1.68

4.9

1.88

5.55

1.62

2.46

1.81

3.4

1.86

4.52

1.97

5.45

1.52

5.34

1.53

5.91

1.30

The mean and standard deviation was then calculated for each hazard on all Dread items
for the Affective Psychometric Risk research instrument (table 7.2).
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Table 7.2
Affective descriptive statistics by hazard and Dread item
Aspirin

Vaccines

Smoking

Fossil Fuels

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

Uncontrollable

2.5

1.91

3.15

1.85

2.98

2.0

4.91

1.8

Dread

2.45

1.74

2.52

1.66

4.5

2.11

3.36

Consequences
Fatal
Not Equitable

2.93

1.63

2.91

1.68

6.00

1.13

3.98

1.94

4.84

1.84

4.66

Catastrophic

2.39

1.78

2.67

1.69

Future
generations
Not easily
reduced
Risk increasing

3.32

1.98

3.8

2.7

1.87

3.99

Involuntary
Global
Catastrophic

Uranium
Mining
M

Nuclear
Accidents

SD

M

SD

5.19

1.87

5.61

1.69

1.84

4.53

2.01

5.03

1.95

3.89

1.78

5.32

1.65

6.0

1.45

1.87

3.79

1.97

4.41

1.97

4.52

2.01

4.8

1.94

4.32

1.82

5.22

1.67

5.96

1.51

1.91

5.41

1.63

5.45

1.67

5.68

1.47

6.23

1.20

3.27

1.73

3.96

2.11

4.89

1.66

4.95

1.86

5.68

1.53

1.22

3.7

1.58

4.86

1.59

5.2

1.56

4.82

1.38

4.86

1.76

3.02

1.88

3.54

1.9

3.21

2.06

5.03

1.7

5.41

1.63

5.69

1.53

2.65

1.88

3.58

1.83

4.49

1.82

5.69

1.45

5.12

1.71

5.47

1.57

A summary table of the mean Psychometric Dread Risk perceptions for each hazard was
then constructed for comparison with the findings from the Risk Consequence Task (table
7.3).

Table 7.3
Summary of descriptive statistics by hazard and Dread item.
Neutral
Mean
SD

Affective
Mean
SD

Aspirin

2.98

1.78

2.99

1.78

Vaccines

3.29

1.83

3.39

1.76

Smoking

4.47

1.86

4.48

1.82

Fossil Fuels

4.64

1.69

4.65

1.72

Uranium Mining

5.04

1.7

5.06

1.72

Nuclear Accidents

5.56

1.6

5.5

1.62
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The results of the descriptive data analysis for the Phase Three neutral Psychometric
instrument indicated that concern over the effect of nuclear reactor accidents on future
generations elicited the greatest average perception of risk, while the Aspirin hazard was
demonstrated to be of least concern, especially in relation to the Psychometric Dread Risk
item Uncontrollable. The standard deviation was also calculated for each neutral Dread
item in each hazard to determine the amount of variance in the risk perceptions. The
hazards demonstrating the greatest variation in risk perceptions was demonstrated to be
smoking, especially in the Dread factor items Not Easily Reduced, Dread, and
Uncontrollable. The hazards which demonstrated the most uniform perceptions of risk
were the Fatal Consequences of smoking, and the effect of nuclear reactor accidents on
Future Generations.

The results for the Affective Psychometric instrument indicated that nuclear reactor
accidents had the largest means for the majority of the Dread factor items, whereas the
Aspirin hazard had the lowest average perception of risk. The standard deviation was also
calculated for each Dread item in each hazard for the Affectively worded research
instrument, in order to determine the amount of variance in the risk perceptions. The
hazard demonstrating the greatest variation in risk perceptions was smoking, largely
associated with the Dread factor items Dread, Not Easily Reduced, and Involuntary,
while the most uniform perception of risk was found to be associated with Consequences
Fatal for the smoking Hazard.

As with the Phase One descriptive data analysis results, the mean Affective and neutral
responses were plotted to ascertain the overall shift in the risk perceptions from neutral to
Affective for each hazard (figure 7.1).
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Figure 7.1.

Mean neutral and Affective Psychometric risk perceptions of each hazard.

The results demonstrated little difference between the mean neutral and Affective
responses to the Psychometric Dread Risk surveys, with only slightly higher mean
Affective risk perceptions for the five lower Dread hazards. However, as with the Phase
One results, it was the neutral perceptions of nuclear reactor accidents which were
perceived to be slightly higher than the Affective responses.

As with Phase Two, the next stage of data analysis began with initial descriptive statistics
of the data for the Risk Consequence Task, for which a neutral cohort (n=434) and an
Affective cohort (n=433) of respondents rated their perceptions of the severity of risk
consequence, harm and benefit for each of the six hazards. Measures of central tendency
were calculated via the mean, and the standard deviation was used to test for variability.
The tests were first performed for each of the six hazards for both the neutral and the
Affective severity of risk consequence data (table 7.4).
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Table 7.4
Summary of descriptive statistics for risk consequence for each hazard.
Neutral
Mean
SD

Affective
Mean
SD

Aspirin

3.41

1.74

4.3

1.63

Vaccines

3.69

1.66

3.91

1.8

Smoking

6.0

1.12

6.2

1.1

Fossil Fuels

4.24

1.69

5.29

1.4

Uranium Mining

4.73

1.63

5.04

1.54

Nuclear Accidents

5.2

1.62

5.71

1.34

The mean for each hazard in the neutral condition indicated that the perception of the
severity of risk consequence increased in general agreement with the locations of the six
hazards in the Dread spectrum, with the exception of the smoking hazard, for which the
highest mean rating of risk severity was found. Determined by the Standard Deviation,
smoking also demonstrated the least variation in risk perception, whereas Aspirin
demonstrated the greatest. Variations in the perception of neutral risk consequence were
more uniform for the remainder of the hazards.

The hazard with the highest mean rating in the Affective condition was smoking, which
again demonstrated the least variation in risk perception. Vaccination was once more
perceived as the posing the least risk, but with the greatest variation in risk perception.
Each of the hazards in the Affective condition for the estimation of risk consequence
were rated as having a greater mean severity of risk consequence than in the neutral
condition. The Affective cohort also demonstrated less variation among risk perceptions
than the neutral cohort for all hazards except vaccination.

Descriptive statistics were then calculated for the neutral and Affective estimations for
harm for each of the six hazards (table 7.5).
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Table 7.5
Summary of descriptive statistics for severity of risk harm for each hazard.
Neutral
Mean
SD

Affective
Mean
SD

Aspirin

3.32

1.67

4.09

1.78

Vaccines

3.4

1.63

3.55

1.86

Smoking

6.1

1.09

6.2

1.05

Fossil Fuels

4.07

1.74

5.03

1.45

Uranium Mining

4.57

1.62

4.78

1.65

Nuclear Accidents

4.8

1.74

5.51

1.51

The mean for each hazard in the neutral condition indicated that the perception of the
severity of risk harm once more increased in general agreement with the locations of the
six hazards in the Dread spectrum, with the exception of the smoking hazard, for which
the highest mean rating of risk severity was found. The Standard Deviation also indicated
that smoking demonstrated the least variation in estimation of risk harm, whereas fossil
fuels and nuclear reactor accidents demonstrated the greatest. Variations in the perception
of neutral risk harm were more uniform for the remainder of the hazards.

The hazard with the highest mean rating of risk harm in the Affective condition was
smoking, which again demonstrated the least variation in risk perception. vaccination was
once more perceived as the posing the least harm. Each of the hazards in the Affective
condition for the estimation of risk harm were rated as having a greater mean severity of
risk consequence than in the neutral condition. The Affective cohort demonstrated greater
variation among perceptions of risk harm for the two lower Dread Risk hazards (namely
Aspirin and vaccination), but demonstrated either similar or less variation than the neutral
cohort for all other hazards. Finally, descriptive statistics were calculated for the neutral
and Affective estimations of benefit for each of the six hazards (table 7.6).
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Table 7.6
Summary of descriptive statistics for estimations of benefit for each hazard.
Neutral
Mean
SD

Affective
Mean
SD

Aspirin

5.19

1.31

4.32

1.56

Vaccines

5.22

1.49

5.02

1.63

Smoking

2.32

1.79

2.14

1.75

Fossil Fuels

5.05

1.46

4.25

1.68

Uranium Mining

4.22

1.57

4.1

1.61

Nuclear Accidents

4.86

1.69

4.14

1.85

The mean for each hazard in the neutral condition indicated that the perceptions of
benefit did not increase in general agreement with the locations of the six hazards on the
Psychometric Dread Risk spectrum. The Standard Deviation indicated that Aspirin
demonstrated the least variation in perceptions of benefit, whereas smoking demonstrated
the least agreement. The hazard with the highest mean rating of benefit in the Affective
condition was vaccines while smoking demonstrated the lowest. Perceptions of benefit
were most uniform for Aspirin and the least agreement was found for nuclear reactor
accidents.

Each of the hazards in the Affective condition were rated as having a lower mean benefit
than in the neutral condition. When the perceptions of benefit and harm were plotted
graphically, it became clear that the Affective cohort had perceived the harms to be
greater and the benefits to be lower for each of the six hazards (figure 7.3) compared with
the neutral cohort (figure 7.2).
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Figure 7.2.

Figure 7.3.

Mean neutral perceptions of benefit and harm for each hazard.

Mean Affective perceptions of benefit and harm for each hazard.

Finucane et al. (2000) suggests that ―perceived risk and benefit are linked via some sort
of Affective commonality‖ (p. 14) and the result that the inverse relationship of risk and
benefit was evident indicated that the Affective wording and framing of the hazards had
influenced Affective feelings.
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7.4.2 Independent Samples t-test
The next stage of the Phase Three data analysis employed the independent samples t-test
to determine whether the difference between the mean neutral and mean Affective
Psychometric Dread Risk responses to each hazard in the results were significant. In
addition to requiring a between-subjects study design, the independent groups t-test relies
on the assumption that the two surveyed cohorts are drawn from population with equal
variances, determined via the Levene test for equality of variances (Coakes et al., 2010,
p. 75). The results of the Levene‘s test for equality of variances indicated that for each
hazard, the t-test should be interpreted with equal variances assumed (p>.05), except for
the Aspirin Hazard (p<.05). For this Hazard, a modified version of the t-test called
Welch‘s t-test was used (Allen & Bennett, 2012), as the assumption of homogeneity of
variance could not be assumed.

As with the Phase One t-test, a positive relationship between neutral and Affective
responses to equivalent hazards was expected, requiring a one-tailed significance to be
calculated for the independent samples t-test on the overall mean Psychometric Dread
Risk response for each hazard (Argyrous, 1996). The results demonstrated no significant
difference between the mean neutral and Affective responses for any of the six hazards.

A second independent samples t-test was then performed on the mean responses to each
Dread factor item for each hazard to compare the neutral responses with those of the
Affective worded survey. Given the expectation of a direction of the difference (that is,
an increase in the perception of risk in the Affective results), a one-tailed significance
was calculated (Argyrous, 1996). The analysis showed that equal variances could be
assumed for some, but not all of the Dread factor items. The Welch‘s t-test was used for
those Dread Factor items where the assumption of homogeneity of variance was violated.
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The results indicated statistically significant differences between the neutral and
Affective items for each of the six hazards. The t-test showed that the amount of personal
choice (specified as the Dread risk item Involuntary) in exposure to the four of the six
hazards were significantly different. The Affective cohort for Aspirin (M=3.02, SD=1.88)
indicated perceptions of risk marginally higher than the neutral cohort (M = 2.48,
SD=1.8), t(769) = -3.99, p < .001, one tailed, d = -.3.

The Affective cohort for vaccines (M=3.54, SD=1.92) indicated perceptions of risk
marginally higher for the Involuntary Dread item than the neutral cohort (M = 3.21, SD =
1.9), t(769) = -2.42, p < .005, one tailed, d = -.28. The Affective cohort for smoking
(M=3.2, SD=2.05) indicated perceptions of risk marginally higher for the Involuntary
Dread item than the neutral cohort (M = 2.72, SD = 1.99), t(769) = -3.34, p < .001, one
tailed, d = -.26. The Affective cohort for uranium mining (M= .4, SD=1.63) also
demonstrated perceptions of risk marginally higher for the Involuntary Dread item than
the neutral cohort (M = 4.89, SD = 1.88), t(733) = -4.0, p < .001, one tailed, d = -.29.

Also significant were the Affective responses to fossil fuels (M=5.68, SD=1.45), which
demonstrated marginally higher perceptions of risk than the neutral cohort (M = 5.45, SD
= 1.52) for the Global Catastrophic item, t(769) = -2.22, p < .02, one tailed, d = -.16, as
well as the Affective responses to uranium mining for the Uncontrolable item (M = 5.19,
SD = 1.86) compared to the neutral responses (M = 4.8, SD = 2.01), t(750) = -2.75, p <
.003, one tailed, d = -.2. Finally, the Affective responses to nuclear reactor accidents
(M=5.61, SD=1.69), demonstrated marginally higher perceptions of risk than the neutral
cohort (M = 5.38, SD = 1.81) for the Uncontrolable Dread item, t(752) = -1.79, p < .03,
one tailed, d = -.17.

An independent samples t-test was then performed on the responses to the risk
consequence task, in order to determine whether the difference between the mean neutral
and mean Affective responses to each consequence task was significant. The results of

148
the Levene‘s test for equality of variances indicated that the t-test should be interpreted
with equal variances assumed (p > 0.05), with the exception of Aspirin (p = .02), fossil
fuels (p < .01) and nuclear reactor accidents (p < .01), where equal variances could not be
assumed. For those hazards where the assumption of homogeneity of variance was
violated, the Welch‘s t-test was used. Given the expectation of a direction of the
difference (that is, an increase in the perceived seriousness of consequences in the
Affective results), a one-tailed significance was calculated for the independent samples ttest (Argyrous, 1996, p. 221) (table 7.7).

Table 7.7
Summary of Phase Three t-test results.
Hazard

Neutral

Affect

t

p (1-tail)

d

Aspirin

M = 3.41
SD = 1.74

M = 4.3
SD = 1.63

t(861) = -7.81

< .001

-.52

Vaccines

M = 3.69
SD = 1.66

M = 3.91
SD = 1.8

t(865) = -1.85

=.032

-.013

Smoking

M = 6.0
SD = 1.12

M = 6.2
SD = 1.08

t(865) = -2.58

= .005

-.25

Fossil Fuels

M = 4.24
SD = 1.69

M = 5.29
SD = 1.41

t(865) = -9.92

< .001

-.67

Uranium Mining

M = 4.73
SD = 1.63

M = 5.04
SD = 1.54

t(865) = -2.88

= .002

-.19

Nuclear Reactor Accidents

M = 5.2
SD = 1.62

M = 5.71
SD = 1.33

t(836) = -5.04

< .001

-.34

The results indicated significant differences between the neutral and Affective risk
perceptions for each hazard. Effect sizes (d) ranged from large for the fossil fuel hazard,
medium for Aspirin, moderate for nuclear reactor accidents, and small for the remainder
of the hazards. This result indicated that an association with Affect for estimations of
severe consequences.

149
Finally, to ascertain whether linguistic variations in the way participants ascribed
meaning to the terminology used in the surveys had any significant influence on the
responses, two further independent samples t-tests were performed. These were
performed by splitting the cohorts between those from native and non-native English
speaking countries.

The responses from the neutral and Affective cohorts from native English speaking
countries were examined first. The results of the Levene‘s test for equality of variances
indicated that the t-test should be interpreted with equal variances assumed (p > 0.05),
with the exception of the Vaccine (p = .001) and Uranium Mining (p = .041) hazards,
where equal variances were not assumed. The results demonstrated no significant
differences between the mean neutral and Affective perceptions of any of the six hazards.

The responses from the neutral and Affective cohorts from non-native English speaking
countries were examined next. The results of the Levene‘s test for equality of variances
indicated that the t-test should be interpreted with equal variances assumed (p > 0.05), for
all hazards. The results demonstrated no significant differences between the mean neutral
and Affective perceptions of any of the six hazards, with one exception. This exception
was found in the Affective responses to Vaccines (M=4.05, SD=1.15) which were
significantly different to the neutral responses (M=3.57, SD=1.23) for the respondents
from non-native English speaking countries, t(351) = 3.69, p < .001, two tailed.

7.4.3 Multidimensional Scaling Analysis
To mirror the Phase One analysis of the Psychometric research data, the Phase Three
results was also subjected to multidimensional scaling ―to quantify and map risk
perceptions‖ (Lazo, Kinnell, & Fisher, 2000, p. 180). This multidimensional scaling
process would produce low-dimensional plots of the neutral and Affective Psychometric
Dread risk data. The neutral and Affective spatial maps would be compared with one
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another, as well as with the low-dimensional plots produced by previous Psychometric
studies.

The multidimensional scaling analysis was completed by transforming the Psychometric
results for both neutral and Affective cohorts to perform an ordination of the data, placing
each hazard in a low-dimensional coordinate system (Johnson & Wichern, 2002). The
resulting spatial map demonstrated the Psychometric Dread risk locations of the six
neutral and Affective risk hazards in a single Dread dimension. When the spatial maps of
the neutral and Affective data sets were overlayed, very little difference between the
neutral and Affective Dread risk locations for the six hazards were demonstrated,
consistent with the findings of the Phase One multidimensional scaling analysis (figure
7.4).

Figure 7.4.

Locations of the six neutral and Affective hazards within the Dread
spectrum for Phase Three.

Examination of the neutral and Affective Multidimensional Scaling distance measures
showed remarkably similar results between the two surveyed cohorts (figure 7.5).

151

Figure 7.5.

Low-dimensional spatial locations of six neutral and Affective hazards
from the Phase Three MDS.

The resulting low-dimensional spatial locations from the Phase Three neutral data
analysis were then compared with Slovic‘s (1987) spatial map from which the study‘s six
hazards arose. The locations of the six hazards on both of the spatial maps were recorded
and plotted graphically to highlight any similarities or differences (figure 7.6).
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Figure 7.6.

Comparison of Slovic (1987) and Phase Three MDS.

The plot indicated that the Phase Three results were generally consistent with the
locations identified by Slovic (1987) and were consistent with the findings of Phase One,
showing that the Aspirin, smoking, and fossil fuel hazards occupied slightly higher Dread
locations than those reported by Slovic (1987), whereas the vaccine, uranium mining, and
nuclear reactor accident hazards occupied lower Dread risk locations (figure 7.7).
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Figure 7.7.

7.4.1

Dread locations of hazards from the Phase Three MDS and Slovic (1987).

Factor Analysis

A Factor Analysis was performed next as an exploratory data reduction technique to
determine whether the ten Dread factor items from the Phase Three results were ―tapping
into the same construct‖ (Coakes et al., 2010, p. 133). First, the factorability of the ten
Dread items for the neutral condition was examined. The majority of the correlations for
the ten Dread items for Phase Three correlated at least .3 with another item, indicating the
data were suitable for Factor Analysis. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling
adequacy was > .6 for all hazards, and Bartlett‘s test of sphericity was significant for
Aspirin (2 (45) = 2011.76, p < .05), vaccines (2 (45) = 1902.04, p < .05), smoking (2
(45) = 1278.16, p < .05), fossil fuels (2 (45) = 1770.33, p < .05), uranium mining (2 (45)
= 1823.22, p < .05), and nuclear reactor accidents (2 (45) = 1471.98, p < .05).
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The diagonals of the anti-image correlation matrix were all > .5, supporting the inclusion
of each of the ten Dread items in the Factor Analysis. Finally, the majority of the
communalities were well above > .3, further confirming a large common variance among
the items. However, the Dread factor item Not Equitable was demonstrated to have
communalities < .3 for the Aspirin, smoking, fossil fuel, and uranium mining hazards,
indicating that very little of the variance of Not Equitable was explained in the analysis
for these hazards. The Not Equitable item was also demonstrated to have a low
communality (=.3) for the vaccine hazard. However, for the nuclear reactor accident
hazard, the Dread factor item Not Equitable was shown to have the highest communality
(=.3). Supported by these overall indicators, Factor Analysis was conducted with all ten
neutral Dread items for the neutral hazards.

The initial eigen values indicated that the first factor explained 53% of the variance for
Aspirin, 52% for vaccines, 40% for smoking, 46% for fossil fuels, 48% for uranium
mining, and 45% for nuclear reactor accidents. The remaining factors for each hazard
accounted for 15% or less of the variance. Solutions were examined using oblimin
rotations of the factor loading matrix, as the ten Dread items are considered to measure a
single construct, and a high correlation of factors was expected (Coakes et al., 2010, p.
142). A summary table of factor loadings > .75 for Phase Three was constructed for the
neutral condition. The intention of this summary was to draw attention to the Dread items
which explained the greatest amount of the variance observed in the extracted primary
factors (table 7.8).
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Table 7.8
Primary Neutral explanatory factor loadings for Dread items by hazard
Neutral Condition Hazard

Dread Item

Factor
Loading

Communality

Aspirin

Risk Increasing
Consequences Fatal

.84
.77

.55
.66

Vaccines

Consequences Fatal
Risk Increasing
Global Catastrophic
Catastrophic

.85
.85
.84
.83

.72
.61
.69
.75

Smoking

Catastrophic
Global Catastrophic

.81
.79

.66
.66

Fossil Fuels

Involuntary
Uncontrollable
Global Catastrophic

.84
.83
.78

.63
.62
.68

Uranium Mining

Consequences Fatal
Catastrophic
Dread

.91
.9
.82

.74
.79
.6

Consequences Fatal
Catastrophic
Dread
Note. Factor loadings < .75 are suppressed

.88
.85
.77

.69
.69
.56

Nuclear Reactor Accidents

Overall, the analysis of the primary factor in the neutral condition indicated that of the ten
Dread factor items used, the item Catastrophic explained the greatest variance in neutral
risk perceptions for the uranium mining, vaccines, and smoking hazards. The Dread
factor item Consequences Fatal explained the greatest variance in neutral risk perceptions
for the hazards nuclear reactor accidents and Aspirin, whereas Global Catastrophic
explained the greatest variance in neutral risk perceptions for fossil fuels.

A Factor Analysis was then performed on each of the ten Dread factor items for each of
the six hazards in the Affective condition. For the Affective Factor Analysis, the
factorability of the ten Dread items for each hazard in the was examined. In testing the
assumptions of the Factor Analysis for each hazard, all ten Dread items correlated at least
.3 with another item, suggesting sound factorability.
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The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was > .6, and Bartlett‘s test of
sphericity was significant for Aspirin (2 (45) = 1851.95, p < .05), vaccines, (2 (45) =
1571.81, p < .05), smoking, (2 (45) = 1150.91, p < .05), fossil fuels, (2 (45) = 1405.82,
p < .05), uranium mining (2 (45) = 1542.13, p < .05), and nuclear reactor accidents (2
(45) = 1254.53, p < .05).

The diagonals of the anti-image correlation matrix were all > .5 for each hazard,
supporting the inclusion of each of the ten Dread items in the Factor Analysis, and the
communalities were almost entirely above .3. Supported by these overall indicators, a
principle components Factor Analysis was employed using oblimin rotations of the factor
loading matrix to examine all ten Affective Dread items for each hazard. A summary
table of the factor loadings > .75 was constructed in order to highlight those Dread items
with the greatest potential for driving perceptions of risk for the Affective condition
(table 7.9).
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Table 7.9
Primary Affective explanatory factor loadings for Dread items by hazard
Affective Condition Hazard

Dread Item

Factor
Loading

Communality

Aspirin

Catastrophic
Consequences Fatal
Future Generations
Global Catastrophic
Dread

.89
.81
.79
.77
.75

.82
.69
.54
.62
.73

Vaccines

Catastrophic
Dread
Consequences Fatal

.84
.83
.83

.77
.76
.63

Smoking

Catastrophic
Consequences Fatal

.79
.79

.67
.58

Fossil Fuels

Uncontrollable
Involuntary

.78
.75

.59
.55

Uranium Mining

Catastrophic
Consequences Fatal

.84
.76

.74
.73

Nuclear Reactor Accidents

Catastrophic
Consequences Fatal
Dread

.83
.81
.76

.68
.64
.58

Note. Factor loadings < .75 are suppressed

Overall, the analysis of the primary Affective factor for each hazard indicated that the
Dread risk item Catastrophic explained the highest percentage of the variance in
Affective risk perceptions for the six hazards in the primary factors, with the exception of
the Fossil Fuel hazard, for which Uncontrollable explained the highest percentage of
variance. Similar to the Phase One results, the item Dread held explanatory power in the
two lowest and the highest Dread Risk spectrum hazards, being Aspirin, vaccines, and
nuclear reactor accidents respectively.

To mirror the exploratory Factor Analysis completed in Phase One of the study, a second
Factor Analysis was performed as an exploratory data reduction technique to determine
whether the mean of the ten Dread factor items across the six hazards were demonstrating
related constructs. This would inform the study of whether the Dread factor items the
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data suggested were most likely responsible for driving overall risk perceptions in Phase
One would hold true with the larger sample size used in Phase Three.

The mean Dread item scores for each Dread Factor item were first calculated across the
six hazards for the neutral and the neutral Psychometric data. The factorability of the ten
mean Dread items for the neutral condition was then examined. The majority of the
neutral Dread items correlated at least .3 with another item, indicating sound factorability
and the diagonals of the anti-image correlation matrix were all > .5, supporting the
inclusion of all ten Dread items in the Factor Analysis. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure
of sampling adequacy was > .6, and Bartlett‘s test of sphericity was significant for (2
(45) = 2345.55, p < .05). A factor scree plot was created to ascertain the number of
factors to be extracted using Kaiser‘s criterion which asserts that factors should be
extracted until their eigenvalues fall below 1 (Bahr, 1999) (figure 7.8).

Figure 7.8.

Neutral scree plot of eigenvalues with Kaiser‘s Criterion of > 1
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The Factor Analysis resulted in the extraction of two neutral factors, rather than the three
factor solution found in Phase One. The initial eigenvalues indicated that the first factor
explained 58% of the variance, while the second factor accounted for 13%. Solutions
were examined using oblimin rotations of the factor loading matrix. A summary table of
the factor loadings was then constructed for the neutral condition (table 7.10).

Table 7.10
All Neutral explanatory factor loadings for Dread items by hazard
Dread Item

Factor 1
Loading

Factor 2
Loading

Communality

Catastrophic

.92

.82

Risk Increasing

.84

.68

Global Catastrophic

.84

.74

Not Easily Reduced

.45

Consequences Fatal

.9

Future Generations

.45

Dread

.77

.59

.83
.74

.59

.83
.72

Involuntary

.91

.76

Uncontrollable

.94

.79

Equity

.31

.2

The results showed that all Psychometric Dread Factor items had primary loadings > .5,
with the exception of Not Easily Reduced and Future Generations. As with the Phase One
results, the analysis indicated that items measuring the severity of risk consequence
explained a greater amount of variance in the neutral Psychometric Dread Risk
perceptions of the six hazards than did the emotional Dread item, or Voluntary,
Uncontrollable, or Not Equitable items. The communalities revealed the proportion of
variation in each Dread Factor item that was explained by the two factors, and indicated
that items measuring the severity of risk consequences explained a greater proportion of
the variation than did the emotional Dread item, or Voluntary, Uncontrollable, or Not
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Equitable items, with the exception of the Not Easily Reduced and Future Generations
items, which loaded on the second factor.

Overall, the analyses of the primary factor in the neutral condition indicated that of the
ten Dread factor items, Catastrophic, Risk Increasing, Global Catastrophic, Consequences
Fatal and Dread met the internal consistency criterion of a factor loading > .7 (Salkind,
2006, p. 58). The second factor also met the same criterion for Voluntary and
Uncontrolable. This indicated that these two factors were the Psychometric Dread risk
items that were driving perceptions of risk in the neutral condition. However, it should be
noted that the second factor did not meet the criteria for retaining factors proposed by
O‘Rourke, Hatcher and Stepanski (2005, pp. 449-454) where, in addition to having an
eigenvalues >1 and accounting for more than 10% of the variance, a minimum of three
items are required to establish a factor. As with Phase One, Neill‘s (1994) proposed
method for labeling factors was again used to form factor labels for factors one and two.
The items with factor loadings of > .7 included in factor one and two, could conceivably
be labeled Neutral Catastrophic Consequence and Neutral Voluntary Control
respectively.

The next stage of the Phase Three Factor Analysis began with an assessment of the
factorability of the ten mean Dread items for the Affective condition of Phase Three. The
results showed that all ten Dread items correlated at least .3 with another item, indicating
sound factorability. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was > .6,
and Bartlett‘s test of sphericity was significant for (2 (45) = 2149.63, p < .05). A factor
scree plot was created to ascertain the number of factors to be extracted using Kaiser‘s
criterion which asserts that factors should be extracted until their eigenvalues fall below 1
(Bahr, 1999) (figure 7.9).
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Figure 7.9.

Affective scree plot of eigenvalues with Kaiser‘s Criterion of > 1.

The Factor Analysis using oblimin rotations resulted in the extraction of two Affective
factors. The initial eigenvalues indicated that the first factor explained 50% of the
variance in Affective risk perceptions, and the second factor accounted for 15%. A
summary table of the Affective factor loadings was constructed (table 7.11).
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Table 7.11
All Affective explanatory factor loadings for Dread items by hazard
Dread Item

Factor 1
Loading

Factor 2
Loading

Communality

Catastrophic

.91

.84

Consequences Fatal

.89

.77

Not Easily Reduced

.38

Global

.78

.62

Dread

.8

.69

Risk Increasing

.76

.66

Future Generations

.79

.58

.59

.66

Catastrophic

Uncontrollable

.84

.7

Involuntary

.9

.71

Equity

.4

.25

The analysis revealed that the items making up Factor one with loadings > .7 were very
similar to those items identified in the neutral data set, but with the loss of the Dread
Factor item Not Easily Reduced. Factors one and two met O‘Rourke, Hatcher and
Stepanski‘s (2005, pp. 449-454) criteria, where the factor must have eigenvalues greater
than one for each item, and account for more than 10% of the variance, however, as with
the neutral results for Phase Three, only factor one contained a minimum of three items.
As with the neutral cohort, the Affective results indicated that it was the items
Uncontrollable and Involuntary that loaded on the second factor.

The analyses of the primary factor indicated that of the ten Dread factor items, six items
met the internal consistency criterion of a factor loading > .7 (Salkind, 2006). These were
Catastrophic, Consequences Fatal, Global Catastrophic, Dread, Risk Increasing and
Future Generations. These results indicated that these Psychometric Dread risk items
were driving perceptions of risk in the Affective condition. As with the neutral Factor
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Analysis results, only being two items loaded on the second factor, although the factor
loadings of these two items were high (> .7), and explained > 10% of the variance.
Again, using Neill‘s (1994) proposed method for labeling factors, the factor one and two
items with factor loadings of >.7 were tentatively labeled Affective Catastrophic
Consequence and Affective Voluntary Control respectively. In contrast to the results of
the Phase One Factor Analysis, the Psychometric risk item Dread was present in the
primary factor for both the neutral and Affective conditions. However, the influence of
Dread on the risk perceptions of participants from the neutral cohort was less than that of
the Affective cohort.

7.5 Reliability and Validity
Validity may be defined as providing evidence that it is the measured variables that are
contributing to significant results and not extraneous variables (Graziano & Raulin,
2004). The primary variable under investigation in this study was Affect. The results
indicating an inverse relationship of perception of risk and benefit in the Affective results
compared with the neutral indicated that the Affective wording and framing of the
hazards had influenced Affective feelings. Finucane et al. (2000) suggests that ―perceived
risk and benefit are linked via some sort of Affective commonality‖ (p. 14), and this
finding provides a measure of validity to the results of the study.

This finding is also supported by the t-test results between respondents from non-native
and native English speaking countries. The results showed no significant difference
between neutral and Affective risk perceptions for respondents from either the non-native
or the native English speaking countries (with the exception of vaccine perceptions
among non-native English speakers). This supported the view that Affective
manipulation had not failed due to linguistic variations in the way respondents ascribed
meaning to the terminology used in the surveys.
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The Psychometric Dread research instrument used in the study (Slovic, 1987) is widely
regarded as a robust and valid measure of perceived risk. It was found in this study to be
highly reliable in the neutral condition (α=.85) and in the Affective condition (α=.89).
Use of this instrument provided the study with construct validity. All ten of Slovic‘s
(1987) Dread factor items were included in the research instruments, supporting
translational content validity.
Comparison of the multidimensional scaling results with Slovic‘s (1987) work also
provided a measure of external validity. When the Phase Three spatial maps were
compared with Slovic‘s (1987) findings, each of the six hazards were located in
remarkably similar locations, supporting confidence in the external validity of the
Multidimensional Scaling Analysis results and the integrity of the data.

7.6 Conclusion
Phase Three of the study was designed with a between-subjects methodology consisting
of neutral-worded and Affective-worded surveys focusing on the Psychometric Dread
Risk factor (Slovic, 1987). The surveys centered around six different hazards which are
located across the Dread risk spectrum, ranging from low Dread to high Dread. Four
independent cohorts of respondents were surveyed (N=1638). The first cohort (n=401)
completed an Affective-worded Psychometric Risk perception instrument, while the
second cohort (n=370) completed the neutral worded version of the same instrument.
Phase Three also included a third (n=434) and a fourth cohort (n=433) completing
neutral-worded

and

Affective-worded

Risk

Consequence

estimation

surveys,

respectively. Responses most closely representing respondents‘ risk perceptions and
estimations of consequence, harm and benefit were recorded on a seven-point Likert
Scale.

The results of the Phase Three descriptive data analysis suggested that the hazard that
elicited the greatest and most uniform perception of risk, was the impact of nuclear

165
reactor accidents on Future Generations for both the neutral and the Affective cohorts. By
contrast, an inability to control exposure to Aspirin was perceived as posing the least risk
for the neutral cohort, while the Affective cohort rated the Dread item as being of the
least concern in regards to the Aspirin hazard.

The Fatal Consequences of smoking produced the most uniform perceptions of risk for
both the neutral and Affective cohorts, together with the impact of nuclear reactor
accidents on Future Generations. The hazards of smoking, however, proved to be a more
polarized issue, with much less agreement in relation to reducing exposure, the level of
personal control, voluntary exposure, and dread.

The neutral and Affective cohorts were both found to perceive nuclear reactor accidents
as posing the greatest risk, with the least variation in opinion, while Aspirin was
perceived as posing the least risk. The hazard with the least amount of agreement for both
cohorts, in terms of perception of the risk, was smoking. When respondents were asked to
rate the seriousness of the consequences of each hazard, both the neutral and Affective
cohorts perceived smoking as being the most serious, with the least variation in opinion.
The neutral cohort, however, perceived Aspirin as having the least serious consequences,
while the Affective cohort held the same view of the risks associated with vaccination.

Overall, the Affective cohort demonstrated less variation in perceptions of the seriousness
of the consequences of the six hazards compared with the neutral cohort. When asked to
rate how harmful each hazard was perceived to be, the neutral and Affective cohorts were
once again in agreement with the view that smoking posed the greatest risk. The hazard
perceived to create the least harm was demonstrated to be Aspirin for the neutral cohort,
but the Affective cohort saw vaccination as posing the least risk. Both of these hazards
were also demonstrated to have the most variation in opinion.
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The hazard with the highest mean rating of benefit in the Affective condition was
vaccines while smoking demonstrated the lowest. Perceptions of benefit were most
uniform for Aspirin and the least agreement was found for nuclear reactor accidents.
Each of the hazards in the Affective condition were rated as having a lower mean benefit
than in the neutral condition. When the perceptions of benefit and harm were plotted
graphically, it became clear that the Affective cohort had perceived the harms to be
greater and the benefits to be lower for each of the six hazards compared with the neutral
cohort. This result indicated that Affect has been influenced in the Affective cohort.

The Independent Samples t-test on the Psychometric Dread risk survey data showed no
significant difference between neutral and Affective perceptions of the six hazards
overall, but indicated significant differences on several of the hazards for some Dread
factor items. There was a significant difference found between neutral and Affective
perceptions of voluntary exposure to the risks of Aspirin, vaccines, smoking and uranium
mining. The Affective cohort‘s perception of the Global Catastrophic consequences of
the use of fossil fuels was also demonstrated to be significantly greater than that of the
neutral cohort, as was the Affective cohort‘s perception of a lack of personal control over
the risks of nuclear reactor accidents. These results suggested that Affect, via the use of
Affective wording, had influenced perceptions of voluntary control over the risks and
evidence of the Affective wording significantly influencing perception of the severity of
risk consequences was found only for the Global Catastrophic consequences of the use of
fossil fuels.

A significant difference was found, however, between neutral and Affective perceptions
of the consequences of the six hazards in the Risk Consequence Task data, with the
effects of this difference being most pronounced for the fossil fuel, Aspirin, and nuclear
reactor accident hazards. These findings taken together, suggested that Affect had
influenced judgements of consequence severity, but that this influence was dependent on
certain aspects of the risk, which were inferred from the Dread risk results to be the
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perception of how much personal control can be exerted over exposure to a risk, and the
degree to which risk exposure is voluntary.

The Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) analysis indicated that the locations of the six
hazards obtained from the Phase Three Psychometric Dread risk data were consistent
with the results of the Phase One MDS, as well as being in agreement with the findings of
Slovic (1987). This finding demonstrated both internal and external validity of the results
obtained. Factor Analysis of the neutral Psychometric Risk data indicated that the
greatest amount of variance was explained by Catastrophic Consequences for the
uranium mining, vaccination and smoking hazards, while Fatal Consequences explained
the greatest amount of variance in perceptions of the nuclear reactor accident and Aspirin
hazards. Global Catastrophic was identified as explaining the greatest amount of variance
in risk perceptions of fossil fuels. When Affect was manipulated, however, the Factor
Analysis identified Catastrophic Consequences as the Dread Factor item explaining the
greatest variance for all hazards except fossil fuels, for which Uncontrolable was found.

As component correlations were moderately related, indicating the presence of a secondorder model, a two factor solution was examined for both the neutral and Affective data.
The primary neutral factor was largely driven by the severity of risk consequence items,
and although the Dread item was identified as loading on the primary factor, it held the
lowest value of the explanatory factor loadings. The explanatory factor loadings on the
secondary factor were shown to be Involuntary and Uncontrolable. Similar findings were
shown for the Affective cohort, where the only notable difference to the neutral results
was the loss of the Dread Factor item Not Easily Reduced from the primary factor, and
the gain of the item Future Generations.

The findings of the Factor Analysis indicated that Affect had very little association with
the Psychometric Dread Risk items holding the greatest explanatory power in the
perception of the six hazards. The indication that the Psychometric Dread Risk items
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Involuntary and Uncontrolable formed a second factor was noteworthy, as the results of
the Independent Samples t-test suggested it was largely within these characteristics that
the significant differences between neutral and Affective risk perceptions lay. The results
also suggested that it was the severity of risk consequence Dread factor items that held
the most explanatory power of the risk perceptions of the six hazards.

After having completed and analysis of the three study Phases, the results were
considered in light of the relevant literature. The proceeding chapter discusses the
interpretations of the results and the limitations of the study. The findings are discussed
in response to the Research Questions and exceptions and alternate explanations are
examined. The chapter then summaries the implications and significance of the findings
before outlining the study‘s limitations.
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CHAPTER 8: INTERPRETATIONS AND LIMITATIONS
8.1 Introduction
The previous chapter detailed the analysis of the main Phase of the study, whereas this
chapter offers an interpretation of those results. The response to the Research Questions
suggests that Psychometric Dread risk should not be thought of solely as a measurement
of Dread or fear, nor as consequence severity alone. Previous Psychometric risk
perception research has shown Dread risk to be the most robust predictor of perceived
risk, and it is a widely held view that Dread is chiefly governed by emotional processes.

However, it may be inferred from the results that the aspects of perceived risk, which the
Dread factor captures, are not principally governed by emotional processes. The
discussion in this chapter reveals a more complex process, where concepts of voluntary
choice and control are significantly related to emotional stimuli and form a separate
construct from risk consequence. It also shows that the framing of risk consequences is
associated with Affect, and how this may relate to concepts of choice and control. The
final section of this chapter discusses the limitations of the research and how they impact
the interpretation of results.

8.2 Response to the Research Questions
The Research Questions were based on the problem identified by Sjöberg (2006a), who
asserts that the strong evidence for ―a correlation between attitudes and perceived risk‖
(p. 5) found in Affect Heuristic research (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000;
Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2007), together with the traditional conception of
the Dread factor as driven by emotion, has arisen from the broadening of the meaning of
Affect to include the concept of Attitude. This view has resulted in widespread support
for the idea that emotion plays a significant role in risk perception and Affect being
linked to the concept of Dread (Sjöberg, 2006b). Such an assertion highlighted the need
for clarification on the question of how Affect is associated with the Dread factor‘s risk
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characteristics. However, Sjöberg (2006b) also raises a related issue, arguing that Slovic
et al.‘s (1980) Dread factor is a heterogeneous assortment of risk characteristics
dominated by items related to severe consequences. This related issue suggested that the
question of how Affect is associated with risk consequence estimations should be
investigated in tandem with Dread risk. Thus the Research Questions were framed as:
how is Affect associated with the Dread factor‟s risk characteristics? and how is Affect
associated with risk consequence?

In response to the first Research Question how is Affect associated with the Dread
factor‟s risk characteristics? it may be inferred from the results that although perceptions
of voluntary exposure and control over risk are significantly associated with Affect, it is
the risk consequence characteristics of the Dread factor which are dominant and largely
unrelated to emotional Affect. This finding is supported by Pidgeon, Simmons, and
Henwood (2006) who argue that many of the Dread characteristics tap into concerns
unrelated to Affect. The Factor Analysis showed that Dread as a risk characteristic was of
minor importance to overall Dread risk factor perceptions and the t-test showed that
Affect was primarily associated with Involuntary and Uncontrolable risk characteristics.

It may therefore be inferred from the results that Affect is significantly associated with
risk characteristics related to voluntary choice and control, but is not significantly
associated with perceptions of consequence severity or dread. In this view, concepts of
choice and control are the emotional risk characteristics within the Psychometric Dread
risk factor, and these concepts form a separate construct from consequence severity or
dread feelings. This view is evidenced by the t-test results and the two factor solution
found in the Factor Analysis.
Such an interpretation is supported by Sjöberg (2006a), who asserts that ―a close look at
the definition of Dread shows that it is measured wholly, or mostly, with non-emotional
components which can be best summarised as measuring the perceived severity of
consequences‖ (p. 7). This view is also supported by Schusterschitz, Schütz, and
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Wiedemann (2010), who found that ―the explanatory power of the Dread factor is
strongly influenced by the Severity of Consequences‖ (p. 394). This is not to suggest
however, that Affect has no influence on estimations of risk consequence, only that the
association is not significant to severe consequence risk characteristics. The significance
of Dread as Affect is based on the importance of choice and control. The Psychometric
Dread factor may therefore be considered as a combination of two separate constructs:
cognitive estimations of risk consequence, and emotionally sensitive perceptions of
choice and control.

The second Research Question, how is Affect associated with risk consequence? may be
addressed by suggesting that in general, consequence perceptions are not significantly
influenced by Affect, although this may depend on risk framing. This interpretation is
supported by the lack of significant difference in the t-test results between neutral and
Affective perceptions of the Dread risk consequence characteristics. However,
indications of some association between Affect and consequence perception were found
in the significant differences in the t-test results between neutral and Affective
perceptions of consequence severity in the Risk Consequence Task.

The lack of significant difference for the consequence items of the Dread risk factor
compared with the Risk Consequence Task results may be attributed to the effects of risk
framing. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) demonstrated the impact of Affectively framing
risks, finding that ―framing influences the experience of consequences‖ (p. 458). In the
Psychometric Dread risk instrument, hazards were framed in terms of specific
characteristics. By contrast, the Risk Consequence Task was framed in less specific terms
but were framed with negative or positive statements about each hazard, potentially
resulting in perceptions of the hazards as impersonalised and not easily interpreted as
voluntary or involuntary, creating frame-dependent estimations of risk consequence.
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From this line of argument, it may be inferred that the lack of specific risk characteristics
on which to base risk judgement results in the Affective associations becoming more
pronounced. Jenkin (2006) supports this view, asserting that the framing of risks in a way
that is not specific is ―more likely to increase anxiety without increasing awareness‖ (p.
5). This view is also supported by Hamilton, Adolphs, and Nerlich (2007) and Zajonc
(1980), who underscore how linguistic assessments impact precognitive Affective
impressions of risk based on good/bad or like/dislike. It may be inferred from these
results that without adequate framing of risk consequence in terms of its characteristics,
judgement is deferred to Affective impressions; however, when risk characteristics are
made explicit, Affect is shown to be primarily associated with perceptions of voluntary
choice and personal control.

8.3 Discussion
The interpretation of the results was based on the most significant findings of the study as
they relate to the literature. It was concluded that consequence severity risk
characteristics dominate the Dread risk factor, and the factor is not significantly related to
emotional Affect. This interpretation not only provides a clearer view of the Dread risk
factor, but also a greater understanding of the role of Affect in the way in which risks are
perceived, and how risk judgements are made.

8.3.1 Interpretations of the Findings
The significant results led to several related interpretations that were supported by the
literature. The first interpretation was that Dread risk is primarily a measure of the
severity of consequence, while the second inference was that Affect is related to
perceptions of voluntary choice in exposure to a risk and personal control, but not dread
or severity of consequence characteristics. It was also inferred from the results that Dread
risk is largely a measure of two distinct constructs, including estimations of risk
consequence and perceptions of voluntary choice and personal control.
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The view that Dread risk is primarily a measure of the severity of risk consequence was
based on several findings supported in the literature. The study results indicated that the
neutral and Affective cohorts in the descriptive analysis were in agreement as to the
riskiness of each of the six hazards, and no significant differences were found in the t-test
between overall neutral and Affective Dread risk perceptions. Comparison of the
Multidimensional Scaling analysis conducted in Phases One and Three confirmed this
interpretation, and Factor Analysis showed risk consequence characteristics as a primary
construct. This suggests a conception of Dread risk as a measurement of risk consequence
perceptions which are largely uninfluenced by Affect.

Despite a widespread view of Dread risk as the emotional factor (see Finucane et al.,
2000; Peters & Slovic, 1996; Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, &
MacGregor, 2002, 2004; Slovic et al., 2007; Slovic, Peters, Finucane, & MacGregor,
2005), it may be inferred from the these results that Dread risk is not primarily a measure
of risk-as-feelings. This interpretation is supported by Fischhoff et al.‘s (1978) seminal
Psychometric risk study, at which time the Dread factor was labelled Severe due to the
dominance of consequence severity in the factor. It was not until Slovic et al.‘s (1980)
subsequent expansion of the work that the equivallent factor was labelled as Dread.
Sjöberg (2006b) has been a vocal proponent of the view that the Dread risk factor is a
heterogeneous assortment of risk characteristics dominated by items related to severe
consequences rather than emotion, and this interpretation supports this view.

The second major inference of the study is that Affect is associated with perceptions of
voluntary choice and personal control, but not with dread or consequence characteristics.
The study found a significant difference in the t-test results between neutral and Affective
perceptions relating to voluntary exposure to the risks of Aspirin, Vaccines and Smoking
and a lack of personal control over the risks of Uranium Mining and Nuclear Reactor
Accidents. From this it was inferred that Affect is largely associated with perceptions of
voluntary control. The literature suggests that there tends to be a clear separation between
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the way individuals perceive risks to themselves as opposed to those impacting on others
(Sjöberg & Drottz, 1987) and Starr (1969) asserts that there is a significant difference
between acceptance of voluntary versus involuntary risks. The interpretation of this study
that Affect is associated with risk perceptions of voluntary choice and control offers an
explanation as to the mechanisms behind risk acceptance.

The literature suggests that Affect may be considered as feelings of like or dislike for a
particular activity (Alhakami & Slovic, 2006), and it may be inferred from the results of
this study that it is these impressions that are associated with the amount of personal
control and choice over a risk. The difference between the perception of risks as general
or personal is related to Weinstein‘s (1980) proposed optimism bias, where personal risks
are viewed with unrealistic positivity. It may thus be surmised that positive Affect or
optimism regarding a hazardous activity is associated with the perception of how
personal the risk is, a concept directly related to ideas of control and choice. This
interpretation is supported by Nickerson (1998), who refers to Confirmation Bias in
which individuals unconsciously gather selective information and give undue
consideration to ―evidence that supports one's position while neglecting to gather, or
[discount], evidence that would tell against it‖ (p. 175).

The study results also indicated that choice and control characteristics were independent
of the characteristics of severe consequences. The smoking hazard elicited the largest
variation in mean perception, especially in regards to the Uncontrolable and Involuntary
characteristics. It may be inferred from this result that although smokers and non-smokers
have a similar perception of the risk consequence, Affect impacts perceptions of choice
and control over exposure. The ways in which these perceptions may be influenced is
indicated in the literature, which shows that the choice to smoke is largely influenced by
attitude (Slovic, 2000) and suggests Confirmation Bias, or selective case building
(Nickerson, 1998). Although there were large variations in the perceptions of choice and
control for this hazard, perceptions of smoking were also demonstrated to have the least
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variation in opinion in regards to the Fatal Consequences of the risk. Respondents
perceived the smoking hazard as a voluntary and controllable risk on par with Aspirin
consumption, while also perceiving it to be as fatal as nuclear reactor accidents. It may be
inferred from this result that the severe consequences of some hazards may be
acknowledged and perceived similarly, while differing Affective perceptions associated
with choice and control will influence risk acceptance.

The view that voluntary control is a significant construct to overall Dread risk
perceptions is supported by the finding that smoking was perceived to be the most severe
and harmful risk on average, when respondents were asked about severity of consequence
or harm alone. From this it was inferred that the role of Affect in overall Dread risk
perceptions is largely limited to an association with voluntary choice and personal control
characteristics within the factor. This view is supported by Lupton and Tulloch (2002),
who assert that voluntary risk taking is a form of emotional engagement associated with
control. It may be further inferred that the association of voluntary control with Affect, or
feelings of like or dislike for a hazard, may be related to the personal nature of particular
risks.

The third major interpretation that Dread risk is largely a product of the two distinct
constructs of consequence estimation and perceptions of choice and control, was based
on several findings and is supported by the literature. The results showed a two factor
solution in the Factor Analysis, with a primary factor comprised primarily of severity of
consequence items. The secondary factor was made up of the voluntary and control
items, albeit not quite meeting O‘Rourke, Hatcher and Stepanski‘s (2005) Factor
Analysis criterion. From this result, it was surmised that the Psychometric Dread risk
factor is a measure of the two distinct constructs of risk consequence estimations and
perceptions of voluntary choice and personal control. This interpretation is supported by
Fischhoff et al. (1978), who found this factor to be ―associated with severity of
consequences and, to a lesser extent, with common/dread‖ (p. 137).
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The separation of voluntary control from consequence was also supported by the findings
in relation to the smoking hazard which showed that Affect and perceptions of voluntary
control do not necessarily impact perceptions of consequence severity. Although the
severity of risk consequences may be a point of agreement and be perceived similarly,
differing Affective perceptions associated with choice and control may influence risk
acceptance. This finding is supported in the literature, which suggests that there is a
separation ―between the level of risk perceived and the willingness to take the risk‖
(Breakwell, 1996, p. 51).

For example, post 9/11, many Americans who feared flying chose to drive personal
vehicles instead, due to the threat of further terrorist activity targeted at the airline
industry. As a result, the number of fatal traffic accidents in the United States increased
for a period of 12 months after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, when
compared with the previous five years of data (Gigerenzer, 2006). The apparently fearprovoked increase in motor vehicle fatalities may be ascribed to the perception of greater
control and choice in the risk outcome of driving a personal vehicle, when compared with
airline travel. Although still linking risk acceptance to Affect, this interpretation offers
are more refined perspective through reference to perceptions of choice and control.

8.3.2 Exceptions and Alternate Explanations
The study also revealed results to which alternate interpretations to those outlined above
might be attributed. For example, a significant difference was found in the t-test between
neutral and Affective perceptions of the consequences of the six hazards in the Risk
Consequence Task. This indicated that Affect was associated with risk consequence
estimations. One interpretation of this result would be to infer that Affect is associated
with risk consequence judgements, resulting in a view in conflict with the Psychometric
results. However, risk consequence judgements are shown in the literature to be
associated with control, the perception of which is a ―major factor in determining risk
consequence value‖ (Rowe, 1988, p. 135). This interpretation offers some reconciliation
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with the main assertions of this Thesis by viewing concepts of choice and control as
inextricably linked to estimations of consequence severity, just as Affect is an integral
part of overall risk perception.

In this instance, participants were not asked to consider specific aspects of risk
consequence, such as fatality, but simply to rate the seriousness of the risk consequences.
Many different risk characteristics may have been considered by different participants in
estimating the seriousness of a risk. It may also be argued that, compared with the Phase
Two results which indicated no Affective association with consequence estimation, the
framing statements used in the Risk Consequence Task for Phase Three (Appendix B)
were the most likely reason behind the difference. The neutral framing statements
highlighted the benefits of the hazards or downplayed the consequences, while the
Affective framing statements emphasised the negative aspects. Taylor-Gooby and Zinn
(2006) assert that this type of Affective priming provides a frame of reference through
Affective experience, and that any assessment is necessarily subject to context and
framing. This interpretation suggests that the context within which a risk is framed has a
greater association with Affect than the content of a risk message.

Also indicating an association between Affect and risk consequence were the results of
the Factor Analysis. Although the primary factor to emerge was dominated by severity of
consequence risk characteristics, the Dread item was found to load on this primary factor.
Factor Analysis of the Affective results showed the Dread item to load slightly higher on
the primary factor than for the neutral cohort. It is most reasonable to infer from this
result that Affect is associated with worry or dread of a hazard, and that dread feelings
are part of the mental construct dominated by severe consequences. An alternate
explanation however, is that worry, concern or dread feelings are not significantly related
to perceptions of risk consequence. This interpretation is in agreement with Sjöberg
(2006b), who found the emotional aspects of the Dread risk factor to be of minor
importance to perceived risk compared with severe consequences. A third consideration
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is that worry, concern or dread feelings may be associated with severe consequences, but
this characteristic of risk perception is not a significant driver behind severity of
consequences construct.

Another finding suggesting alternate interpretations, was the significant difference found
in the t-test on Global Catastrophic between neutral and Affective perceptions of the
fossil fuel hazard. This finding may be interpreted as suggesting that risk consequence
characteristics are associated with Affect for particular hazards. However, significant
differences for the remaining hazards were related to Involuntary and Uncontrolable.
From this, it may be inferred that the globally catastrophic consequences of fossil fuel use
and climate change represent a risk that is both Involuntary and Uncontrolable, resulting
in an association of Affect with risk consequence estimation. Sunstein (2004) suggests
that when risk consequences conjure vivid mental impressions, they tend to produce
visceral Affective reactions. From these findings, it might be further suggested that risks
perceived as highly Involuntary and Uncontrolable also produce visceral Affective
reactions related to estimations of catastrophic risk.

Also supporting this view were the responses for the fossil fuel hazard, which showed
higher mean Affective risk perceptions compared with the neutral cohort for Involuntary,
Uncontrolable and Global Catastrophic, while Dread and other consequence severity
items were lower. An alternate interpretation of the Global Catastrophe finding is that
consequence perceptions may be influenced by Affect if the magnitude and severity of
the risk is large enough, such as with climate change risks. Slovic et al. (2007), assert that
in some circumstances, the magnitude of a risk consequence conveys little meaning and
may not be evaluable, and it may be argued that the estimation large magnitude
consequences is mediated by Affective impressions, including perceptions of choice and
control.
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Comparison of the Multidimensional Scaling Analysis results of the study with those of
Slovic (1987, p. 282) indicated general agreement, but with some exceptions. The Dread
risk perception of uranium mining and nuclear reactor accident hazards has were lower in
the study results than those reported by Slovic (9187). These differences could be
accounted for by the shift in risk perceptions over time. Nuclear energy is no longer a
new and unfamiliar technology and the mining of uranium is understood to be related.
Such an interpretation is supported by Sjöberg and Drottz- Sjöberg (2009) who found the
perception of nuclear waste to be neither perceived as new or ―particularly dreaded‖ (p.
90).
The risk context of nuclear energy during Slovic‘s (1987) investigation was also
significantly different to the present. For example, the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident
occurred the year before Slovic‘s (1987) findings were published, which could
conceivably account for increased Dread risk perceptions for nuclear reactor accidents
and uranium mining in Slovic‘s (1987) study. Likewise, the knowledge of the
consequences of fossil fuel use on climate change has also increased in the last 28 years,
and the slightly increased perceptions of Dread risk (or consequence) for the fossil fuel
hazard may be interpreted as a reflection of this. Such an interpretation is also supported
by Sjöberg and Drottz-Sjöberg (2009), who questioned whether concern over the
Greenhouse effect was ―replacing nuclear fear‖ (p. 290). This study would suggest a
response in the affirmative.

8.3.3 Implications, Significance and Relationships to Previous Work
Risk research is immensely significant to risk governance and policy development.
Because of the high level of uncertainty and limited knowledge surrounding decisions,
―the need for certain knowledge is enormous‖ (Zinn & Taylor-Gooby, 2006b). Questions
surrounding public acceptance of technologies and risky decision making are immensely
important to risk management and policy development. As Psychometric risk research
has ―often being primarily concerned with issues of risk communication‖ (Taylor-Gooby
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& Zinn, 2006a, p. 398), it follows that the outcomes of this research would also have
implications in this area. The interpretation of an association of Affect with concepts of
voluntary and control has implications for the Psychometric risk contribution to risk
management and communication.

Risk assessment is a necessary precursor to risk management. Understanding risk
perception contributes to effective risk assessment, as the human factor is frequently
important to determining the likelihood and consequences of a hazard (Breakwell, 2007).
Psychometric risk research provides insights into the way in which risks are perceived,
which has implications for understanding behaviour in response to risk issues, as ―one
cannot predict how people will respond to an issue without knowing how they perceive
it‖ (Fischhoff, 1985, p. 90). In terms of risk management, operationalisation of this
finding might take the form of greater and more frequent stakeholder consultation and
involvement to promote perceptions of control and voluntary, thereby influencing
Affective associations with the risk issue.

The outcomes of this study may also result in considerable advantage to the risk
communication effort. It has long been recognised that ―risk communication would
benefit from a shift in attention from message construction to audience analysis‖ (Marris,
Langford, & O'Riordan, 1998, p. 646). The finding in this study that Dread risk is chiefly
governed by estimations of severe consequences rather than emotional considerations
may influence how the judgements of risk communication audiences are interpreted.
One of the key questions impacting risk communication is ―what systematic departures
from rationality can be identified‖ (Viscusi, 1997, p. 1659). If Dread risk is viewed as a
measure of irrational emotional response to risk, then it may be inferred that Dread risk
may inform the degree of irrational perception. However, the view of Dread risk offered
in this Thesis infers a limited role of Affect in Dread risk perceptions, offering a different
perspective in the interpretation of risk judgement rationality. Sjöberg (2007) asserts that
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risk communication based on the ―notion of the primacy of a primitive initial emotional
reaction‖ (p. 223) will likely fail, and the outcomes of this study potentially offer a more
refined perspective on Dread risk and the role of Affect relating to perceptions of
voluntary and control in risk judgements.

This view that the Affective association with voluntary control is of importance to risk
perception is also relevant to policy formulation and an awareness of the impact of
different risk judgements is ―of intense practical significance‖ (Viscusi, 1997, p. 1658).
In this domain, Kahlor, Dunwoody, Griffin, and Neuwirth (2006) highlight a need for
greater research into impersonal rather than personal risk in order to meet the needs of
policy issues. The interpretation of this Thesis that concepts of personal choice and
control are associated with emotions may offer potential avenues of policy research, as
investigations in this area consistently ―measure public opinions…but struggle to
understand the basis for those opinions‖ (Viscusi, 1997, p. 1658). It is also significant
that the interpretation of results offers implications for understanding risk acceptance in
relation to choice, control and Affect, potentially offering insights into ―how the behavior
and responses of actors are to be understood‖ (Taylor-Gooby & Zinn, 2006a, p. 407).

Several findings of the study were found to replicate the outcomes of previous
Psychometric risk studies. The Multidimensional Scaling Analysis results were in good
agreement with the spatial locations of the same hazards in Slovic‘s (1987) original work,
with the exception of some shifts in perceptions of uranium mining and nuclear
technology over time. The Factor Analysis results were also noteworthy, as the finding of
severe consequences to be dominant was in good agreement with both the seminal work
of Fischhoff et al. (1978), as well as the later findings of Sjöberg (2006b). The finding in
the results of a secondary factor relating to voluntary choice and personal control is also
supported by the literature. When Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein (1980) found a
three factor solution differing from the two-dimensional structure obtained by Fischhoff
et al. (1978), items relating to voluntary choice and personal control were no longer
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linked to novelty and knowledge of the risk, but to Dread and the severity of risk
consequence (Breakwell, 2007). From this it might be surmised that voluntary control
may require a place as a distinct construct from the established factors.

The findings also showed the Psychometric Dread risk factor to be largely dominated by
items related to the severity of risk consequence, a finding supported by Schusterschitz et
al. (2010) who asserts that ―the explanatory power of the Dread factor is strongly
influenced by the Severity of Consequences‖ (p. 394). This interpretation was previously
advocated by Sjöberg (2006a), who asserts that ―a close look at the definition of Dread
shows that it is measured wholly, or mostly, with non-emotional components which can
be best summarised as measuring the perceived severity of consequences‖ (p. 7). In
agreement with Sjöberg‘s (2006b) view of the Dread factor, the study findings are also
supported by the results reported in Fischhoff et al.‘s (1978) seminal paper, where the
Severity of Risk Consequence item was found to have the highest factor loading of all of
the Dread factor items.

8.4 Limitations
The study was limited by a number of factors which may be broadly summarised as those
inherent to the Psychometric risk methodology, those anticipated in the study design and
those encountered during the course of research. Limitations inherent to the Psychometric
risk approach were largely adopted in the study and regarded as acceptable. Limitations
that were anticipated were acknowledged and accounted for in the study design where
possible, as were those encountered during the course of the research.
Breakwell (2007) asserts that the Psychometric risk approach can only capture an
―appreciation of the risk that [participants] have at the moment of the study and in a way
that they can articulate at that time‖ (p. 41). Although this risk ‗snapshot‘ is the basis for
all Psychometric risk research and is an arguably adequate one, this limitation should
nevertheless be taken into consideration. It may be necessary to accept that the relative

183
pre-eminence of Affect and of Consequence may truly be a matter of timing, context and
audience, and be heavily frame-dependent.

The Psychometric risk approach has also been criticised for the use of aggregate data,
which gives ―much less random error than individual values‖ (Sjöberg, 2006a, p. 5). It
was therefore deemed essential that the results of this Thesis be interpreted in the context
of ―why people on average judge technologies differently‖ rather than ―why different
people judge the same technologies differently‖ (Breakwell, 2007, p. 46). The
Psychometric risk tradition has also been criticised for the mixing of hazards and
hazardous activities in the research instruments (Breakwell, 2007). The hazards chosen
for the research contained in this Thesis were subject to this limitation; for example,
smoking is a hazardous activity, whereas a nuclear reactor accident is a hazard.

There is some debate over the representativeness of samples of participants crowdsourced
via Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), and this was identified as a potential limitation of
the study in the initial stages. However, the typical demographic of an MTurk sample
was not anticipated to contain sub-populations that would invalidate the subject of
measurement in the study (Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). This assumption was
justified by the Multidimensional Scaling Analysis results which showed Dread risk
perceptions to be in general agreement with those reported by Slovic (1987).

It was also considered that there was a potential for inconsistencies in the logic used to
ascribe meaning (semantics) to the neutral and negative words. Although it was
anticipated that the use of words from the ANEW list (Bradley & Lang, 2010) would
provide a level of consistency in interpretation, the potential remained for differences in
word interpretation to influence reported perceptions of risk.

Several limitations of the study were identified as the first two study Phases progressed.
As the target population was defined as having few demographic boundaries, it was
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recognised that a larger sample size would be needed to maximize the chance of detecting
a significant result. Statistical Power Analysis was performed on the data gathered in
Phases One and Two to provide an optimal sample size for Phase Three. When the data
cleanse was performed on the Phase One and Two data, it became apparent by that
concentration levels on the accuracy of expressed preferences. This limitation was
accounted for by the introduction of ‗concentration check‘ questions in the Phase Three
research instruments, where only one answer was correct. Any incorrect responses to this
question were discarded from the data analysis.

A major limitation that was identified in Phases One and Two was the need to confirm
that the emotional wording used in the study had actually manipulated perceptions of risk
via negative Affect. The solution to this issue, it was reasoned, lay in the inverse
relationship between risk and benefit observed in previous risk perception research
(Alhakami & Slovic, 2006; Finucane et al., 2000; Gardner & Gould, 1989; Gregory &
Mendelsohn, 1993). The view that the inverse relationship of risk and benefit is due to
the influence of Affect on risk judgements is supported by the work of Finucane et al.
(2000) who suggested that ―perceived risk and benefit are linked via some sort of
affective commonality‖ (p. 14). Questions relating to the perceived benefit and harm of
each hazard were introduced in Phase Three of the study to ascertain whether an increase
in perceived benefit and a decrease in perceived harm would be observed in the Affective
cohort compared with the neutral cohort. This mitigated the limitation by providing
evidence of whether greater Affect had been elicited in the Affective condition or not.

8.5 Conclusion
The received message from the results of this study is that Psychometric Dread is a
misleading label for a group of items which relate to two constructs: emotional risk
responses based on choice and control, and cognitive risk estimations based on the
severity of risk consequences. Affect is chiefly associated with voluntary control, but also
with the framed risk context. The implications of the outcomes of the study are
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significant to the research and practical levels of risk governance. It offers a view of how
risks are assessed in terms of risk consequence estimations, perceptions of personal
choice and control, and the subtle associations of Affect with the risk characteristics of
the Psychometric Dread risk factor. The next chapter will conclude the Thesis by
discussing how the empirical findings of the study converge in response to the Research
Questions. The theoretical and policy implications of the results are also discussed
together with recommendations for future research. The chapter concludes with closing
remarks on the significance and contribution of the study‘s outcomes to the risk domain.

186
CHAPTER 9: RECOMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
9.1 Introduction
This study set out to explore the concept of Dread risk in terms of Affect and
consequence estimation. The study has identified a relationship between risk
consequence, voluntary control and Affect in Dread risk perceptions. The general
theoretical literature on risk and specifically in the context of Psychometric risk
perception, leaves several vital questions relating to Dread risk and Affect unanswered.
This study sought to respond to two of these questions:
1. How is Affect associated with the Dread factor‟s risk characteristics?
2. How is Affect associated with risk consequence?
This chapter will provide a synthesis of the empirical findings of the study, and show
how these converge in response to the Research Questions. The theoretical and policy
implications of the research outcomes are also discussed, demonstrating how the findings
of the study may influence further understanding and application of knowledge in the risk
domain. The chapter concludes with recommendations for future investigations and
closing remarks on the significance and contribution of the research.

9.2 Empirical Findings
The main empirical findings are chapter specific and were summarised within the
respective empirical chapters five, six, and seven. This section will synthesise the
empirical findings in response to the study‘s Research Questions, how is Affect
associated with the Dread factor‟s risk characteristics? and how is Affect associated with
risk consequence?

Responses to the Research Questions were based on several interpretations of the
empirical findings. The first interpretation was that perceptions of voluntary exposure and
control over risk are significantly associated with Affect. The empirical findings

187
underpinning this interpretation included the finding that the neutral and Affective
cohorts had significantly different perceptions of either voluntary or control for all but
one of the hazards. These risk characteristics were shown to form a separate construct
from the remainder of the Dread risk factor items in the Factor Analysis. These result was
interpreted as indicating that the Psychometric Dread risk factor is comprised of two
separate constructs related to cognitive estimations of risk consequence and emotionally
sensitive perceptions of choice and control.

The second interpretation was that the Dread risk factor is largely dominated by risk
consequence characteristics. This view was based on the findings that risk consequence
characteristics were dominant in the primary factor to emerge from the Factor Analysis
and the Dread risk item was of minor importance to overall Dread risk factor perceptions.
The third interpretation to shape the response to the Research Questions was that the risk
consequence characteristics of the Dread factor are largely unassociated with Affect. The
results showed that there were no significant differences between most of the neutral and
Affective perceptions of Dread risk consequence characteristics or the Dread item,
indicating little association with Affect. This interpretation is not to suggest that Affect
has no influence at all on perceptions of risk consequence or on Dread risk, but only that
the influence is not greatly significant to the constructs under measurement.

The fourth interpretation significant to the response to the Research Questions was that
risk framing may influence Affective perceptions of risk consequences. Indications of
some association between Affect and consequence perception were found in the
significant difference between neutral and Affective perceptions of consequence severity
in the Risk Consequence Task. This result was in contrast to the lack of evidence for an
Affective association to risk consequence characteristics found in the Dread risk results.
As the major difference between the two research instruments was the specificity with
which the risk consequences were framed, an inference based on the literature was made
that a lack of specific risk characteristics on which to base risk judgements may result in
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the Affective association becoming more pronounced. It was inferred that without
adequate framing of risk characteristics, judgement is deferred to Affective impressions
based, at least in part, on available information. However, when risk characteristics are
made explicit, Affect is shown to be primarily associated with perceptions of voluntary
choice and personal control.

The above synthesis of the empirical findings of the study show how these interpretations
converge in response to the Research Questions as follows:


how is Affect associated with the Dread factor‟s risk characteristics?

The association of Affect with the Dread risk factor‘s risk characteristics is chiefly
limited to a construct related to perceptions of voluntary and control, and Affect is largely
unrelated to the remaining Dread risk items.


how is Affect associated with risk consequence?

The association of Affect with perceptions of risk consequence is dependent on the
characteristics of the risk. When risk characteristics are explicit, perceptions of severe
consequences are not generally associated with Affect. Affective associations are largely
limited to voluntary and control, which become important to perceptions of risk
consequences when they are not framed with reference to specific risk characteristics.

9.3 Theoretical Implications
The implications of the research findings indicate that revisiting the Psychometric Theory
of Risk and the role of Affect may be worthwhile. This Thesis forwards an understanding
of the role of Affect in perceived risk, and offers some insight into the elements which
make Dread risk successful. The Dread risk factor is widely regarded as the most
important factor to emerge from the Psychometric Paradigm of risk perception (TaylorGooby & Zinn, 2006b) and the role of Affect in risk judgements was identified early on
as being among the key questions in the research domain (Breakwell, 2007). However,
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Sjöberg (2006b) argues that confusion has arisen from the broadening of the meaning of
Affect to include the concept of Attitude, and this has resulted in the findings of Affect
Heuristic research being linked to the Psychometric concept of Dread risk.

It is however noted from the results of this study that the association between Affect and
Dread risk is not entirely unjustified. Among the heterogeneous assortment of Dread risk
items, it is the voluntary and control characteristics which are associated with Affect.
Sjöberg (2003) has previously highlighted the need for an investigation of the Affective
relationship to Dread risk items, stating that these ―dimensions may have a relationship to
emotional processes but they are not emotional per se and their emotional significance
remains to be documented‖ (p. 109). In this way, the results of this study offer some
insight into the emotional processes behind Dread risk characteristics, and are significant
to Psychometric risk research.

Sjöberg (2006b) also asserts that the Dread factor is a heterogeneous blend of different
risk characteristics, rather than a quantitative measure of Affective risk reactions. The
outcomes of this study show that this view is also not unjustified, indicating that Dread
risk is dominated by severe consequences. Schusterschitz, Schütz, and Wiedemann
(2010) found that ―the explanatory power of the Dread factor is strongly influenced by
the Severity of Consequences‖ (p. 394), an interpretation previously advocated by
Sjöberg (2006a), who asserts that ―a close look at the definition of Dread shows that it is
measured wholly, or mostly, with non-emotional components which can be best
summarised as measuring the perceived severity of consequences‖ (p. 7).

However, the outcomes of this research are also in agreement with the early findings that
perceptions of Dread risk are associated with Affect (Fischhoff, Slovic, Litchtenstein,
Read, & Combs, 1978; Slovic, 1987; Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1980), although
the findings limit the association to perceptions of voluntary and control. The assertion of
Pidgeon, Simmons, and Henwood (2006) that many of the Dread risk factor‘s
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characteristics tap into concerns unrelated to Affect is not unfounded, nor is the view that
Dread is related to Affect, however the results of this research reveal a more subtle and
complex relationship between feelings, choice, control and consequences that is of value
to the understanding of risk perception and risk acceptance.
The research finding that Affective associations with perceptions of risk consequence are
linked to the characteristics with which risks are framed also has significant implications
for the Psychometric Theory of Risk. The view that Affective reactions are inextricably
linked to linguistic meanings of risk provides the Psychometric paradigm of risk with a
vehicle for assessing risk perceptions. The Psychometric paradigm attempts to explain
risk perception through expressed preferences (Fischhoff et al., 1978; Slovic, Fischhoff,
& Lichtenstein, 1985), and the context and content of the language used to elicit those
preferences is important.

The finding of the study that the specificity of the terms with which risk characteristics
are communicated is of greater importance to Affect than the emotional tone, suggests
that Affect may be more strongly related to the context than to the content of the risk
message. The importance of language to Affect and perceptions of risk is also significant
to the Psychometric Theory of Risk in the respect that Dread is a misleading label for a
consequence dominated factor. Sjöberg (2007) asserts that as a factor in the Psychometric
paradigm, Dread is somewhat of a misnomer, and that the bulk of the explanatory power
of Dread risk is ―carried by the non-emotional content of the Dread factor‖ (Sjöberg,
2007, p. 2). The study results confirm this observation, finding that Affect was not
associated with the dominance of consequence risk characteristics in the factor.
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9.4 Policy Implications
Risk research is ultimately concerned with questions about ―the kind of world we would
like to live in, and the technical developments we wish to support, or the risks we are
willing to take‖ (Zinn & Taylor-Gooby, 2006a). As such, the implication of any risk
research has significant implications for risk governance and policy development. The
implications of the research outcomes are best understood in the context of the theoretical
framework from which the study arose.

In this context, Psychometric risk research provides insights into the way in which risks
are perceived, which has implications for understanding behaviour in response to risk
issues, as ―one cannot predict how people will respond to an issue without knowing how
they perceive it‖ (Fischhoff, 1985, p. 90). The Psychometric Dread factor is regarded as
the main determiner of risk perception and much of the success in the field of risk
perception research may be attributed to the Psychometric Paradigm (Bouyer,
Bagdassarian, Chaabanne, & Mullet, 2001; Breakwell, 2007; Conrad, 1980; Fischhoff et
al., 1978; Jenkin, 2006; von Winterfeldt, John, & Borcherding, 1981).

Other work has refined the concept of Dread risk to an emotional factor, principly in light
of research stressing the importance of the Affect Heuristic to percieved risk (see
Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000; Peters & Slovic, 1996; Rottenstreich &
Hsee, 2001; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002, 2004, 2007; Slovic, Peters,
Finucane, & MacGregor, 2005).

However, evidence from several studies, including Palmer (1996), Sjöberg (2006b),
Schusterschitz et al. (2010) and this Thesis indicate that the Dread risk factor is largely
comprised on non-emotional items dominated by consequence characteristics. The
findings of this Thesis also document the significance of Affect to Dread risk
characteristics, thereby clarifying some ―questionable assumptions and overly strong
generalizations have been made‖ (Sjöberg, 2003a, p. 109) regarding the Dread risk factor.
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The theoretical arguments for this justification suggest that it is insufficient to advocate
for the inclusion of the Psychometric Dread factor in risk governance processes on the
basis of Dread risk as Affect. For example, the Standards Australia HB 167:2006
Security Risk Management handbook asserts that ―many aspects of risk management are
highly subjective and are greatly influenced by the perceptions of information providers,
analysts, and users of the products of security risk management‖ (Standards Australia,
2006, p. 20).
The guide defines Dread as ―the level of fear… of an event occurring [which] elevates
perceptions of the risk beyond reasonable norms‖ (Standards Australia, 2006, p. 20), and
gives the example of the perceived risk of airline travel in response to the threat of
terrorism. The results of this study however, offer a more refined conception of the
Affective influence on Dread risk characteristics, providing greater clarity on risk
judgements and acceptance. For example, instead of an example of fear increasing risk
perceptions beyond the norm, the increase in motor vehicle fatalities in the 12 months
post 9/11 in the United States (Gigerenzer, 2006) may be ascribed to the perception of
greater control and choice in the risk outcome of driving a personal vehicle, when
compared with airline travel.

The study outcomes are also significant to risk communication and are related to one of
the key questions impacting the area, which is ―what systematic departures from
rationality can be identified‖ (Viscusi, 1997, p. 1659). The finding in this study that
Dread risk is chiefly governed by estimations of severe consequences rather than
emotional considerations may influence the understanding of how the judgements of risk
communication audiences are expressed. If Dread risk is viewed as a measure of
irrational emotional response to risk, then it may be inferred that Dread risk informs the
degree to which risk perception is ―beyond reasonable norms‖ (Standards Australia,
2006, p. 20).
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However, Sjöberg (2007) asserts that risk communication based on the ―notion of the
primacy of a primitive initial emotional reaction‖ (p. 223) will likely fail, and the
outcomes of this study offer a more refined perspective of Dread and Affect relating to
perceptions of voluntary and control. Risk communication practitioners may benefit from
the results which show that that it is perceptions of voluntary control which are sensitive
to Affect and may influence risk perceptions beyond the norm. It may also be inferred
from that results that if perceptions of risk consequences are considered to be beyond
reasonable norms, then the risk message may be enhanced through ensuring that risk
characteristics are made clear, with care taken to address issues of voluntary and choice.
An awareness of the impact of different risk judgements is also ―of intense practical
significance‖ (Viscusi, 1997, p. 1658) to policy development. The interpretation of this
Thesis that concepts of personal choice and control are associated with emotions may
offer potential avenues of policy research, as investigations in this area consistently
―measure public opinions…but struggle to understand the basis for those opinions‖
(Viscusi, 1997, p. 1658). Of significance to policy development are the implications of
the study outcomes to understanding risk acceptance in relation to choice, control and
Affect, potentially offering insights into ―how the behavior and responses of actors are to
be understood‖ (Taylor-Gooby & Zinn, 2006a p. 407).

9.5 Recommendations
The scale of the debate over the relationship of Affect to Dread risk characteristics and
the dominance of severe consequences in the factor is therefore multifaceted. In order to
generate a robust theoretical framework around these concepts that will lead to
achievable risk governance strategies, further investigation into the role of Affect in
perceptions of voluntary control related risk characteristics is recommended. Exploring
the following, as future research strategies, will facilitate the attainment of this goal:
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Investigation of other potential risk characteristics related to the voluntary
control construct: research into other risk characteristics related to the voluntary
control construct would allow exploration of the extent of the factor and its
association with Affect. Outcomes may be significant to Psychometric risk
research and risk governance.



Investigation of the specificity of risk framing and the association with Affect:
research into the context of risk messages versus the content, and how this
impacts risk perception and Affective reactions may have outcomes particularly
significant to the field of risk communication.



Investigation of whether Affect and attribute substitution play a role in risk
perceptions when information is specific versus non-specific: research in this area
would show which other risk attributes are substituted for cognitive
considerations when risk characteristics are and are not specified, and whether
there is an association with Affect. Outcomes may also be significant to
Psychometric risk and risk governance research.

These future research directions would build on the findings of the current study, and
allow further assessment of the way in which Affect and concepts of personal choice and
voluntary control impact risk perceptions and behaviour. Such a direction in future
research would promote the development of a more robust view of the ways in which
Affect is associated with different risk characteristics, and further dispel some of the
misconceptions of Psychometric risk factors.
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9.6 Conclusion
The most important statement that can be made in regards to the research outcomes is
that Dread risk as Affect is largely limited to concepts of control and choice, and that
these concepts form a construct distinct from unemotional assessments of severe
consequences. The way in which fear influences risk perceptions and acceptance is
related to the ability to anticipate future events, and to judge the implications of those
events. Risk perception invariably originates from an individual perspective, giving rise
to concern over how the risk of the hazard impacts me. From an evolutionary perspective,
it is most logical for emotion to influence perceptions of how much control and choice
one has over an anticipated negative outcome.

Consideration of control and choice in the face of risk influences risk behaviour and is
associated with an Affective impetus for action, an innate human impulse for mitigation
of those risks which are perceived as being responsive to one‘s control and choice. There
is arguably little evolutionary point in an Affective association with risk consequences
that are unrelated to voluntary choice and personal control. If there is the potential for a
choice in exposure and control over a risk, it follows that an emotional impetus to carry
out mitigation strategies is an excellent survival trait. The fight or flight response refers to
the emotional impulse to either run away from or confront a threat; to choose retreat or
exercise some form of control. Control and choice are therefore arguably more
fundamental considerations to the Affective impact on the perception of risk, than the
concept of Affect as a fear response.

Just as the fear of a harmless spider may cause a fight or flight response despite the
knowledge of negligible consequences, activities with severe consequences such as
smoking are routinely indulged in by some individuals. Thus an Affective association
with concepts of choice and control is a far more satisfactory explanation for many risk
behaviours than the conception of Affect as Dread risk. Simply because a risk is dreaded
does also not infer that this relates to estimations of consequence severity or that
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consequence severity is related to Affect. The label of the Dread risk factor is therefore a
misleading representation of its two main characteristics of consequence and voluntary
control. The overall view of this Thesis that the emotional response to risk is frame
dependent and related to concepts of action, such as voluntary and control, offers a
tangible link between the biases of subjective human perception and the objective reality
of risk behaviour.
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APPENDIX A: PSYCHOMETRIC DREAD RISK SURVEY
Phase One Neutral Psychometric Dread Risk Survey
This research instrument used ten Psychometric Dread Risk items and posed them as
questions concerning six hazards:
a) Aspirin
b) Vaccination
c) Smoking
d) Fossil fuels
e) Uranium mining
f) Nuclear reactor accidents
The following questions were asked separately for each hazard (x), but have been
condensed here.
Thinking of the risks associated with (x), please answer the following questions:
Do you think that this is the kind of risk where the consequences could be fatal?
(1 = No risk of fatality / 7 = High risk of fatality)
Is this the kind of risk you can learn to live with and rationally deliberate about, or one
that you dread? (1 = Calmly deliberate / 7 = Dread)
Do you think this kind of risk has the potential to become a catastrophe?
(1 = Low potential / 7 = High potential)
Do you think that any risk that may be posed from (x) extends to future generations?
(1 = This generation only / 7 = Many generations to come)
How easy or difficult would it be for you to reduce any risk you might face from (x)?
(1 = Extremely easy / 7 = Extremely difficult)
Do you think the risks from (x) are increasing, decreasing, or staying the same?
(1 = Decreasing / 4 = Staying the same / 7 = Increasing)
Do you think this kind of risk has the potential to have a global catastrophic impact?
(1 = small local impact / 7 = global catastrophic impact)
How much control do you think you personally have over avoiding possible risks to
yourself from (x)? (1 = Total control / 7 = No Control)
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Do you think that all people are impacted by this risk equally, or are some people more
at risk than others? (1 = Very equal / 7 = Not equal at all)
Do you think you have much choice over accepting any possible risks of (x)?
(1 = Completely my choice / 7 = No choice)
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Phase One Affective Psychometric Dread Risk Survey
This research instrument used ten Psychometric Dread Risk items and posed them as
questions concerning six hazards:
a) Aspirin
b) Vaccination
c) Smoking
d) Fossil fuels
e) Uranium mining
f) Nuclear reactor accidents
The following questions were asked separately for each hazard (x), but have been
condensed here.
Thinking of the risks associated with (x), please answer the following questions:
Do you feel that this is the kind of risk where the consequences could result in death?
(1 = No risk of death / 7 = High risk of death)
Is this the kind of risk you can learn to live with and rationally deliberate about, or one
that you dread and are terrified of? (1 = Calmly deliberate / 7 = Dread)
Do you feel this kind of risk has the potential to cause catastrophic death and
destruction? (1 = Low potential / 7 = High potential)
Do you feel that any risk that may be posed from (x) extends to the babies, children and
adults of future generations? (1 = This generation only / 7 = Many generations to come)
How easy or difficult would it be for you to reduce any danger you might face from (x)?
(1 = Extremely easy / 7 = Extremely difficult)
Do you feel the dangers of (x) are increasing, decreasing, or staying the same? (1 =
Decreasing / 4 = Staying the same / 7 = Increasing)
Do you feel the impact of this risk has the potential to be a very localised tragedy, or a
global catastrophe that brings misery and grief to millions? (1 = very local impact / 7 =
global catastrophic impact)
How much control do you feel you personally have over avoiding the possible dangers of
(x)? (1 = Total control / 7 = No Control)
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Do you feel that all people are impacted equally by this risk, or do some people suffer
more than others? (1 = Very equal / 7 = Not equal at all)
Do you feel you have much choice over accepting any possible risks from (x), such as
[Affective example]? (1 = Completely my choice / 7 = No choice)
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Phase Three Neutral Psychometric Dread Risk Survey
This research instrument used ten Psychometric Dread Risk items and posed them as
questions concerning six hazards:
a) Aspirin
b) Vaccination
c) Smoking
d) Fossil fuels
e) Uranium mining
f) Nuclear reactor accidents
The following questions were asked separately for each hazard (x), but have been
condensed here.

Think of the risks associated with (x). What comes to mind?
Now please answer the following questions:
Do you think that this is the kind of risk where the consequences could be fatal?
(1 = No risk of fatality / 7 = High risk of fatality)
Is this the kind of risk you can learn to live with and rationally deliberate about, or one
that you dread?
(1 = Calmly deliberate / 7 = Dread)
Do you think this kind of risk has the potential to become a catastrophe?
(1 = Low potential / 7 = High potential)
Do you think that any risk that may be posed from (x) extends to future generations?
(1 = This generation only / 7 = Many generations to come)
How easy or difficult would it be for you to reduce any risk you might face from (x)?
(1 = Extremely easy / 7 = Extremely difficult)
Do you think the risks from (x) are increasing, decreasing, or staying the same?
(1 = Decreasing / 4 = Staying the same / 7 = Increasing)
Do you think this kind of risk has the potential to have a global catastrophic impact?
(1 = small local impact / 7 = global catastrophic impact)
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How much control do you think you personally have over avoiding possible risks to
yourself from (x)?
(1 = Total control / 7 = No Control)
Do you think that all people are impacted by this risk equally, or are some people more
at risk than others?
(1 = Very equal / 7 = Not equal)
Do you think you have much choice over accepting any possible risks from (x)?
(1 = Completely my choice / 7 = No choice)
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Phase Three Affective Psychometric Dread Risk Survey
This research instrument used ten Psychometric Dread Risk items and posed them as
questions concerning six hazards:
a) Aspirin
b) Vaccination
c) Smoking
d) Fossil fuels
e) Uranium mining
f) Nuclear reactor accidents
The following questions were asked separately for each hazard (x), but have been
condensed here.
Think of the risks associated with (x) What comes to mind?
Now please answer the following questions:
Do you feel that this is the kind of risk where the consequences could result in death?
(1 = No risk of death / 7 = High risk of death)
Is this the kind of risk you can learn to live with and rationally deliberate about, or one
that you dread and are terrified of?
(1 = Calmly deliberate / 7 = Dread)
Do you feel this kind of risk has the potential to cause catastrophic death and
destruction?
(1 = Low potential / 7 = High potential)
Do you feel that any risk that may be posed by (x) extends to the babies, children and
adults of future generations?
(1 = This generation only / 7 = Many generations to come)
How easy or difficult would it be for you to reduce any danger you might face from (x)?
(1 = Extremely easy / 7 = Extremely difficult)
Do you feel the dangers of (x) are increasing, decreasing, or staying the same?
(1 = Decreasing / 4 = Staying the same / 7 = Increasing)
Do you feel the impact of this risk has the potential to be a very localized tragedy, or a
global catastrophe that brings misery and grief to millions?
(1 = very local impact / 7 = global catastrophic impact)
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How much control do you feel you personally have over avoiding the possible dangers of
(x)?
(1 = Total control / 7 = No Control)
Do you feel that all people are impacted equally by this risk, or do some people suffer
more than others?
(1 = Very equal / 7 = Not equal at all)
Do you feel you have much choice over accepting any possible risks from (x), such as
[Affective example]?
(1 = Completely my choice / 7 = No choice)
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APPENDIX B: RISK CONSEQUENCE TASK SURVEY
Phase One Neutral Risk Consequence Task

For each of the following questions, please select the number (1 to 7) that best represents
your opinion.
Please indicate how severe you think the consequences associated with the risk of taking
Aspirin are. (1 = Not Serious / 7 = Extremely Serious)
Please indicate how severe you think the consequences associated with the risk of
Vaccination are. (1 = Not Serious / 7 = Extremely Serious)
Please indicate how severe you think the consequences associated with the risk of
Smoking are. (1 = Not Serious / 7 = Extremely Serious)
Please indicate how severe you think the consequences associated with the risk of using
Fossil Fuels are. (1 = Not Serious / 7 = Extremely Serious)
Please indicate how severe you think the consequences associated with the risk of
Uranium Mining are. (1 = Not Serious / 7 = Extremely Serious)
Please indicate how severe you think the consequences associated with the risk of
Nuclear Reactor accidents are. (1 = Not Serious / 7 = Extremely Serious)
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Phase One Affective Risk Consequence Task

For each of the following questions, please select the number (1 to 7) that you feel best
represents your opinion.
How severe do you feel the consequences of taking Aspirin could be, such as the danger
of developing ulcers? (1 = Not Serious / 7 = Extremely Serious)
How severe do you feel the consequences of Vaccination could be, such as suffering
distressing symptoms like fever and vomiting?(1 = Not Serious / 7 = Extremely Serious)
How severe do you feel the consequences of Smoking could be, such as developing
cancer or heart disease? (1 = Not Serious / 7 = Extremely Serious)
How severe do you feel the consequences of using Fossil Fuels are, such as rising
pollution and toxic waste? (1 = Not Serious / 7 = Extremely Serious)
How severe you feel the consequences of Uranium Mining are, such as the possibility of
accidents during the transport of nuclear material? (1 = Not Serious / 7 = Extremely
Serious)
How severe you feel the consequences of Nuclear Reactor Accidents are, such as the
threat of radiation burns or developing cancer? (1 = Not Serious / 7 = Extremely
Serious)
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Phase Three Neutral Risk Consequence Task
This research instrument asked about three aspects of each of the six hazards:
1. Benefit
2. Harm
3. Consequence
Each of the hazards were preceded by a framing statement:


"Aspirin's benefits go far beyond the traditional treatment for aches and pains"



"Doctors say side-effect fears obscure vaccination benefits"



"Increasing obesity rate eliminates benefits from smoking cessation"



"Fossil fuels: Efficient, cheap, and have storage advantages"



“It is completely safe to consume fish, game and fruit from regions near operating
uranium mines and mills.”



"Nuclear power can be harnessed safely"

The following questions were asked separately for each hazard (x), but have been
condensed here.
Please think of the risks associated with (x) what comes to mind?
Now please answer the following questions:
How much of a benefit do you think (x) is?
(1 = No benefit / 7 = Great benefit)
How much harm do you think is caused by (x)?
(1 = No harm / 7 = Great Harm)
How severe do you think the consequences associated with the risk of (x) are?
(1 = Not Serious / 7 = Extremely Serious)
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Phase Three Affective Risk Consequence Task
This research instrument asked about three aspects of each of the six hazards:
4. Benefit
5. Harm
6. Consequence
Each of the hazards were preceded by an Affective framing statement and had differing
Affective wording. The survey is reproduced in full here.
Please read the following statement, and answer the questions below.
"Daily Aspirin use could be more harm than good"
After reading the statement above, how much harm do you think the use of Aspirin
causes?
(1 = No Harm / 7 = Great Harm)
How much Benefit do you think is associated with the use of Aspirin?
(1 = No Benefit / Great Benefit)
How severe do you feel the consequences of taking Aspirin could be, such as the danger
of
developing ulcers?

Please read the following statement, and answer the questions below.
"Autism-vaccine fear confounds scientific community"
After reading the statement above, how much harm do you think Vaccination causes?
(1 = No Harm / 7 = Great Harm)
How much Benefit do you think is associated with Vaccination?
(1 = No Benefit / Great Benefit)
How severe do you feel the consequences of Vaccination could be, such as suffering
distressing symptoms like fever and vomiting, or the anecdotal link to Autism?
(1 = Not Serious / 7 = Extremely Serious)
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Please Read the following statement, and answer the questions below.
"Risk of early death from smoking more severe than thought ..."
After reading the statement above, how much harm do you think is caused by Smoking?
(1 = No Harm / 7 = Great Harm)
How much of a Benefit do you think Smoking may be?
(1 = No Benefit / 7 = Great Benefit)
How severe do you feel the consequences of Smoking could be, such as developing
cancer or heart disease?
(1 = Not Serious / 7 = Extremely Serious)

Please Read the following statement, and answer the questions below.
"Governments Are Blind To Fossil Fuel Energy Risk"
After reading the statement above, how much harm do you think is caused by Fossil Fuel
use?
(1 = No harm / 7 = Great Harm)
How much Benefit do you think is associated with the use of Fossil Fuels?
(1 = No Benefit / 7 = Great Benefit)
How severe do you feel the consequences of using Fossil Fuels are, such as rising
pollution, polar melting, and toxic waste?
(1 = Not Serious / 7 = Extremely Serious)
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Please read the following statement and answer the questions below.
"Greenland Has Melted So Much That We Can Mine It for Uranium Now"
After reading the statement above, how much harm do you think is caused by the mining
of Uranium?
(1 = No harm / 7 = Great Harm)
How much of a benefit do you think the mining of Uranium is?
(1 = No benefit / 7 = Great benefit)
How severe you feel the consequences of Uranium Mining are, such as the possibility of
accidents during the transport of nuclear material?
(1 = Not Serious / 7 = Extremely Serious)

Please read the following statement, and answer the question below.
"Scientists Warn of Extreme Risk: Greatest Short term Threat to Humanity is from
Fukushima Nuclear Plant Fuel Pools"
After reading the statement above, how much harm do you think is caused by Nuclear
reactors, and potential accidents?
(1 = No harm / 7 = Great Harm)
How much of a benefit do you think Nuclear Reactors are?
(1 = No benefit / 7 = Great benefit)
How severe you feel the consequences of Nuclear Reactor Accidents are, such as the
threat of radiation burns or developing cancer?
(1 = Not Serious / 7 = Extremely Serious)
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APPENDIX C: PARTICIPANT INFORMATION FORM
The following information was made available to participants on an introductory screen
that displayed after participants clicked on the survey.

This study is about risk perception and how people estimate the impact of risks. People
judge risks based on their perception, which is a rapid process of forming and testing
ideas regarding what is being perceived.
The aim of the project is to examine the way that emotions influence our judgements of
risk consequences. You are a potential participant as a user of Amazon Mechanical Turk.
You will be asked to complete a simple survey. You may withdraw your participation at
any stage. Participants in the study will receive [amount specified] per survey completed
through Amazon Mechanical Turk.
The first survey involves indicating your opinion about certain risks. Remember, there
are no right or wrong answers. We are interested in your opinion. You can indicate your
opinion by selecting the number which best represents your opinion on a scale of 1 to 7.
The survey is easy to complete, and all the questions ask you to simply rank your opinion
by circling a number. The survey takes approximately [time specified] to complete, and
no further participation in the study is required.

This research project is being undertaken as part of the requirements of a PhD at Edith
Cowan University. Participation in the study is entirely voluntary and consent to
participate may be revoked at any stage without condition. The information gathered
about you by the investigator or obtained during the study will be held by the investigator
in strict confidence. All the people who handle your information will adhere to traditional
standards of confidentiality and will also comply with all relevant privacy legislation. In
Australia this is the Privacy Act 1988. The Ethics Committee has obtained assurances
from the investigator that the „Information Privacy Principles‟ laid down in the Act will
be met, and will oblige all involved to meet strict privacy standards. The Privacy Act
does not apply overseas but there is equivalent binding legislation in force in the USA,
the European Union and elsewhere. No reader will be able to identify individual
participants in any publication, report, or presentation arising from this study.
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APPENDIX D: PARTICIPANT CONSENT
The information on the following form was made available to participants. Participants
were able to confirm their consent to participate in the study by clicking on and ―Agree‖
button on the page which linked to the online survey site.
If you would like to participate in the study, please click on the “Agree” button below.
By pressing the agree button, I freely agree to participate in the above study. I have read
and understood the Participant Information and I have access to a copy of it. I
understand that I have the opportunity to ask questions about the study. I am aware that I
am free to contact the researcher if I have any further questions. I understand that the
study involves indicating my opinion on a set of statements in the online questionnaire. I
am aware that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time.
I understand that the information I provide will only be used for the purposes of this
research project. I am aware that the investigator of the study will adhere to usual
standards of confidentiality in the collection and handling of any personal information
and that the standards of the Privacy Act 1988 will apply to the way information is
handled.
Agree

Disagree

